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ABSTRACT
ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY AND IDENTITY CHANGE DURING THE
SYRIAN CIVIL WAR (2011-2019)
SAMER SHARANI
CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION, M.A. THESIS, JULY 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik
Keywords: Ontological Security, Identity Change, Civil War
This research probes into the relationship between identity change and ontological
security during the civil war in Syria, taking Salamiyah City as a case study. On-
tological security is defined as an expressive zone demarcating the relation between
the Self and the world; the wider this zone is, the more an individual or a group is
ontologically secure. It refers to the ability of an individual (or a group) to express
herself (itself) in the world, simply put. Contrary to the mainstream ontological
security theory, change in identity or in routine is not necessarily a threat; indeed,
ontological security is endorsed – exactly as identity – through change.
The research suggests that the collective of Salamiyah at the meso-level describes a
local identity (Salamiyah identity) more positively than it does the national identity
(Syrian identity) because the former fosters ontologically secure space more than
the latter, not because people hyper-identify themselves with their in-groups in civil
wars as the essentialists argue. Individuals also endorse – sometimes deliberately –
changes in their identities in order to increase their ontological security. That is, the
expressive zone is not confined to identity, but to other dimensions demarcating the
relation between the Self and the world. A change in identity does not necessarily
ignite ontological insecurity, the research argues.
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ÖZET
SURIYE İÇ SAVAŞI’NDA (2011-2019) ONTOLOJIK GÜVENLIK VE KIMLIK
DEĞIŞIMI
SAMER SHARANI
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü, Yüksek Lisans, TEMMUZ 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ontolojik Güvenlik, Kimlik Değişimi, İç Savaş
Bu çalışma, Suriye İç Savaşı süresince Selamiye kentini vaka araştırması alarak, on-
tolojik güvenlik ve kimlik değişimi arasındaki ilişkiyi derinlemesine inceliyor. Ontolo-
jik güvenlik kişinin kendisi ve dış dünya arasındaki ilişkinin tanımlayıcı bir bölgedeki
hududu olarak tanımlanır. Bu bölge ne kadar genişse, kişi veya grup o kadar ontolo-
jik güvendedir. Bu, kolay bir deyişle, kişinin veya grubun kendilerini yeryüzünde
ifade edebilme kabiliyetine işaret eder. Yaygın ontolojik güvenlik teorilerin aksine,
kimlikteki ve rutindeki değişim tehdit değildir; dahası değişim sürecinde, ontolojik
güvenliğin kendisi kimliği uygun görür.
Bu araştırma, Selamiye topluluğunun bölge düzeyinde, ulusal kimlikten (Öz Suriyeli)
ziyade daha olumlu bir yerel Selamiye (Öz Selamiyeli) kimliğini tanımladığını iddia
ediyor. Esensiyalistlerin, insanların iç savaş süresince kendi gruplarının kimliklerine
aşırı derecede bağlanır görüşünün aksine, bu çalışma Öz Selamiyeli olmak Öz Suriyeli
olmaktan daha çok ontolojik güvenlik alan teşvik eder görüşünü savunuyor. Bireyler
de ontolojik güvenliği artırmak için, bazen kasti olarak kendi kimliklerindeki değişimi
uygun görürler. Kısacası, tanımlayıcı bölge kimlikle sınırlandırılamaz, fakat kişinin
kendisi ile dış dünya arasındaki ilişki diğer birtakım boyutlarlarda sınırlandırabilir.
Bunlar, günlük aktiviteler, meşruiyet, güç ilişkileri, kolektif anlam sistemleri ve
özkimliktir. Araştırmanın savunduğu gibi kimlikteki herhangi bir değişim ontolojik
güvensizliği körüklemez.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social life during civil war still constitutes a black box needing further elaboration.
Generally, the literature on civil war can be divided into three categories: the lit-
erature that has soldiered on studying pre-civil war settings to explain the possible
factors that pave the way to eruption of civil war; other academic efforts have been
dedicated to probing into the aftermath phase of civil war; and finally the litera-
ture that has dug into the duration period of civil war in terms of its length (e.g.,
Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), and
severity (Lu and Thies 2011). Although these wide studies, the social changes that
take place during civil war and the dynamics of these changes require more elabo-
ration and investigation. This thesis theoretically and empirically probes into the
duration of civil war that has been burning Syria since 2011. It takes Salamiyah
City, which roughly lies at the center of Syria, as a case to unearth how the society
and its individuals change during the civil war. By doing so, this thesis investi-
gates the relationships between identity change and ontological security at both the
meso-level (collective) and individual level as the civil war is still being flamed.
During civil war, some groups are detached from their places, having displaced to
strange lands; relentless apprehension alters individuals’ behaviors and their secured
realm; some jobs are abolished while others prosper; and fear itself varies along the
course of war, as bullets become the object of fear instead of “ghosts” (e.g., Pearlman
2016). In other abstract words, the relations between groups within the same country
change to be either collaborative as they face mutual enemies or antagonistic as they
fight each other. The relations between individuals and the state also change, such
that the state may lose its legitimacy while religious institutions become legitimized
alternatively, for example. Power relations that once were dominating the society
may change as well, and new power-holders emerge. Meanings and the belief-systems
are also not averse to dramatic changes. New ideas and norms may be injected in
the society suffering a war and become adopted as new scaffolds for the meaning-
system in the society. Martyrdom, for example, come to the play intensively and
death stops to be seen as merely a loss but also a source of honour. Hence, the first
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question sought to be answered by this thesis is what are these changes?
Since this question is wide, I look into how the meso-level, collective-level that
is represented via Facebook public pages in Salamiyah City, depicts the duration
of civil war. What these pages say about all issues that are related to the war.
Qualitatively analyzing these pages will help us to discover the main “topics” or
themes that the collective of Salamiyah is concerned about. In parallel, at the
individual level, semi-structured interviews with individuals from Salamiyah will
show us how they perceive the structure of the society and how this perception has
changed before and after the outbreak of the war.
All these social and structural changes can lead to changes in identities at both the
collective level and individual level. Indeed, this thesis argues that identity can func-
tion as an anchor systemizing the wide array of these structural and social changes.
Therefore, after elaborating on these social, economic, and political changes, the
thesis seeks to reveal how identities have changed between two stages, before and
after the war eruption. Hence, the second question to be answered in this thesis
is: What are the changes that have taken place in identity at the individual and
collective levels?
Ontological security conceptual framework (which refers to the security of a being
or the security of identity) comes to the play because it helps us to grasp a more
comprehensive picture of the civil war duration – identity change nexus. Every
entity, either individual or collective, seeks to maintain and enhance its ontological
security. This thesis tries to discover how the social and structure changes and the
changes in identities are related to ontological security seeking behaviors. In other
words, the collective of and individuals in Salamiyah seek ontological security during
the war; how do they manage their ontological security as inevitable changes “wreck”
the previous “peaceful” life and strain their identities? Thus, the nexus of civil war
duration–identity changes– ontological security is what, eventually, this thesis probes
into. The final and basic research question can be formulated as follows: What are
the relationships between ontological security and identity change during civil war?
This thesis adopts a qualitative methodology to answer these questions. It uses
semi-structured interviews with individuals from Salamiyah to collect data, and
uses thematic analysis framework in order to analyze these collected data. To cap-
ture the necessary data at the meso/collective level, Facebook public pages that
concern about and represent Salamiyah were analyzed by using also the framework
of thematic analysis.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter is the literature review;
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it reviews and systematically – as much as possible – analyzes the literature on
the three pillar of the nexus under concern: duration of civil war, identity change,
and ontological security. At the end of this chapter, I suggest an adjusted model
of ontological security by building on both identity change literature and Giddens’s
(1991) account. Then the methodology will be presented in the next chapter. I
will justify the choice of adopting qualitative method and thematic analysis. I also
describe Salamiyah as a case-study and why I chose it, and explain in detail how
the data were collected and analyzed. The next chapter will set forth the discussion
and the analysis of the data at both the meso- and individual levels. The main
themes will be presented and elaborated on, besides the results that emanate from
the analysis. The final chapter is the conclusion chapter. It summarizes the basic
results and suggestions of this thesis.
3
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature widely addresses that civil wars do not only engender death, dis-
placement, and misery, but they also change societies where they take place. Civil
war-induced “social change” is almost an amorphous concept, difficult to be framed
with concrete and precise conceptual properties especially during the war. There-
fore, this review seeks to narrow and systemize the academic research on changes
during civil war by elaborating on three topics, as follows.
First, civil war and violence will be discussed through the lens of their processes
that befall societies and social groups with changes. Why and how do civil war and
violence lead to a change? what is that change? How does literature depict this
change during civil war?
Second, I will argue that tracing identity change could be a better way to systemize
social change during civil war instead of dealing with change as a set of scattered,
non-systemized aspects in a society. In this vein, identity will be depicted through
three levels: individual identity, collective identity, and intersection between collec-
tive and individual levels. In each level, I will delineate how identity is defined and
how it changes.
Third, I will depict ontological security framework as a “mechanism” that helps us
grasp the whole relations between the circumstances and processes during a civil
war and possible identity changes. Ontological security will be delineated as it has
been conceptualized in the literature on political science (and IR), then Giddens’s
conceptualization of ontological security will be discussed since his theoretical model
is the source from which the ontological security concept has been diffused. Finally,
I suggest an adjusted theoretical model of ontological security by tapping onto the
incompatibilities between Giddens’s account and the mainstream theory of ontolog-
ical security, on the one hand, and by incorporating the theories on identity changes
into our conceptualization of ontological security, on the other hand.
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2.1 Civil War
In this section, I will depict how the literature has addressed the duration of civil
wars. How civil wars change or impact societies as they are happening, and how we
can delineate the period of civil war’s duration conceptually are what this section,
mainly, aims at clarifying.
2.1.1 Civil War as a Social Process
Civil war is a prevalent bloody political violence that destroys people’s lives in the
contemporary world. Civil war is a cascade of devastating actions that emerge within
a home-country, defined as “[an] armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized
sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of
the possibilities” (Kalyvas 2006a, 17). Warring parties, then, belong to the same
state; they may be different political parties; government and rebels; or adjacent
social, or ethnic groups that had lived together without obvious physical violence
before the war onset. Those fighting parties contest over a territory; governance;
political, social, or economic interests; or over material or symbolic goals (Themnér
and Wallensteen 2014).
Old studies have generally pictured the warring parties in civil wars as ethnic (or
sectarian, religious) groups that are centered around their in-group identities in order
to fight the Others, who are different ethnic or religious groups. This argument,
which can be labelled as “essentialist,” draws on the necessity of identity groups to
commence a collective action that will lead to a civil war. Such an identity group
is essential because a clearly defined group is the subject of frustration that will
engender aggression against the Others, those who caused the frustration (Horowitz
1973). Additionally, an identity group is a necessary condition for mobilization,
without which civil war will not get off the ground (Nagel and Olzak 1982). This
essential understanding of civil war, in sum, argues that civil wars happen between
identity groups, and the battle front is clearly determined between these different
ethnic or religious groups (see for example, Gurr and Scarritt 1989). As a result,
individuals’ identification within the in-group will increase during civil wars.
Nevertheless, Kalyvas (among others) has argued against this essentialist under-
standing of civil war (Kalyvas 2001, 2006b, 2012). According to him, conflicting
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parties should not be understood as unified, homogeneous parties that are identical
to “pure” ethnic or religious groups. Various and conflicting rebel sub-groups act
on the rebel side, and different actors may co-exist and infight with each other on
the government’s side as well, in case of a rebels-government conflict. Besides that,
individuals from the same ethnic or religious group could fight each other by taking
the side of various ethnic or religious groups that differ from their in-groups. This
understanding of Kalyvas can be labeled as non-essentialist.
Digging deeper in the conceptualization of civil war makes us elude its reduction to
the conflicting parties. The phenomenon of civil war is neither confined to objects
over which parties fight, nor to the fighting itself. Rather it is a complicated phe-
nomenon that surpasses the mere fighting to be rooted in a social narrative that
nourishes and justifies the war and the resulted catastrophe. This social narrative is
called “conflict ethos” which is “shared central societal beliefs” that equip the social
groups (whom the warring parties claim representations and fighting for) with the
discursive tools to understand the ongoing civil war, to picture the enemy-Other in
a way that justifies killing, and to hold a positive image of the Self (Schori-Eyal,
Halperin, and Bar-Tal 2014).1 Civil war, therefore, has two basic scaffolds: (1)
violence as its material, tangible scaffold; and (2) a social narrative(s), the conflict
ethos, as the discursive, emotional, and cognitive immaterial scaffold. Hence, Ka-
lyvas (2008) asserts that war is not only violence (thus, confined to its conflicting
parties); it is a social process.
Civil war develops as a social process along various phases. It does not get off the
ground suddenly, but rather it is begotten throughout a cascade of events. These
phases can be drawn from wide literature and re-ordered into a timeline: (1) pre-war
phase or “peaceful" relations between the citizens; (2) demonstrations; (3) repres-
siveness by the state; (4) violence conducted by the would-be rebels; (5) ethnic
mobilization; and (6) institutionalization of the violence.
“Peaceful” relations between citizens fail to stand out for different reasons (which
are out of this thesis’s scope); the government increasingly uses political violence
against would-be demonstrators, real demonstrators, and would-be rebels. This
repressive trend, in turn, ignites angry people to take up weapons, and a bloodier
level of killing ensues as the political violence proceeds; thus, the situation passes
the threshold to be considered as a civil war (Besley and Persson 2011; Joshi and
Quinn 2017; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014). As a civil war progresses, ethnic
mobilization (sometimes class-based mobilization or another type of mobilization)
1It is worthy to note that conflict ethos could exist before the eruption of civil war as dormant awaiting
the high level of violence to break out. Conflict ethos can also emerge as a new one that is built or hinged
upon a previous one.
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is activated as the essentialists would argue. Although, at the very nascent phase of
civil war, rebels exist across heterogeneous ethnic groups (or social identity groups),
homogeneous ethnic groups become the fostering environment for rebellion, later
(Lewis 2017). With the diffusion of the internally displaced people (IDPs), hatred
becomes intensively overwhelming among the “rival” ethnic/social groups and those
who once were neighbors become now enemies, and violence is increasingly fueled
(Balcells 2018).
Additionally, new institutions emerge as institutions of violence, competing with
other institutions such as police and traditional local authorities. Violence, hence,
becomes institutionalized in life, more brutal or “unlawful.” For example, raping
becomes an institutionalized action that is conducted as a frightening show in public
spheres, not hidden in dark basements by masked men (Kalyvas 2006a,b). This
institutionalization of violence is what paves the way for individuals from the same
in-group to join various, and sometimes warring parties (non-essentialist under-
standing of civil war). Because these new institutions can function as if they were
independent from ethnic groups and other social entities. Along this progress of
violence, what were used to be social norms and expected behaviors in everyday life
may not hold anymore, while certain values, such as masculinity, arise to dominate
(Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Creppell 2011; Hoover Green 2016; Kanazawa and Still
2000; Reichardt 2013). In few words, civil war/violence itself continuously changes
and steers the society to change along the war’s course. Civil war/violence is neither
one constant phase, nor is it a simple phenomenon.
The social process of civil war is dynamic and complex. We can find highly organized
violence (e.g., organized rebel groups) and less organized violence (e.g., youth gangs
having sympathy to one warring party) functioning together in the same civil war.
Violence does not evolve linearly in the course of civil war (Cunningham and Lemke
2014); it is complex and non-linear. Moreover, those who apply violent strategies
and those who persist on applying non-violent strategies to achieve their goals co-
exist during the same civil war; similarly, victimized and non-victimized people live
adjacent to each other (Daly 2012; Henry 2011; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Each
part of this complex picture impacts the course of civil war/violence in different
ways, which gives rise to the dynamism and complexity of the civil war phenomenon
(e.g., see Galtung (1995) for the difference between violence and non-violence’s social
impacts).
Analytically speaking, the distinction between violence and civil war is essential to
establish the civil war concept as a social process. Civil war and violence are not
identical (Kalyvas 2006a, 19), so what is the relationship between them? Violence is
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a “tool” functioning to achieve specific goals within the civil war as Kalyvas argues
(2006a). Differently put, civil war is more than violence. Most importantly, violence
is implemented to reshape people behaviors in a way that serves the actors’ interests
by creating a constant fear (Kalyvas 2006a,b). However, this tool (violence) is not
ultimately and freely used, otherwise it would backfire. Government, for example,
utilizes (not overuses) violence against the “civilian” groups to which the insurgents
belong in order to show that it still has enough power. So, government - optimally -
seeks to control its own violence; only rebels are its target, not the whole rebels’ social
group. However, this controlling of violence (called selective violence) changes along
the course of war as the actual power of government varies (Bhavnani, Miodownik,
and Choi 2011; Kalyvas 2006b). This is to say, violence is the first scaffold of civil
war.
This argument leads us to the second scaffold adherent to the civil war phenomenon:
social narrative. Violence exists through events that occur in specific times and
places. What makes the effects of these events impact those who are not directly
affected by them and impact the society as a whole is the narrative of the war. This
narrative is what extends the pure, limited violent “events” into an unseen milieu
saturating the whole society. In this vein, Weinstein (2006) describes rebellions as
diffusing “rumor[s]” (Weinstein 2006, 1). Not the tangible events per se are what
imbue civil war with its changing effects over a society, but the discursive milieu
(which starts as a rumor then turns into a robust narrative) in which these events
spring up because it gives meanings to these events. Generally, social narrative that
is used in civil war (or the conflict ethos) justifies the war; delegitimizes the Other
by de-humanizing it; glorifies the Self and the group of belonging (in-group); and
alludes to the desired, pre-designed peace which is nothing more than the desired
victory (Bar-Tal and Alon 2016).
In sum, civil war is a social process with the following qualities: (1) its properties
and effects change as the civil war proceeds; (2) it is dynamic and complex; and (3)
two pillars (violence and social narrative) scaffold it.
Perceiving civil war as a social process entails that a society – in a point of time
– is transformed into a war; civil war is not something that exogenously inflicts
societies from outside, “the conflict process is endemic to society [. . .] and is
self-contained and self-generated,” Lichbach and Gurr (1981, 4) assert. Literature,
directly or indirectly, indicates how pre- civil war’s social/political structure (social
network, economic stratification, values and norms, accumulated human and physi-
cal capital) is transformed into a civil war. Just to mention a few of these structural
transformations: various levels of income disparity among individuals; level of GDP
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per capita all over the country; richness in natural lootable resources; relationship
types between ethnic groups; and various ways of experiencing grievance are trans-
formed into different levels of civil war severity and different types of rebellion as
well (Braithwaite, Dasandi, and Hudson 2016; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004;
Lu and Thies 2011; Mosinger 2018; Nwankwo 2015; Oyefusi 2007; Weinstein 2006;
Zeira 2019). Collective emotion, too, is transformed from fear to anger (Pearl-
man 2013), and so do values from civilians-values to combatants-values (Berger
2019; Kaplan 2013a). Therefore, it is more precisely to think of “social changes
through/via/channeled by” civil war than “social changes derived/caused/led by”
civil war. More precisely, civil war can be understood as constitutive.
2.1.2 Social Changes Channeled by Civil War
The transformative process of civil war constitutes changes in a society during and
after civil war. Put differently, some properties of a society should differ between
two stages: before civil war, on the one hand, and during and after civil war, on the
other hand. In this section, I will depict how this change has been demarcated in
literature, and what the missing elements are as well.
Civil war changes identities (who are we?) of groups. Kalyvas went further con-
tending that civil war might generate new collective identities as it contributes to
changing how groups perceive themselves, and how they construe the meanings
and the picture they uphold on themselves and on the world (Kalyvas 2006a, 80).
Groups, because of the traumatic events, recompose their identities emotionally in
order to cope with unfamiliar daily events, and rationally to adjust their beliefs
and norms to fit into the emerging violent situation they –themselves- are engaged
in. In other words, groups’ identities change because of seeking survival, to escape
victimization, or to launch violence against those who form a threat (Brubaker and
Laitin 1998; Kalyvas 2006b; Petersen 2012).
Individual identity (who am I?) also changes. As violence becomes prevalent in
everyday banal life, individuals cope with it by normalizing it. Individuals create
or prime certain values within their inner selves in order to perceive the violence
as normal, expected, and a part of their daily lives (Munck 2008). Thus, values
change and so do individual identities. Besides changing values, some scholars have
indicated how group’s members add qualifiers to their identities to adapt to a civil
war (Kalyvas 2008). For example, some individuals can define themselves as mod-
erate Muslims instead of Muslims in a context of civil war between Muslims and
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non-Muslims.
Changes in identity also springs up within the same identity group during a civil
war. That happens throughout engendering new cleavages at the local level among
individuals who belong to the same group, because of an old hatred and the desire to
take revenge, or simply to take advantages over others. Some individuals utilize the
macro-cleavages (around which the civil war originally was erupted) to serve their
own intentions by transforming these cleavages into micro-cleavages within their
in-group (Kalyvas 2001, 2006b; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). For example, some indi-
viduals, who belong to an ethnic group X, may join a strong militia which represent
an enemy ethnic group Y. They do, then, fight their own ethnic group in order to
take revenge for their previous marginalization. This case leads to change in identity
within the in-group by creating different “selves,” (non-essentialist understanding of
civil war).
Another strand of the academic literature has focused on civil war-channeled change
that happens at the structural level (not identity). Structure refers to the funda-
mental endured aspects of a society; these aspects are deep, last for a long time, and
do not unfold directly in front of observer’s eyes (Baber 1991). In a more tangible
sense, structure points to: (1) norms and symbols that incorporate individuals’ be-
haviors with meanings and control these behaviors in terms of what is allowed and
what is not; (2) power that indicates the societal stratification and resources distri-
butions in terms of political and economic seizure of resources; and (3) legitimacy
that gives a consensual right to some institutions (and people) to punish deviant
behaviors (Giddens 1989).
Looking at structure as the location of civil war-channeled change has been a topic
of academic research for a long time. Thompson (1931) addressed the change in the
society’s socio-economic structure during the American Civil War in the Southern
States. He showed how those who previously occupied a higher social status turned
down to a lower status as new individuals scaled up the social stratification, because
new jobs erected to meet new needs of the war while traditional jobs declined.
Recently, Kalyvas contends that violence in civil war is produced by removing and
destroying what was – before the war – a traditional mechanism of control (Kalyvas
2006a). Civil war changes norms that hinder violent deeds and promotes other
values that ignite aggressive actions; thus, norms (allowed and not allowed) and
their meanings are altered. Civil war, also, changes social power by removing the
traditional social power from elderly people to young people, who usually take up
weapons (Kalyvas 2006a, 55-58).
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Other scholars have focused on changes that take place in social capital as another
facet of structural changes (indicated basically by social trust), positively or neg-
atively. Weidmann and Zürcher (2013) argue that intensive violence in civil war
erodes social trust among the same local community as individuals who tend to use
violence at the banal life level enormously dominate the society (Miguel, Saiegh, and
Satyanath 2011). By contrast, Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014) argue that so-
cial cohesion increases when local community is exposed to violence perpetrated by
outsiders. Congruently, Kuol (2014) finds that social capital of a local community
(trust and cohesion) is contingent on the violence conductors’ identity: If they are
from within the local community, social capital fades away, while strange conductors
strengthen the social capital within the local community.
The above mentioned literature does not provide a consent picture of structural
changes in civil war. On the one hand, civil war is described as “development in
reverse” since it destroys the human capital, which results in a deep and difficult-to-
heal damage in society (Collier and Duponchel 2013; Lai and Thyne 2007). On the
other hand, civil war can incite positive changes in the societal structure, such as in
some cases, women have become productive at the core of their societies, politically,
socially, and economically after being marginalized for a long time (Ingiriis and
Hoehne 2013; Kuol 2014). In other words, norms, power, and legitimacy could be
shifted in a positive way as well as in a negative way.
Therefore, we see again that dynamism and complexity constitute the deep nature of
social changes though civil war. Although women participation in political and eco-
nomic spheres is a positive change per se, it may emit negative consequences. Men
find themselves jobless as they come back from battle fields; hence, they tend to ex-
pand the fighting operations and violence as long as possible (Demeritt, Nichols, and
Kelly 2014). Social networks and social capital, also, do not always change in a clear
direction as depicted above. Civil war re-mixes and conflates social networks in a
complicated way as a function of displaced people: Individuals who belong to polar-
ized identity groups could find themselves working in the same place or living in the
same neighborhood, namely, they would find mutual interests to defend (Lehmann
2009). This dynamism is amply elaborated by Kane (1997). She argues that sym-
bols and cultural elements’ meanings (which boost the norms and symbols of the
structure) are contested between society members during crisis. This contestation
over “re-interpreting” cultural elements (norms and symbols) is ambiguous and un-
certain in terms of its consequences. That is, a new meaning injected into the system
of symbols and social practices would lead to changes in other connected meanings,
which we cannot predict. This happens because culture is a whole connected system
having its autonomous entity. A change in one side leads to unpredicted changes in
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many other cultural sides.
To sum up, changes through civil war are traced on two planes: identity (individual
and collective) and structure. The change’s process is dynamic and complex; could
be positive or negative; and is eventually anchored in the meaning dimension of self
and culture. Nevertheless, identity and structure changes are mostly depicted as two
separate fields of change. The systemized link between the two is missing (we will
see later why it is important to bridge them). Moreover, the presented literature
either does not specify the period of change, post-civil war or during civil war, or
clearly confines its scope to the aftermath of civil war. In what follows, I will set
forth how another strand of the literature has delineated changes during civil war.
2.1.3 Social Changes During Civil War
Capturing changes in identity and structure during civil war is an arduous task
because these changes are fluid (King 2004) and fast in pace. In this section, I will
depict the scholarship that has focused on changes during civil war specifically.
Munif (2013) approaches civil war duration from the hegemony perspective. Hege-
mony, simply, refers to power or social narrative installed into a society (so, it is
interwoven in and by the society culture),2 determining how citizens perceive objects
in the political and social world around them. It saturates social objects with a sense
of nature: political order, state building-model, state ideology, socio-economic strat-
ification, gender-based division of labour, and the like seem to be natural; hence,
not radically challengeable. According to Munif (2013) duration of civil war is not
only entangled with hegemony, but also this duration is determined by hegemony
(along other features). As long as a hegemony is contested without setting a new
“dominant” hegemony, civil war continues.
Other scholars have studied civil war duration by probing into emotions’ change
since war requires anger, frustration, and (maybe) fear. Emotions could drive peo-
ple’s behaviors to fight, prolonging civil war, or to compromise and reach peace
with the rivals, shortening the war duration. In this vein, emotions do not flee
freely to be picked up by individuals. Rather, emotions – to some extent – lurk
2Hegemony, the concept that is taken from Gramsci (1999), is ethical-political domination (p.161) that is
not only and merely imposed upon the society, but also is shaped by the interaction between the civil
society’s culture and the elite’s (ruler) institutions or the state’s “culture” as Gramsci calls it (p.12). The
hegemony is enrooted in a society when a consensus over this ethical-political discourse develops to be
accepted by the majority and incorporated in the society’s culture.
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in the collective cultural repertoire to which individuals belong (Bar-Tal, Halperin,
and De Rivera 2007; Pearlman 2016). Hence, different cultures produce different
emotional responses to violence, so duration of civil wars may vary from a culture
to another ceteris paribus (close to this discussion, see (Galtung 1990, 1995)). For
example, a masculine culture that glorifies honor by revenging may prime anger
more than fear when harm is befallen on someone. On the contrary, a liberal-like
culture may incite frustration more than anger as a response to the harm. However,
this strand in the literature (regarding the role of culture in relation to emotion and
hegemony) is limited and needs more discussion, yet it is not ignorable.
Kalyvas, on the other hand, partly explains duration of civil war as a function of one
need, survival (Kalyvas 2006a, 124). What happens during a civil war is derived by
an omnipresent motive which is seeking survival. All other motives, such as meeting
ethical norms, seeking power, protecting identities come secondary.
Besides the strands of culture and survival, other significant literature has ap-
proached civil war duration from the actors’ angle. Not surprisingly, actors of a
conflict (rebels, government, civilians, and paramilitary) are more tangible and ob-
servable objects to be studied in such a period. So, civil war duration has been
analyzed as a function of actors.
Four actors have been defined by scholars: state/government, paramilitary (semi-
official troops backing the state), rebels, and civilians. Civil war is mutually pro-
duced by all these actors (Kalyvas 2006b), and is complicated – partly at least–
because no one actor is unified and homogenous (Orjuela 2005; Pearlman 2009).
Heterogeneous sub-groups act among rebels, civil society organizations, and state’s
side. These sub-groups could infight to maximize their self- interests, and even they
might collaborate with other sides (Lyall 2010; Staniland 2012), which lead to a
prolonged duration.
Briefly speaking, rebellion – civil war duration nexus has been elaborated in terms
of rebels’ unification, their organizational capacity, and their strategy to fulfill their
goals (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom
2004; Pearlman 2012). The more the rebels are unified, the shorter the civil war is.
Civilians and civil communities, on the other hand, have been studied by Kaplan
(2012, 2013b, 2017) as an active party in civil wars. Civilian actors deal with both
warring parties (the rebels and the state) to neutralize themselves during the war,
and they may participate in implanting peace seeds amidst the violence, shortening
the war duration. This “civic” ability to neutralize communal locals from war is
basically contingent on the strength of their collective identity and social capital
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(trust) (Bramoullé and Kranton 2007; Southwick and Kaplan 2016).
In terms of government-rebels interaction, this nexus is not limited to violence and
fighting.3 Some studies, for example, have shown that legitimacy (a structure’s com-
ponent) is mutually re-produced between government and its rivals! Both parties
overlap in applying their sovereignty and legitimacy in different sectors (education,
health, etc.) in the same region (Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra 2017; Klem and Mau-
naguru 2017). Moreover, and paradoxically, rebels may mimic state legitimacy in
their own stronghold areas (Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra 2017; Klem and Maunaguru
2017), which shifts people’s view of the conflict from being an “emancipatory” in-
surgency to a merely grappling over power.
Finally, paramilitary is the troop that keeps the state clean from conducted human
rights abuses, seeking to suppress the rebels and their supporters. However, paramil-
itary often reduces the state legitimacy in front of state supporters’ eyes since power
is shared between the state and the paramilitary (Staniland 2012).
To this end, civil war duration is depicted as a function of the war actors and their
relationships. For example, if rebels adopt guerrilla warfare tactics, civilians might
suffer more than the case of conventional war with clear-cut fronts (Balcells and
Kalyvas 2014) (or the reverse (Krcmaric 2018)). Therefore, civilian victimization
would decrease (or increase); thus, the civilians’ legitimization of both the state and
the rebels, social norms, and their relations with powerful institutions will change.
The literature, then, represents duration of civil war as a function of actors; function
of survival; and function of culture (hegemony and emotion). However, it does
not tell us enough how these variables lead to social change. Differently put, the
mechanism that sutures survival, actors, culture (more precisely, some elements of
culture) and social change during civil war together needs more clarification.
To sum up, civil war is a social process through which society endorses an unavoid-
able change. Such change is endogenously engendered as societal structures are
transformed through the process of the civil war. Civil war, then, is a transforma-
tive process of society. This transformation is dynamic and complex, and rests on
two pillars that – indeed – compose civil war: violence and social narrative.
Violence, which is a material (or tangible) event-based tool, aims at creating fear, re-
imposing power of the parties, and reshaping people’s behaviors. Social narrative,
which is an immaterial discourse-based tool, imbues the war with meanings, on
the other hand. However, understanding civil war as a social-transformative process
3It is worthy to note that civil war duration is not only about how long the war is, but also about what is
going on in this period. This thesis is concerned about the latter more than the former.
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pushes us not to describe violence and social narrative as merely tools or instruments
of such wars; rather they constitute simultaneously (1) a milieu in which the social
transformation takes place and (2) tools to stimulate this transformation.
Changes in society are the observable aspects of this transformative process. The
literature shows that changes throughout civil war are observed in both identity
(individual and collective) and structure.
Regarding changes in identity, the relations between Self (in-group) and Other (out-
groups) become more radicalized as war outbreaks (essentialists argue). Addition-
ally, in-group becomes divided between different sub-groups in terms of how the
group members understand themselves, their group, their relations with the others,
and the conflict itself; viz., an identity– group does not remain one unified group
during a civil war, but many disputes within it may emerge (non-essentialist under-
standing of civil war). In other words, Other is not only limited to out-groups, but
also new Others can be generated within the in-group or the collective Self, creating
“other-Selves,” to borrow Lupovici (2014a) expression.
With respect to identity change, we find that: values upheld by individuals and
groups; emotions; and meaning-systems change. These changes, worthy to mention,
are not only generated by reaction from “passive” groups/individuals (who are not
actively participants in the war) who struggle to only survive, but they also come
out from those who decidedly become aggressive, the active actors.
On the other hand, changes in social structure are traced along three dimensions:
the symbols of the culture and the social norms (meaning’s dimension); power’s
relations, and political and economic institutions; and the legitimacy that are held
by the state and the traditional societal configurations. These changes could be
negative or positive, normatively. 4
These changes (in identity and structure) are either approached as general changes
channeled or constituted by civil war or clearly demarcated aftermath civil wars as
a time frame. Other literature has approached changes occurring during civil wars
as a time frame. In this vein, civil war duration has been depicted as: (1) a function
of survival; (2) a function of culture (indicated by hegemony and emotions); and (3)
as a function of actors and their complicated relations. How these variables affect
or facilitate change during a civil war needs more clarification.
To this end, it will be useful to explicitly address the contributions to the literature
4Structure is not something tangible; it is immaterial, and only instantiated by observable actions as defined
by Giddens (1991) and Wendt (1987). Therefore, meaning is the latent variable that changes as structure
changes. Meaning is alluded by culture and symbols of structure but not limited to.
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this thesis seeks to do.
Firstly, this thesis will try to draw a systematic and comprehensive view as much as
possible on what happens during a civil war by looking at the changes at the levels
of identity and structure. Secondly, it seeks to explain identity changes during civil
war by incorporating identity theories into the conceptual framework of civil war
duration. That is, the literature on civil war usually explains identity’s changes by
using the concepts of civil war (e.g., frustration that is related to an identity-group)
but not by using the concepts that inherently belong to identity theories. Therefore,
this thesis tries to use the concepts of identity theories in order to explain how and
why identity may changes during a civil war. The next chapter will discuss the
identity theories extensively.
Thirdly, this thesis aspires to systematically bridge the structure and identity the-
oretical concepts together to study the duration of civil war. As mentioned above,
changes during civil war are observed at two levels: identity and structure. Bridg-
ing these two together in order to have a whole comprehensive (and systematic)
understanding of changes during civil war is a worthy endeavor. Indeed, identity
(collective or individual) springs up within structure, and the two are inextricable
(e.g., Giddens 1989, 1991). More importantly, this separation between identity and
structure could be misleading when we study civil war because of the very nature of
such conflicts. Many scholars have contended that conflict (and civil war, more par-
ticularly) is complex and ambiguous in its very nature (Berger 2019; Brubaker and
Laitin 1998; Granzow, Hasenclever, and Sändig 2015; Kalyvas 2001, 2003), so we
need to account for identity and structure together to properly study this complex
phenomenon.
To dig deeper in this point, I will delineate what complexity means. The basic
idea of a complex social system is the negation of the ceteris paribus notion. When
a factor changes, all other factors change, nothing remains constant as any single
thing changes. This case is very prevalent in social phenomena because – partly at
least - we cannot define a concept as ontologically distinct from other concepts; i.e.,
the boundaries of a concept is permeable and porous. “Legitimacy,” for example,
is inherently – not independently – interwoven with many other concepts (Byrne
2005; Jervis 1997; Little 1993). In other words, we need to approach civil war
and social change as one whole system. Therefore, the best approach to deal with
this complexity (in social science generally) is to bring the two interactive levels
together: micro- and macro-levels, identity (at individual or collective level) and
structure as various scholars have asserted (Cederman and Vogt 2017; Chandra
2006; Elster 1982; Gerring 2010; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Jepperson and Meyer
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2011; Kalyvas 2003, 2012; King 2004; Little 2015; Norton 2014; Tilly 2001).
In order to capture effectively and parsimoniously the interaction between micro-
and macro-level and between identity and structure, we need to find a conceptual
framework that can function as a “mechanism” suturing these levels together (e.g.,
King 2004; Tilly 2001). I argue that ontological security framework will be helpful
in this regard because it basically studies the security of the being in its relations to
the world and to the others. The third section in this chapter, therefore, will depict
ontological security framework.
Figure 2.1 below represents the main concepts that are discussed in this section.
Figure 2.1 Concepts Map of Civil War – Change
2.2 Identity Change
Delineating the mechanisms and processes of identity changes would enhance our
understanding of how changes happen during civil wars. Two points should be
asserted here. First, measuring or operationalizing changes in identity speculates
that identity indicates the deepest, the most lasting, and systemized changes in
a society(de la Sablonnière 2017; Kranton 2016). Identity helps to filter out the
superficial changes, or those changes which are temporary and not able to stand
by themselves when the war ends. However, change in identity does not mean that
changes in structures are ignored since both types of change are not separable as we
will see in this section and the next one.
Second, I will depict identity theories on three levels, focusing on how change is the-
orized at individual, collective, and in-between (individual–collective) levels. Pre-
senting these three levels will serve two goals: (1) having a comprehensive view of
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identity change concepts; and (2) revealing how these three levels interact, which
meets the requirements of complex phenomena studies.
2.2.1 Individual Identity and Marcia Model
Individual identity spins around the question of “who am I?” Identity is neither
merely the answer, nor the question itself; it is both. James Marcia, and Erik
Erikson before him, defined individual identity as self-awareness, self-perception,
and self-imagination of one’s self (cf. Cieciuch and Topolewska 2017). If someone
could not develop a sense of him/herself, s/he would have no identity, suffering
from psychological disorders. 5 An important development of identity concept
has blossomed by Marcia’s seminal works, who has developed the Identity Statuses
Model (or Marcia Model), expanding the identity definition to be a dynamic, not a
static awareness of the self.
Marcia Model delineates identity as a process of developmental self-awareness. Iden-
tity develops along two dimensions: exploration and commitment. The exploration
dimension refers to efforts an individual exerts to discover possible values that will be
upheld; possible beliefs on the world and the others; and possible goals of his/her life.
The exploration dimension is about discovering possible identity elements. On the
other hand, the commitment dimension refers to an individual’s conformity to the
identity elements s/he has already adopted. An individual is committed to his/her
identify by clearly addressing certain goals, values, and beliefs (Kroger, Martinussen,
and Marcia 2010; Marcia and Josselson 2013; Marcia 2002; Marcia and Archer 1993;
Schwartz 2004).
These two dimensions generate four identity statuses: (1) Those individuals who
exert a high level of exploration, then conform highly to the explored identity’s ele-
ments are in the achievement status; (2) those who exert a high level of exploration,
but did not yet decide about what to adopt – i.e., they have only a low level of
commitment – are in the moratorium status; (3) those who show a high level of
commitment to their identity’s elements, but only a scant effort has been devoted
to explore other possible elements (low level of exploration) are in the foreclosure
status; finally (4) those who do not commit seriously to any values, goals, and beliefs
5Identity and self are not identical. Identity - in this thesis - refers to a sense of self; hence, any human
being has a self, but not necessarily an identity. A schizophrenia patient has a self, but s/he lacks the
sense of his/her“self” as well as a sense of reality (Parnas et al. 2005). The scope of this thesis stops at
the borders of schizophrenia, we assume at least a minimum sense of self. It is worthy to note that when
I write Self - with an upper case - I mean sense of self.
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(low level of commitment) and do not exert any important effort to explore possible
identity’s elements (low level of exploration) are in the diffusion status (Bilsker and
Marcia 1991; Crocetti et al. 2013; Kroger, Martinussen, and Marcia 2010; Marcia
and Josselson 2013; Marcia 2002; Marcia and Archer 1993).
Figure 2.2 Marcia Model
Achievement and moratorium statuses are called progressive or high statuses,
whereas foreclosure and diffusion statuses are called regressive or low statuses
(Kroger, Martinussen, and Marcia 2010; Slugoski, Marcia, and Koopman 1984). An
achievement status - especially - is associated with a higher level of well-being. It im-
plies that someone has more control over him/herself and life, higher levels of caring
of him/herself and others, and more self-esteem. Moratorium status paves the way
for the self to discover new identity’s elements to be integrated into the inner realm
of the Self. Generally, both of the moratorium and achievement statuses(progressive
statuses) enriches the identity. Foreclosure status, on the other hand, does not allow
someone for developing his/her ideal astray from the traditional or political author-
ity and the related “sacred” identity’s elements. For individuals of the foreclosure
status, adapting to and adopting new ideas and changes in life become an obstinate
track and a source of anxiety. Finally, diffusion status points to a careless person,
such that s/he does neither care of him/herself nor of others, and significantly s/he
lives in void of meanings (Årseth et al. 2009; Bilsker and Marcia 1991; Cieciuch and
19
Topolewska 2017; Crocetti et al. 2013; Marcia 2002; Schwartz 2004).
Apparently from the names, progressive statuses (achievement and moratorium)
denote a more coherent and richer identity. A progressive status individual can
adopt different values, goals, and beliefs without endorsing self-conflicts among these
elements. Thus, a person in a progressive status is more open to others and to
changes, more emotionally secure, and more positively oriented towards the future
(Årseth et al. 2009; Crocetti et al. 2013; Slugoski, Marcia, and Koopman 1984).
By contrast, regressive statuses (foreclosure and diffusion) are associated with less
ability to adapt to changes in the life course. A person in a regressive status is
less open to others, and has a less ability to build a whole coherent self. S/he is
emotionally insecure, and shows a negative disposition towards the future. Moreover,
his or her self-ideal is easily distorted when changes occur in his/her life; that is,
s/he is uncertain about his/her opinions and his/her “uniqueness” since s/he borrows
his/her Self from others (Årseth et al. 2009; Crocetti et al. 2013; Feiner 1970; Flury
and Ickes 2007; Marcia and Josselson 2013; Slugoski, Marcia, and Koopman 1984).
At the psycho-individual level, Marcia Model stresses that the progressive statuses
are laborious and effortful. Individual has to devote efforts in order to achieve these
statuses. As a reward, progressive statuses help individual to deal with crisis (such
as a civil war), and indeed, these statuses are activated during crisis as adaptive
mechanisms, roughly speaking. The achievement status – especially – leads to a
complex-self, which is a Self with multiple goals, values, and beliefs co-existing in
a harmony, and is a Self with an open disposition towards changes in life (Crocetti
et al. 2013; Gatson 2003; Marcia 2002; Slugoski, Marcia, and Koopman 1984).
Complex-self derived by progressive statuses equips individual with a clear “pur-
pose—in—life” helping him/her to pass the crisis because purpose—in—life sustains
the continuity of individual Self by maintaining a coherent-continuous meaning of
the Self from the past through the present to the future (Côte and Levine 1983).
Therefore, complex-self is hardly shaken up even when radical, unpleasant changes
stir up the individual’s life. Analogously, complex-self resembles a house with mul-
tiple pillars, whereby falling apart is difficult.
On the contrary, regressive statuses are less laborious. Foreclosure and diffusion
statuses are maladaptive during crisis; anxiety and meaninglessness ensue as indi-
vidual faces changes that challenge what s/he has got used to face (Crocetti et al.
2013; Marcia and Josselson 2013; Slugoski, Marcia, and Koopman 1984). To put it
simply, regressive statuses resemble a uni-pillar house, it can easily collapse. 6
6Regressive statuses must not be - essentially - understood as one (or few) goal and value someone embodies
in his/her identity. Rather, I argue based on the previous relative literature, that a regressive status means
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Although this model studies identity at the psychological level,7 it points out that
in fact contexts influence which a status an individual would activate. For example,
living and studying in closed schools with similar students’ backgrounds and rigid
indoctrination will not help the students to develop a progressive status (Kroger,
Martinussen, and Marcia 2010; Slugoski, Marcia, and Koopman 1984). This notion
channels our discussion to the upper level, collective identity, which I will discuss
below.
To sum up, Marcia Model discerns individual identity as changeable. Identity is a
struggle for meaning, and this struggle is projected onto two dimensions: exploration
and commitment (Cieciuch and Topolewska 2017). This model asserts that opening
to new identity elements enriches the Self and leads to a more resilient personality
during crisis (complex-self). Complex-self is strong because it helps the individual
to keep a continuous sense of his/her identity. By contrast, individuals who are
engulfed on their identities – regressive statuses – fail to maintain self-continuity
because what had been unchallenged values, for example, become harshly contested
in crisis times (later, I will discuss the complexity of Self in more details). However, a
serious challenge stands out, operationalizing this model is arduous (Schwartz 2004)
because the four statuses usually function together.
At any rate, carefully we can use the following ways to operationalize the four
statuses (Table 2.1) (Marcia and Archer 1993).
Table 2.1 Operationalization of Marcia Model Statuses
The Status How to Observe in an Respondent’s Narrative
Achievement I have a clear definition of my identity
I have made an enough research to form my identity
Moratorium I am still in researching to form my identity
I am not yet done in forming my Identity
There are some contradictions in expressing the identity
Foreclosure I have adopted my identity from my parents
Diffusion I did not decide yet
I do not care of identity
that a simple-self does not develop a robust mechanism to sustain and develop what the Self believes in.
Hence, the Self meaning-system is fragile.
7Later, in the ontological security section and in the Discussion Chapter, I will compare between Marcia
Model – among other identity theories – and the ontological security framework.
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2.2.2 Collective Identity and Change
Collective identity refers to how a group (such as a religious group, a political party,
or a nation) identifies itself by asserting its norms, belief-system, and the belonging
criteria. Collective identity, in this vein, is not a sum of its members’ identities.
Rather, it has its own “ego,” distinct collective self-esteem from its members’ in-
dividual self-esteem, and its own ideal self sought to be fulfilled (Halperin et al.
2010).
Among many collective identity theories, Chandra’s account fits more than the oth-
ers into the purpose of this thesis because it organically entangles collective identity
and change (Chandra 2000a, 2012a,c; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Chandra de-
fines collective identity as a set of one or more categories, each category consists
of necessary core attributes (Chandra 2012a) which are necessary for a member to
belong to the collective.
Necessary attributes point out that someone cannot be a member of a group if
s/he does not gain all of these necessary attributes. They are the characteristics
that identify a group, distinguishing it from others. For example, to belong to
the black American group, the necessary attributes are that the skin color is black
and the place of birth is the USA. Similarly, to belong to the Arab group, you
should speak Arabic, be born in an Arabic country, your parents are Arabic, and
the like. 8 Collective identity is usually more complicated than being composed of
one category (e.g., a collective identity is only Arab), rather it is generally spun of
a set of categories. Let a collective identity be Arab Syrian Sunni. This collective
identity is composed of three categories: Arab, Syrian, and Sunni. Besides the Arab
category, Sunni category includes attributes, such as believing in Mohammad as the
last prophet, believing in Qur’an, and so on. While the Syrian category includes
attributes, including being born in Syria or having the Syrian nationality. Figure
2.3 represents Chandra’s model for collective identity formation.
8This is a made up example. What makes someone Arabic in Saudi Arabia is different from that in Syria.
Determining the necessary core attributes is a complex process as we will see later
22
Figure 2.3 Chandra’s Model of Collective Identity
Drawing on this understanding, we can define any collective identity, ranging from
a political party to an ethnic group, by addressing its categories and, more impor-
tantly, the necessary attributes of these categories. Ethnic identity, however, has
an additional feature: The attributes of an ethnic identity’s category(s) should be
descent-based; viz., being passed down from generation to another. Such ethnic at-
tributes could be place of birth, religion, language, color of skin, and so on (Chandra
2012d).
Below, we will see that all collective identities are changeable, including ethnic
identities.
2.2.2.1 Change in Collective Identity
Skin color per se means nothing; its attached meanings are what makes it a necessary
attribute for a collective identity. Collective identity (including ethnic identity,
notwithstanding its passed down descent-based attributes) are changeable in the
long-term or the short-term (Chandra 2012c; Fearon and Laitin 2000). This change
is not only a result of political and economic (exogenous) factors, but also a result
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of the endogenous process taking place within the identity’s construction. That is,
collective identity is continuously under social constructions and re-constructions
from inside (Chandra 2012c; Fearon and Laitin 2000).
Change in collective identity happens at three levels, with or without undergoing a
crisis (i.e., exogenous factors). According to de la Sablonnière (2017) change in a
collective identity happens by changing: (1) the social structure of a society, such as
the socio-economic stratification, the nation-building model, or the power of insti-
tutions; (2) the normative structure, which includes the norms and prescriptions of
what to do and what not to do in different contexts; and (3) the belief-system (nec-
essary attributes in Chandra’s words) which is the core of the collective identity.9
These three levels are ordered from the less essential to the more essential–lasting
changes. Thus, changes in the belief-system/necessary attributes allude to the rad-
ical and more lasting changes in an identity.
Chandra (2012a) amply offers a mechanism explaining how changes take place in
identity, penetrating the three previous levels. Simply put, members of a collective
silence some attributes of their identity and prime others in different contexts. A
constant pattern of silencing/priming launches a process of change in the collective
identity, then this process could cause a radical or incremental change. The changing
process also can fail to be achieved, and the collective finds itself stranded in-between
(inertia state); neither does it hold the previous identity, nor does it move to a new
identity (de la Sablonnière 2017). Change - worthy to note - does not necessarily
mean a moving to a completely “done” new state, however.
Change needs capacity to be achieved. Let a collective identity include n categories,
each has m attributes. For a change to be launched, an attribute either should
be subtracted or added to one of the categories at least (perhaps, as a result, a
category will be also added or subtracted). To this end, a significant change should
be observed in a society (more than only in the group under study). For example, to
say that belonging to a socio-economic class is not important any more to identify
a group (subtracting an attribute from a category), a significant change in the
society should be fulfilled (Chandra 2012a), such as melting the socio-economic
stratification in a way or another. Tracing identity’s attributes, then, is crucial to
understand change at the macro-level, i.e., collective identity-level. Differently put,
collective identity attributes form indeed the unit of analysis of any research probing
into collective identity change (Figure 2.4 explains the mechanism of change).
9de la Sablonnière (2017) calls the belief-system or the necessary attributes: core cultural identity
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Figure 2.4 The Mechanism of Collective Identity Change
It is important to assert that change is not easily achieved, not because people resists
it – indeed, change happens all the time at the base of everyday life -– but because
change needs certain capacity and effort to be completed, and needless to say that
such capacity (which can be cognitive capacity) is not always available in a society.
Change is not an easy, soft shift taking place in an identity, rather it is complex
and paradoxical, to borrow Rumelili and Todd (2018) expression. Collective identity
is woven by interactions between the Self (in-group) and the Other (out-group); it
is not confined to the inner realm of “we-ness,” and — partly – that is why it is
not simple. How in-group defines the Other, expresses itself in front of it, and how
both of them interact constitute the collective identity of the in-group (Degli Esposti
2018; Rumelili and Todd 2018). Collective identity is, also, constructed as the col-
lective’s members contest among themselves over certain meanings of their identity.
Consensus is not easily reached, and it is never perfectly done.10 Communication
and struggling among the in-group members continue until reaching a consensus
over what - for example - a social norm must mean and how it must be interpreted
in different contexts (Rumelili and Todd 2018; Todd 2018).
Bearing that in mind, someone may argue that change is not the opposite of self-
10However, lacking a significant degree of consensus leads to an inertia status of the collective identity.
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continuity, as it may seem at the first glance. Change can happen throughout
continuity of the (collective) Self as attributes are added or deleted from the collec-
tive identity, which happens all the time. This change in core attributes can happen
in a way that sustains the sense of self-continuity (because contexts change all the
time, attributes change as well, and that does not mean losing the self-continuity of
a collective identity). Thus, it is better — up to this point – to think of change and
continuity as duality not opposites (Rumelili and Todd 2018; Todd 2018). In this
vein, Geertz (1973) gives an illustrative example of the Bali “tribe” in Indonesia,
such that the Bali people have reinterpreted their polytheist religion as a monotheist
one without losing their core identity as Bali.
Finally, it will be useful to categorize how change in collective identity occurs by
impinging on two wide mechanisms: changes that happen in identity’s boundary and
in identity’s content. Identity’s boundary refers to who is a group’s member and
who is not, how to distinguish between members and non-members. For example,
Kurdish Syrians speak Kurdish, while Arab Syrians speak Arabic; language here
functions as a boundary. Identity’s content, on the other hand, refers to meaning-
and belief-system or necessary attributes of the collective. For example, Kurdish
Syrians believe in their indigenous right of the northern-east part of Syria; this
belief is what makes a Kurdish person Kurdish, for some political parties (David and
Bar-Tal 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Other studies have asserted that changes
in collective identity happen by changing the boundary and the content of that
identity, simultaneously. (Todd 2018).11
2.2.2.1.1 Content-based Identity Change. 12 Individuals from various and
different collective identities interact with each other every day. They create polit-
ical parties, civil society organizations, unions, and other multi-identity collectives
that penetrate different in-groups, besides – of course – collective organizations
which are limited to their in-groups. It is common to find someone who belongs
to Alawite group, in Syria, and simultaneously to a trade union with non-Alawites.
S/he could belong to a working-class, so his/her interests are congruent with other
working-class Sunni people — for example – more than with Alawite people who do
not belong to the working class. This multi-dimensionality of a collective identity
is the cornerstone of changes in identity. Multi-dimensionality means that a col-
lective’s members activate or prime selective attributes from this collective identity
11Belief-system and meaning-system are widely exchangeable terms. However, belief-system denotes a set
of beliefs and ideas about the world and the sacred realms, while meaning-systems or meaning-making
system refers to the process of making meanings on the world and the process of shaping the belief-system.
12Chandra’s account as discussed above denotes changes of collective identity as changes happening in the
content.
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and silence others to meet their needs in varying contexts. In the example above,
the Alawite person may prime her/his status as a worker in the context of his/her
work or when s/he lives in a far city, and silence her/his identity as an Alawite.
When s/he comes back to his/her village, s/he silences his/her identity as a worker
and primes his/her Alawite-ness. (Chandra 2012a,b,d; Chandra and Boulet 2012;
Chandra and Wilkinson 2008).
Multi-dimensionality leads potentially to a change because people interpret their
groups’ or collectives’ meaning-systems in different ways as they move from a con-
text to another, from an activated dimension to another. The accumulation of
differentiated, incremental (re)interpretations of the collective identity’s meanings
leads to a change in the collective identity itself (Akerlof and Snower 2016; Akerlof
and Kranton 2000).
To illustrate, I will reformulate an example taken from Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
Each collective has its own meaning-system (i.e., prescriptions of how to act, how to
understand the outer world’s objects). This meaning-system informs the collective’s
members about their roles in the life; women work inside homes as care-givers, and
men go to work outside in factories. However, because every woman and man acts in
a multi-dimensional milieu, they have multiple motivations, multiple objectives, and
multiple means to achieve their goals. In a time of economic crisis, or war, when men
go to war or their income is not enough for their families, women decide to go to work
in factories. Hence, women violate the collective identity prescriptions. By doing so,
they reinterpret the meaning-system by priming the need for money to give care for
children and silencing the masculine values. Men who are the owners of the factories
would welcome women as workers because they need to continue producing during
the war/crisis. As a result, women’s identity changes and so does men’s. Both of
them now will lack the attribute of gender-based division of labour. This attribute
is omitted from the collective’s categories in Chandra’s words (Akerlof and Snower
2016; Akerlof and Kranton 2000). In few words, we act in various contexts, priming
some identity attributes and silencing others as the contexts vary. The attributes
that contribute to greater symbolic or economic utilities will survive and alter those
which impair such utilities. If being an Alawite contradicts someone’s interests as
a worker, s/he will laboriously pursue changes in the Alawite identity by priming
certain attributes and ignoring others.
This understanding of collective identity change also implies – sometimes – that
change goes through a discrepancy between the ideal collective Self, which conforms
to the meaning-system, and the actual collective Self, which violates the meaning-
system by re-interpreting it or, simply, by acting against it (Halperin et al. 2010). As
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depicted in the previous example, the discrepancy ensues between the prescriptions
of gender-based division of labour and its negation. This discrepancy causes anxiety,
and harms the self-esteem of the collective Self (men would feel that they lost an
important part of how they identify themselves); thus, in order to reduce the anxiety,
the meaning-system as a whole should change (Halperin et al. 2010) by – for example
– modifying the perception of job as a masculine value. Otherwise, the discrepancy,
and hence anxiety, will persist to stir up the collective Self.
2.2.2.1.2 Boundary-based Identity Change. Collective boundary lies at the
zone between the Self (in-group) and the Others (out-groups), and it is mainly
formed via the relationship with the Other (or what is called “othering” as a pro-
cess of defining the Self as against the “ abhorrent” Other to a degree or another,
briefly speaking (see for example, Çelik, Bilali, and Iqbal 2017)). Boundary is not
simply a line that demarcates who belongs to “us” and who belongs to the Other,
“them.” Rather, identity boundary is better understood as a system of differen-
tiation marking the Other and the relationship with it. Does it include sharable
elements or not, for example? Is the region of the in-group tolerated to exchanges
with the Other or not (Geertz has elaborated on the sharable materials between
groups to mark the boundaries, cf. Li 2003)?
To delve deeper, according to Flesken (2018), identity boundary has three com-
ponents: (1) characteristics that determine the in-group’s symbolic and material
region (clothes, language, territory, etc.); (2) boundary’s salience which separates
“us” from “them” to an acute or moderate extent; (3) permeability of boundary,
i.e., to which extent the Other can be included in the in-group.
Collective boundary is “managed” through diverse ways. The literature reviewed
here suggests three ways of boundary’s management or shaping. First, elites could
manipulate the boundary to erect distinctions between the elite’s in-group and others
rival groups. Political party is an important instrument in this regard. Some political
parties mobilize their constituents on the base of ethnic identities and on excluding
a specific Other, which thickens the boundary between groups (Chandra 2000a,b).
For example, Ba’ath Party in Syria defines itself as a Pan-Arabism party; thus,
it excludes Syrian Kurds, and thickens the boundary between Arab and Kurdish
ethnicities.
Stereotype is the second way. Stereotype is assigning, usually, negative characteris-
tics to the Other in a way that these characteristics become enough to identify this
Other (Coutant et al. 2011). Therefore, the boundary between “us” and “them”
becomes salient and impermeable as “we” is unreachable from the stigmatized, tar-
nished Other.
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Finally, disparity between groups (or collectives) in terms of their social, political,
and/or economic statuses demarcates boundaries between identities. “Poor” can
become a sign of a collective boundary distinguishing it from the rich Other. This
disparity steers collective actions (e.g., violence or negotiation and dialogue with the
Other) which, in turn, change the permeability of boundaries. They may become
more solid (in case of violence) or more flexible (De la Sablonnière and Tougas 2008;
de la Sablonnière et al. 2015; Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009).
To sum up, collective identities change throughout changing the boundary that dis-
tinguishes the in-group from out-groups; throughout changing the meaning-system
that imbues the in-group with its “content”; or by both. This change is unavoidable
because every group’s members live and act in a multidimensional milieu, whereby
they need to constantly re-interpret their collective identity’s meanings (see Figure
2.5).
Figure 2.5 The Mechanisms of Collective Identity Change
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2.2.3 Identity between Collective and Individual Construction
Some scholars have contended that dealing with the individual identity and the col-
lective identity concepts separately is misleading. Identity is reciprocally constructed
idiosyncratically and collectively (Breakwell 2001; Timotijevic and Breakwell 2000).
However, that does not mean collective and idiosyncratic identities are identical.
Rather, it means that individual spins his/her identity simultaneously by asserting
his/her personal role and its adhered values (e.g., father, teacher, soldiers, etc.), and
by belonging to a group(s) and adopting its social norms and worldview. (Akerlof
and Kranton 2002; Bar-Tal, Halperin, and De Rivera 2007; David and Bar-Tal 2009;
Kranton and Sanders 2017; Stets and Burke 2000).
Identity Process Theory (hereafter, IPT) which was developed firstly by Glynis
Marie Breakwell (1986) provides us with a systematic way of dealing with these two
dimensions of identity, the idiosyncratic and the collective. More importantly, IPT
incorporates the notion of change within its definition of identity, which makes it fit
into the topic of this thesis.
2.2.3.1 Identity Process Theory
IPT is widely presented congruently among scholars. Some studies have enriched
it with more nuanced details; yet, no contradictions are observed in the literature
on IPT. Below I will delineate this theory as it has been presented and applied in
the relative literature, resting on semi-systematic literature review: Akerlof (2017);
Amiot and Jaspal (2014); Bardi et al. (2014); Breakwell (2010, 2014b); Hogg, Terry,
and White (1995); Jaspal (2013); Jaspal and Breakwell (2014); Jaspal and Cinnirella
(2010a, 2012); Jetten et al. (2015); Kachanoff et al. (2016); Mitha, Adatia, and Jaspal
(2017); Ryeng, Kroger, and Martinussen (2013); Sani, Bowe, and Herrera (2008); Se-
crest and Zeller (2003); Timotijevic and Breakwell (2000); Vignoles, Chryssochoou,
and Breakwell (2000, 2002); Whitbourne, Sneed, and Skultety (2002). Demarcating
the theory in its general aspects, yet with accounting for its nuanced constructive
elements, is what the following paragraphs aim at.
Identity in IPT has a hierarchical construction, which is continuously formed and
re-shaped. The hierarchical construction of identity means that identity’s elements
are arranged along this hierarchy from the most important (at the top) to the least
important (at the bottom). By identity’s elements we mean both idiosyncratic and
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collective elements: personal values, social norms, beliefs, personal and collective
goals, personal traits, and behavioral rules. Each identity’s element has a value:
higher values push the element to the hierarchy’s top, i.e., this element is more
important, and vice versa. It is noteworthy to assert that this process of pushing
elements up and down is continuous and dynamic; viz., the positions of the elements
along the hierarchy change according to various conditions that will be mentioned
below.
What are the criteria that determine where on the hierarchy an identity element is
located? In other words, how do we know how important an identity’s element is?
Seven identity principles are set forth in the literature as “guiding principles” or
criteria that steer the process of re-arranging the elements along the hierarchy. The
higher an identity element scores on each of these principles, the higher position
it occupies along the hierarchy. These principles are: (1) self-esteem, the positive
image a person holds on him/herself, his/her worthy self, and his/her worthy story
to be told to others; (2) distinctiveness, namely, an individual has his/her own dis-
tinguishable characteristics from others; (3) self-continuity referring to a coherence
in the Self between the past, the present, and the future; (4) self-efficacy which
refers to having a control over life in terms of job choices, accommodation, and so
on; (5) purpose-in-life pointing to having a goal to be achieved as long as someone
struggles and acts in life; (6) belonging to a group and feeling close to other people;
and (7) self-consistency, i.e., the different and various identity elements coexist in a
harmony in the identity’s hierarchy, without self-contradictions, creating a coherent
whole.
Finally, individuals are immersed within a society, where they encounter new ideas,
values, norms, and meanings. Therefore, they always “receive” identity’s elements to
be arranged in their identity hierarchy. Being guided by the seven identity principles,
two processes are defined: (1) Those relatively new elements which can be easily
absorbed into the “old” identity’s hierarchy are assimilated and no change occurs in
the identity; while (2) those very new elements which cannot be absorbed into the
“old” identity’s hierarchy are accommodated, i.e., the whole hierarchy is re-arranged
and re-shaped in a way that allows for the new elements to be coherently placed
in their fittest positions. Change occurs only via the accommodation process, and
that happens only because of living in a society when a new element “runs into” an
individual, pushing him/her to accommodate it..
2.2.3.1.1 Identity Change in IPT. Change is a natural aspects of identity in
IPT; change is not something inflicting the identity or something that is wreaked
upon the identity. Pehrson and Reicher (2014) go further by suggesting that iden-
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tity in IPT could be defined as a function of change. Individuals (and groups)13
struggle to impart their meaning-making system over the world. They, therefore,
find themselves immersed in a contesting world where different meaning-systems
confront and interact. As a result, their own identity will be exposed to various
new elements that would roam above the identity hierarchy to be accommodated,
assimilated, or rejected.14 Change in identity, then, is not only unavoidable, but
also adherent to the nature of identity. We simultaneously change others by diffusing
our meaning-systems and are changed by others’ similar endeavors.
This struggle to imbue the world with our own meaning-systems occurs through a
milieu called social representation, which plays an essential role in IPT. Social repre-
sentation is a set of systematic connected concepts, ideas, and images forming a lens
through which the world is seen and objects are comprehended by people (Moscovici
1988). Social representation can be understood as a general (or master) social nar-
rative that forms the space for struggle over meaning-making systems. Individuals
as well as groups, political elites and ordinary people are all engaged in shaping
and re-shaping social representation. In other words, individuals and groups receive
meaning-systems from the social representation in which they live, and at the same
time inject this social representation with meaning-systems that may be “imported”
from different contexts, different cultures, or different social representations. Thus,
social representation is malleable, systematic, and autonomous (i.e., it has its own
existence as a milieu always exists there to be injected with meanings) (Bardi and
Goodwin 2011; Breakwell 2014a; Moscovici 1988).
As change in identity naturally happens via the milieu of social representation, we
need to delve deeper into the identity principles because they are the guiding criteria
that tell us how to evaluate a change; is the “new" identity element positively or
negatively affecting the identity? The seven identity principles (self-esteem, self-
distinctiveness, self-continuity, self-efficacy, purpose-in-life, belonging to a group,
self-consistency) do not function totally in harmony. Some principles are achieved
only at the expense of others, and their relationships are – to some extent – trade-offs.
For example, self-esteem is achieved by balancing two other principles: uniqueness
of the individual and his/her belonging to a group(s), implying conforming to the
group’s norms and “losing” her/his “uniqueness” (Akerlof 2017). In sum, we need
to think of the identity principles as independent from each other, yet interacting
by, often, trade-off relationships (Akerlof 2017; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010a,b, 2012;
Kachanoff et al. 2016). Therefore, change is very dynamic and difficult to be ob-
13IPT is applicable to both individual and collective levels since studying a group’s identity implies that this
group endorses an ego, as Oren and Bar-Tal (2014) demonstrate.
14Later in this thesis we will see that rejection cannot happen without making a change in the own identity.
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jectively evaluated and predicted because individuals and groups’ evaluation of the
identity principles varies; what is good for someone is bad for another and what is
good now could become bad tomorrow. Nevertheless, keeping these principles as a
baseline to observe changes in identity is useful.
To this end, two concepts should be deeper discussed to show how change func-
tions within identity: the self-continuity principle and identity threat. Figure 2.6
illustrates IPT and how change occurs.
Figure 2.6 IPT, Social Representation, and Change
2.2.3.1.2 Self-continuity. Self-continuity is the most controversial principle
and directly related to the main theme of this thesis: change, which seems to be
the opposite of self-continuity. When Marcia Model (identity at the psychological-
level) and collective identity theories (drawing on Chandra’s account and others’)
were discussed above, change in identity appeared as unavoidable, as something that
always happens. IPT pushes the change concept deeper into identity to be a very
“natural” ingredient of it (self-continuity is applied to both individual and collective
levels (Smeekes and Verkuyten 2013)). In what follows, I will argue that change is
not the opposite of self-continuity. If change is the opposite of self-continuity, then
it will not be a natural part of identity, but an exterior quality that inflicts or wrecks
identity. If change is the opposite of self-continuity, then identity must resist it and
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it is not a part of it, differently put.15
Erikson has argued that identity is endorsed, exercised through keeping its conti-
nuity and sameness over time; individual’s identity must stay the same, as s/he
moves in time and places, in front of his/her own eyes and others’ eyes (cf. Cieci-
uch and Topolewska 2017). Patently, continuity and sameness are identical in this
account and opposite to change. However, other scholars have tried to measure self-
continuity and found that there are no coherent measurements of self-continuity; we
cannot objectively capture and generalize a set of aspects that point directly to self-
continuity (Dunkel, Minor, and Babineau 2010; Spini and Jopp 2014). Furthermore,
others have found that continuity and dis-continuity are not mutually exclusive (Se-
crest and Zeller 2003). Someone may explain this case by arguing that self-continuity
is a discursive phenomenon,16 therefore it varies as a person’s discourse (or his/her
narrative topic) varies (Rumelili and Todd 2018).
Conceptualizing self-continuity as discursive in nature paves the way to differentiate
between two types of self-continuity: (1) the first stresses sameness in the past, the
present, and the future; and (2) the second asserts that continuity is an accumula-
tive experience held by the Self throughout the life course, hence, sameness is not
identical to self-continuity (Sani, Bowe, and Herrera 2008; Sani et al. 2007; Santo
et al. 2013). For the latter, accumulative-ness, change happens through accumula-
tion in order to sustain and achieve self-continuity (as an identity principle) over
time. Hence, change is not the opposite of self-continuity; change and self-continuity
are related as communicating vessels, entangled with each other. We add to our ex-
perience and can change our core belief-system in order to sustain the sense of being
continuous from the past through the present to the future. We need to do so be-
cause contexts and social representations change all the time, and changing some
elements of our identity is what can “protect” our identity from being “distorted” by
the changing contexts. Figure 2.7 illustrates the difference between understanding
self-continuity as sameness and as accumulativeness.
15I said above that the seven identity principles are related to each other, sometimes, in trade-off relationships.
Needless to say that change is not an identity principle, and being opposite to a principle is different from
being related to it in a trade-off relationship. The relationship between the identity principles is similar to
that in communicating vessels. Opposite-relationship is totally different. It is a negation of something.
16Namely, self-continuity does not exist out of narrative, discourse, or expression
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Figure 2.7 Self-continuity as Sameness and Accumulative-ness
The questions, still, arise: Is self-continuity as sameness logically valid? Does self-
continuity have two natures, sameness and accumulative-ness?
I argue that sameness is not logically sound. We have seen that identity is endorsed
in a society, and more precisely by immersing the Self in social representation milieus.
Social representation is a field on which individuals and groups struggle to impose
their own meaning-systems. For an individual trying to keep the sameness of his/her
Self, s/he always needs to restore the social representation to the same meanings
and interpretations. But s/he cannot. Social representation is a mutual space;
someone may control him/herself, but s/he cannot control the others, who belong
to the in-group and out-groups. As long as others inject social representation with
meanings, with different interpretations of the world (and thus, understanding of the
Self and its disposition in the world), keeping the “same-Self" entails resisting new
meanings in social representation. The only way to do so - for someone who tries
to keep him/herself the “same” - is to contribute to the social representation by re-
interpreting its (new, intruder-) meanings in a way that restores the sameness. This
leads us to a self-contradiction. S/he seeks to sustain sameness by re-interpreting
meanings by adding to his/her experience new interpretations in order to “fight”
the “annoying” intruder-meanings in the social representation. Let X be a new
interpretation of a norm Y in the social representation of a group. Those who want
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to keep the collective Self of their group the same have to interpret Y as it has been
always interpreted. X then must be refused or be proved futile. The only way to
do so is to add new elements, new meanings Z, showing that X is invalid. Even if
the group needs to use violence against the X interpretation, it has to justify it by
developing meaning and injecting Z interpretation into the social representations to
protect Y as it has been interpreted.
Hence, sameness is an illusion (see a similar argument, Browning and Joenniemi
2017) The Self appears as if it remains the same. Sameness implies change, and
it is only sustained (as an illusion) via creating changes (Figure 2.8 illustrates this
argument).
Figure 2.8 Sameness Is an Illusion
Empirically speaking, Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010a, 2014) studied gay Pakistani
Muslims in Britain, and found that homosexual Muslims have tried to sustain the
continuity principle of their collective identity 17 either by hyper-identifying with Is-
lam; by sacrificing other identity principles such as self-consistency; or by expanding
their belonging to all Eastern Asian people, not to Pakistanis. All of these strategies
aimed at keeping self-continuity by making some changes in the identity (e.g., we are
17I.e., to assert that they are still Muslims despite the fact that they are homosexual, since for Muslims
gayness is sinful.
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Eastern Asians not Pakistanis (changing one in-group), or we are Muslim although
sinful (scarifying the self-consistency)).
In sum, change is not the opposite of self-continuity. Self-continuity is one identity
principle among other six; it is sustained only via change as well as the identity itself
is endorsed only through change, even for those who decidedly seek keeping their
identity as the same.
2.2.3.1.3 Threat to Identity. Change and threat to identity are two essentially
correlated concepts in IPT. Threat facilitates (not causes) changes by triggering
coping strategies.
Threat to identity happens when the social representation, within which individuals
and groups act, hampers the achievement of one at least from the seven identity
principles (Barnett and Breakwell 2001; Breakwell 2010). Threat emanates from
risky events, such as civil wars or diseases, only when these risks challenge the
meaning-systems that are held by individuals’ (or groups’) identities. Put differently,
how people understand and represent risks cognitively is how much the risk threatens
their identities by harming the identity principles (Barnett and Breakwell 2003;
Breakwell 2010).
Civil wars, for example, may threaten some individuals’ or groups’ identity and
enhance others’, depending on how they perceive the civil war and the changes in
meanings that are attached to it. Civil wars change the meanings and the social
narratives as mentioned earlier. This change takes place in the social representation,
i.e., some groups will inject the social representation with ideas, such as “war is a
moral must,” “this war is a revolutionary good war,” while others will impart other
ideas, such as “this war is a war against terrorists,” “the enemy is an extent to
historical religious enemies.” Those whose identities are threatened and who cannot
harmonize their meaning-systems to any of the dominant social representations will
feel detached from their belongings (belonging to a group is an identity principle).
Hence, they face an identity threat (Oren and Bar-Tal 2014). For example, someone
may think “I do not believe that this war is a moral must,” contrary to his in-group.
In order to deal with threat, people adopt coping strategies. These strategies vary
a lot, but they all aim at protecting identity principles as much as possible since
the identity principles can conflict with each other. We can count a number of
these strategies: denying the existence of the threat; acquiring knowledge on the
risk/threat; justifying the change in meaning-system and changing the belief-system
itself; re-interpreting the Self to avoid contradictions; isolating the Self from the
world; and changing the boundary of the group to change the threatening Other
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(Barnett and Breakwell 2001; Breakwell 2010; Halperin et al. 2010; Jaspal and Cin-
nirella 2010a, 2012; Murtagh, Gatersleben, and Uzzell 2014).
People, at any rate, vacillate in their ability to respond to a threat between suc-
cessfully adapting to the threat and tragically falling in a destroying trauma. À la
Marcia Model, scholars (e.g., Jetten et al. 2015; Linville 1985) have contended that
the more the Self is complex, the higher the ability is to adapt to threats. Self-
complexity (developed by Linville (1985)) refers to having multiple concepts of the
Self while all of them are in harmony. In other words, self-complexity is associated
with a rich self-conceptualization; open to others; and able to encompass different
roles. For example, identifying the Self as a teacher and mother is more complex
than identifying it as only a mother. Self-complexity also refers to belonging to
different in-groups without having contradictions in constructing a coherent iden-
tity. For example, being Muslim and British is more complex than being Muslim
Arabic; and being Christian Arabic is more complex than being Christian German
because Arabs and Muslims are two close groups (or say, categories), while British
and Muslims are more distanced from each other (Dixon and Baumeister 1991; Jet-
ten et al. 2015; Koch and Shepperd 2004; Linville 1985; Roccas and Brewer 2002;
Slone and Roziner 2013).This understanding is similar to Marcia Model; foreclo-
sure and diffusion statuses are correlated with less self-complexity and correlated to
low well-being, while achievement and moratorium statuses are attached to more
self-complexity and higher well-being.
To sum up Identity Process Theory, it merges individual (psycho-level) identity and
collective identity, refusing the distinctions between the two. Identity is a hier-
archical dynamic structure, its elements (values, goals, and beliefs) are arranged
alongside the hierarchy according to their importance to the Self (either individual
or collective). This hierarchy is immersed in social representation, which is a set of
systemized ideas, images, and concepts that forms the comprehensive-device for peo-
ple to understand the world. Into this social representation, individuals and groups
inject their meaning-making systems; i.e., how to interpret events and understand
the Self disposition in the world.18
As the Self and the Others are mutually engaged in continuously re-shaping the
social representation, every individual or group seeks to maintain a high level of the
identity principles. These seven principles constitute a “scale” telling us to which
18At this point it is critical to clarify the following point. This thesis studies identity change at the individual
level at the first place. In this vein, collective identity is understood as identity of a group as it is represented
in the group’s official documents, official and semi-official speeches, collective ceremonies, and the collective
rhetoric generally. However, the individual identity includes the collective elements of the group’s identity
as they are perceived by the individual. The researcher, then, does not concern about the “real” or objective
collective identity since s/he studies the identity at the individual level. How an individual perceives such
a collective identity is what matters.
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extent someone (a group) is successful in maintaining a strong identity and endorsing
a higher level of well-being or not. However, this “scale” is dynamic because the
seven principles could contradict each other as someone (a group) constructs his/her
(its) identity. These seven principles also form the baseline for coping strategies that
are used by someone (a group) to adapt to a threat (e.g., civil war).
Change always happens as long as we sustain and endorse our identities (identity is
a function of change). Change is not something inflicts the identity, but an inherent
nature of it. Change, in this vein, happens as (1) the social representation is injected
with new images and concepts; and/or (2) the Self accommodates new elements into
its hierarchy or changes the importance of some elements, silencing or priming them.
Change is not the opposite of self-continuity; the opposite of self-continuity is self-
discontinuity not change.
Finally, I will present a brief of what have been mentioned in this section on identity
at the individual, collective, and the intersecting levels (IPT).
Identity conceptualized either as individual (psycho-) identity, as collective identity,
or as merged between the two (IPT) is endorsed and constructed only through
change. Change is inherent to identity, not exogenous to it.
Individuals or groups continuously re-construct their identities as being guided by
seven identity principles: self-continuity, self-consistency, self-efficacy, distinctive-
ness, belonging to a group and closeness to others, purpose-in-life, and self-esteem.
Every identity construction fulfils these seven principles. When one of these princi-
ples is harmed, the identity is threatened.
Two orientations are discerned as individuals or groups endorse their identities. The
first is openness; i.e., seeking to explore more possible values and meanings to be
incorporated into the identity. The second is closeness; namely, refusing new possible
meanings or values. The first orientation is called progressive statuses (achievement
and moratorium) at the psycho-level analysis, while the latter is called regressive
statuses (foreclosure and diffusion). Progressive statuses – apparently from the
name – are associated with high levels of well-being, or a higher ability to achieve
the seven identity principles. Whereas the regressive statuses are associated with a
lower ability to achieve the seven principles.
In parallel, self-complexity is a another useful concept referring to a Self that inte-
grates various belongings and diverse self-conceptualizations. Put differently, pro-
gressive statuses and high self-complexity, on the one hand; and regressive statuses
and low self-complexity, on the other hand, are identical. Self-complexity, then, is
associated with higher well-being and better resilience to threats. However, self-
39
complexity adds belonging to groups to its definition, while progressive/regressive
statuses do not (because progressive/regressive statuses were designed to study
psycho-identity). As the thesis processes, I will adopt self-complexity terms in-
stead of progressive/regressive statuses, defining it as: an ability of collective and
individual Self to enrich itself by opening to different Others and accommodating
new identity elements (values, goals, and beliefs).
Drawing on this understanding, change is observed in identity in one or more of the
following elements. First, New values are adopted (or old values are omitted) at id-
iosyncratic and/or collective level. Values, in this context, refer to what is good and
what is bad emotions, deeds, or ideas. Second, goals which individual or group aims
at achieving in the future have been shifted. Goals are directly linked to purpose-
in-life; hence, to the meaning someone or a group holds. Third, beliefs-system is
adjusted; i.e., what we had once believed in to be a transcendental truth (e.g., a re-
ligion) or absolute truth (e.g., an ideology) is adjusted in a way or another (Tetlock
and Oppenheimer 2008). In terms of collective identity, belief-system includes the
necessary attributes of the collective;it refers to the content of the collective. Fourth,
the Other is either perceived in a different way or the individual/group defines a
new Other. In terms of the collective identity, a different Other means changing
the boundary of the identity. Change is anchored or becomes easily observable in
these four elements (values, goals, meaning-system, and Othering). In this regard,
it is worthy to reassert that both orientations, openness and closeness or high or
low level of self-complexity (not only openness), can equally lead to changes in – at
least – one of these elements.
However, change-in-becoming (before it is observed and anchored in these four ele-
ments) is also observable and traceable. We can trace change-in-becoming by looking
for new themes that are injected in the social representation milieu, such as media
discussion and elites’ speeches as well as daily conversations. Then we can search
for what elements are silenced and what are primed by individuals or groups.
Tracing changes in identity is useful, I argue, to study changes during a civil war
because any change in identity means that the individual or the group has accom-
modated this change into the Self; hence, this change cannot be superficial. I will
call these changes during civil war which are traced in identity sedimented changes
to distinguish them from superficial changes that evaporate immediately as their
conditions disappear during or after the war. Figure 2.9 illustrates the concepts
related to identity’s changes.
40
Figure 2.9 Change in Identity
2.3 Ontological Security
Ontological security is a theoretical framework studying the relationships between
security and identity (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017a), or the relationship between se-
curity and a being or self, for those who distinguish identity from self (Browning
and Joenniemi 2017; Gustafsson and Krickel-Choi 2020).19 Ontological security has
firstly been developed by Laing as a concept in psychoanalysis theory, then it was
deployed later by Giddens in the socio-psychology field (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017a).
Political and IR scholars have also applied the ontological security concept in their
studies to probe into individuals, groups/societies, or states’ behaviors.
This framework will help us link the security theme and identity change during civil
war. In what follows, I will elaborate on how ubiquitously ontological security has
been depicted in the literature, then I will show how some scholars have challenged
this ubiquitous, mainstream understanding and how they have criticized it. Finally,
I will set forth Giddens’s account of ontological security, and I dwell on certain onto-
logical security’s scholarship to suggest a theoretical model of ontological security by
incorporating what was depicted above about change in identity and the literature
on ontological security in one model.
19I will discuss the difference between identity and Self in relation to ontological security below. For now, I
will use identity only as the object of ontological security because it is ubiquitous in the literature.
41
2.3.1 Mainstream Ontological Security Model
In order to build a comprehensive conceptual picture of ontological security as it
has been ubiquitously depicted in the literature, I will extract the common, agreed
points among scholars to build this picture. Although, these scholars emphasize
different angles in their study of ontological security, they have a consensus on main
points of ontological security. I will call this “extracted” theoretical model or picture
the mainstream ontological security model.20
The mainstream model of ontological security is constructed by systemizing five con-
cepts together as they appear in multiple studies (Browning 2018; Kinnvall 2004;
Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017a,b; Mitzen 2018a; Rossdale 2015; Rumelili 2014a,b, 2018;
Steele 2005). The first concept is being of an individual, group, or state such that
it should be genuine (its values emanate from inside), real (schizophrenia is the
extreme antipode of being real), autonomous (or free), and different from others
(unique). When a being fails to achieve these characteristics, it becomes ontologi-
cally insecure; it becomes fragmented, anxious, or paralyzed. Ontological security in
its fundamental configuration is the security of being, therefore. This first concept
was, indeed, introduced by Laing in his book, The Divided Self, 1964, as the cor-
nerstone of ontological security. For Laing, an ontologically secure individual is “a
real, alive, whole” person, while an ontologically insecure individual feels that s/he
is “dead more than alive” and only “precariously” different from the outer world
(Laing 2010).
Everyday routine is the second concept. It refers to habitual practices that are ex-
ercised at the everyday level. Routine establishes a trusted world around beings;
everything is repeatable, and nothing unexpected would happen. The future is
guaranteed, and things that we cannot observe right now and right here are not
dangerous, ambiguous, or surprising because they are embedded in the whole rou-
tines (e.g., an ordinary person does not worry about what happens behind his/her
boss office’s walls since everything flows well, every day, as usual). Routine resembles
a machine that thinks on behalf of us; that is, we do not need to think of everything
all the time. Obviously, ruptures within a routine causes ontological insecurity.
The third concept is meaningfulness. Meaningfulness refers to acquiring and pro-
ducing meanings in life; deeds, behaviors, and social norms are justified by serving
meanings of beings. Meaningfulness implies that a meaning-making system of a be-
20This literature review I have done is not systematic in the most rigorous term. Therefore, the mainstream
model of ontological security may be understood as something I construct out of these articles and books
I have analyzed more than as an “objective” review that rests on clear and rigorous methodology.
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ing is active and able to provide a satisfying interpretation of events and objects.
Losing meaningfulness leads beings to endorse moral emptiness, making them on-
tologically insecure. In this case, an answer on the question why in life becomes
obscure and unpersuasive: Why should I go to pray? Why should I read books?
Save money? They all become questions without clear answers.
The fourth concept is the Other and the objective world. Beings should not be iso-
lated from the different Other or from the social objective world. Indeed, a being
maintains its genuineness, reality, and all other ingredients of ontological security
only by living in and weaving itself with others in the social world. Otherwise,
a being is isolated and insecure ontologically. Someone cannot experience his/her
uniqueness and cannot express him/herself without an existence of the Other. More-
over, a being could be ashamed or contemned by others, which shakes up its ontolog-
ical security. Ergo, a being has not only to be engaged in the surrounding objective
world, but also it has to well manage its interaction with this world.
The final concept is the being’s identity, which should be continuous-consistent
in the case of ontological security. Consistency within a being’s meaning-making
system and continuity of a being’s self-conceptualization from the past to the future
are two crucial elements that every being seeks to maintain. If an individual or
group’s identity loses continuity over time or includes in-coherent elements in its
self-description, it becomes ontologically insecure.
To put these concepts together, someone may write: ontological security is a con-
cept referring to a genuine, real being21 who is saturated with meaningfulness; who
interacts with Others and acts in the social world through a repeatable daily routine
in order to (and by) keep(ing) its identity continuous and consistent over time and
in different contexts.
It is worthy to note that some scholars have asserted that ontological security is
neither a fixed nor an absolute status, rather it is relatively endorsed and always
not fully achieved. Ontological security is precarious in its nature (Rossdale 2015;
Rumelili 2014b). Precariousness means that all beings cannot absolutely and fully
fulfil their ideal desired routines; their meaningfulness; perfect relationships and
interactions with Others and the social world; and their continuous and consistent
identities.
Two critical points should be dusted before we progress. The first is the critical dif-
ferentiation between a “being” and its identity; a being is not reduced to its identity
21This reality of a being is very essential in Laing’s definition of ontological security, although it does not
explicitly appear in some studies.
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in the light of ontological security. Indeed, ontological security can be defined more
precisely as “security of being” more than of identity,22 although identity appears as
the object of ontological security in some studies (e.g., Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017a).
Both identity and ontological security are qualities of a being, while being is the
object anchoring both of them. Ontological security adheres to a being not to an
identity; ergo, writing ontological security of identity lacks accuracy. Practically,
we study the ontological security of individual, not of his/her identity. To elucidate
more precisely the differences between self, identity, and being, I will recall what
mentioned before when I was discussing identity. Every person (or, to some extent,
social entity) has a self, but does not necessarily an identity because identity is an
auto-reflection on the own self. If an individual does not reflect or is not aware of
his/her own self, then s/he lacks identity. Hence, Self with a capital “S” refers to
being aware of the self; i.e., to identity. Being, on the other hand, is what “anchors”
both identity and self (or the Self and self). Being, then, is the base of identity (that
is why we write an identity of a being).
The source of conflating being and identity, by attaching ontological security equiv-
alently to both of them, is that only through identity we can measure or observe
the state of ontological security. We recognize time through clocks, watches, or the
movement of sun every day; however, time is measured by these observations and
tools, and it is not someone’s wrist watch or the sun’s movement. Time, in other
words, is not anchored in my wrist watch, but it is measured by it (this illustration
is borrowed from Radovan 2011). Similarly, to reassert, ontological security is an-
chored and exists in a “being” and only measured – according to the mainstream
conceptualization – by identity (see Figure 2.10). Let, for example, a being’s re-
lationships with Others radically change. If and only if this change wrecked the
continuity or consistency of this being’s identity, we can say that the ontological
security of this being has deteriorated. The change in the relationship with Others
and with the social world per se does not impact the ontological security state; we
observe this impact only if it unfolds via identity. Hence, it may have no effect if
the being does not feel it, for example. The same is to be said for the routine and
meaningfulness conceptual ingredients.
22Otherwise, we do not need the concept of ontological security; IPT or other theories that are concerned
about psychological security are sufficient.
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Figure 2.10 Ontological Security: Mainstream
The second point to be asserted is that ontological security is expressive in its
nature (Rossdale 2015; Rumelili 2018). Patently, if meaningfulness, continuity, and
consistency of an identity are not narrated, they are not captured either by the
being (or the Self) or by researchers. I will discuss narrative more extensively in
the Methodology Section. For now, it is important to bear in mind that without
narrative, we cannot study ontological security.
In what follows, I will present how the literature on ontological security (the main-
stream model) has demarcated the ontological security seeking behaviors that are
adopted by entities (especially individuals) in order to sustain or obtain ontologically
secure states.
2.3.1.1 Ontological Security Seeking Behaviors
Ontological security is continuously sought by individuals, groups, or states (because
it is precarious as said above), especially when a threat (cf. Threat to Identity) or
a critical situation (such as a civil war) emerges menacing continuity or consistency
of the identity. A critical situation is a threatening change that interrupts or shakes
up one of the ontological security conceptual components (daily routines, mean-
ingfulness, relationships with Others and the social world) causing discontinuity or
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inconsistency in the identity of the being under concern. Accordingly, ontological
insecurity ensues.
In order to restore the state to ontological security, after a critical situation, ontolog-
ical security seeking behaviors are ignited. All these behaviors aim at achieving one
goal: keeping continuity and consistency of the threatened being’s identity, which
implies keeping the routine, the meaning-making system, and the relations with oth-
ers and the world stable and unchangeable (Bloom 2013; Kinnvall 2004; Kinnvall and
Mitzen 2018; Lupovici 2014b; Mitzen 2018a; Rumelili 2014a; Vieira 2018). Simply
put, the only goal is countering the change, the critical situation, or the menacing
interrupting events.
Two main behaviors, in this vein, are addressed in the relative literature: keeping
the threat unthinkable, and simplifying the Self. Keeping threatening ideas (or
even facts) out of mind (out of perception) means that people do not think of what
interrupts their self-continuity or consistency (Mitzen 2018a). In this line, people
tend to freeze their core meaning-system, especially religious beliefs, taboos, and
ideologies (Hameiri et al. 2018; Lodewijkx, Kersten, and Van Zomeren 2008; Tet-
lock and Oppenheimer 2008; Tetlock et al. 2000). This behavior is not conducted
by isolating the Self from Others and from the outer social world (because isolation
triggers ontological insecurity since being in the world is a main ingredient of onto-
logical security), but by strengthening the Self-identification with the in-group and
by blocking the “annoying” information that does not support the Self meaning-
system (Bar-Tal 2017; Bar-Tal, Oren, and Nets-Zehngut 2014; Nasie et al. 2014;
Shahar et al. 2018). This type of behavior makes the threat as if it had not hap-
pened. Needless to say that this behavior is not always applicable. In the case of a
radical change in the daily routine, ignoring behaviors cannot work. Nevertheless,
resisting the routine’s change or thinking of this change as “temporal” is a way to
make the threat unthinkable as much as possible.
The second behavior is simplifying the Self (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2018); a simple self
with few coherent concepts and collective belongings is easier to be kept continuous
and consistent because this Self does not deal with many various ideas and beliefs.
Securitizing the Other is one way to keep the Self simple. Securitizing the Other
is achieved by picturing it as an enemy not merely as a stranger. In consequences,
this enmity prevents the Self from any degree of “identifying” with the Other and
reduces the relationship to one dimension: The Other should be always away there,
while “we” (the Self) are here, and no connection with this Other but (physical or
cultural) violence (Kinnvall 2004; Rumelili 2014a, 2018).23
23There are many other behaviors, such as creating an ambiguous political environment that defers clarifying
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After presenting the mainstream model of ontological security, I will now present
the critiques that some scholars have projected against this model. Discussing these
critiques will lead us, then, to discuss Giddens’s conceptualization of ontological se-
curity and how other ontological security scholars have responded to these critiques.
2.3.2 Critiques of the Mainstream Ontological Security
Some scholars have criticized the ontological security framework, contending that
it is a negative security type (e.g., Roe 2008). Negative security refers to be free
from fear and wants; to keep dignity protected from persecution and repression. By
contrast, positive security refers to be free to achieve “your” potential; and to be
able to actualize prosperity and the desired future. Ontological security is about
keeping the Self (identity) continuous and consistent; i.e., protecting it from unex-
pected changes. Hence, ontological security is negative security. Negative security is
generally sustained by keeping clear-cut boundaries between the Self and the Other,
between friends and enemies (because by doing so, the Self stays protected from
change, which is not available due to thick boundaries against the Other).24 Posi-
tive security, however, is about celebrating opacity of the Self. This type of security
celebrates threats to and some contradictions in Self because Self – in its healthy
state – is not clear like as a fixed mirror, but it is opaque and open to probabili-
ties like as a softly moving surface of water (Giles and Vintimilla 2007; Roe 2008;
Shani 2017). The positive security account is in line with other psychological and
socio-psychological accounts, which assert that self-complexity has a higher level of
well-being and leads to more resilience than simple self does.
Nevertheless, many ontological security scholars are aware of its negative security
aspect. Mitzen (2018a,b) demarcates the difference between a pathological track
of ontological security seeking behaviors and a healthy track. Enclosing the Self
upon its simple, unthinkable realm is an isolation which does not corroborate an
ontological security state in the long term; it is a pathological track of seeking
ontological security. On the other hand, discussing threatening ideas and opening
the Self to the Other – not as an enemy, but as a different identity-project — form
a behavior that carves out the healthy track. In this vein, Rumelili (2018), and
the relation with the previous enemy-Other, keeping the relation with it as it was: simply an enmity not
a new peaceful relation (Lupovici 2014b).
24The previous section on the ontological security seeking behaviors denotes how the mainstream of onto-
logical security framework is negative security.
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Rumelili and Çelik (2017) similarly argue that admitting the validity of different
Other’s narratives by the Self does not menace the Self ontological security in the
long term, rather accepting the Other’s narrative establishes a base for a long-term
peaceful and secure relationship. Ergo, a stable state of ontological security ensues.
The distance between pathological/negative and healthy/positive (ontological) secu-
rities is marked by incompatibility more than discrepancy. A path or a mechanism
that bridges these two types of security is addressed very well in the literature.
For example, I conclude from Rumelili (2014b) that what she calls peace anxiety
is a channel transforming a state of negative ontological security to positive one:
Peace anxiety stirs up “temporarily” ontological insecurity within the Self because
it changes the old meaning-system within the Self to a new meaning that can es-
tablish a positive/healthy ontological security. Mainly, this happens by changing
the relationships with the enemy-Other, and accepting its own narrative even when
this narrative contradicts the Self’s narrative (i.e., opening the Self to the different
Other). Thus, having a positive ontological security passes through anxieties or
ontological insecure statuses. Put differently, ontological security that is based on
enclosing on the Self and securitizing the Other as behaviors to resist any change
in the Self is superficial security or short-term security. On the contrary, accepting
the Other and opening the Self to unfamiliar ideas are behaviors that establish deep
security or long-term security.
In spite of this clarification on the difference between the positive/healthy and the
negative/pathological ontological security in the literature (of the mainstream on-
tological security), the tenet of non-change, stability in self-conception is still the
necessary condition for ontological security. In other words, either in the negative
or positive copies of ontological security and its seeking behaviors, a being is on-
tologically secure if and only if its identity (as narrated) is continuous from the
past through the present towards the future. Therefore, the mainstream model of
ontological security can be labeled as fixation-based ontological security.
This note will bring us to another critique against the mainstream ontological secu-
rity: stability, or non-change, of the identity of a being as the omnipresent criterion
of ontological security is misleading. Flockhart (2016) amply argues that an indi-
vidual (as a being having an agency and an identity, mutually constructive) can
deliberately commence a change-making action in order to enhance his/her ontolog-
ical security. S/he embarks on such a change in order to change the circumstances
in a way that enhances his/her self-esteem. Hence, change is a way of obtaining
ontological security, contrary to what the mainstream ontological security argues.
However, for Flockhart (2016), this change is launched only by agency, not identity;
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i.e., identity of a being (e.g., individual) struggles to stay stable and non-changeable
in order to keep the ontolgoically secure state.25 Browning and Joenniemi (2017)
argue similarly that conceptualizing ontological security as a stability in identity is
misleading; that is, every being (e.g., individual) is “thrown into the world” (p.10)
and the world is constantly changing. Therefore, they argue that ontological security
should be understood as both: stability and ability to adapt to changes. Gustafs-
son and Krickel-Choi (2020) also defend the idea of change; some normal anxiety
(resulted from change) is necessary for creativity and it does not threat ontological
security.
In sum, change is not seen as the antipode of ontological security for some scholar,
rather beings can launch a change in order to destabilize the status quo and enhance
or obtain ontological security. However, a question arises: what is the criterion that
a being seeks to meet as s/he (it) embarks on a change? Why will an individual
make a change in his/her routine or identity?
Flockhart (2016) answers such a question by simply saying that an individual will
(or has to) be engaged in a change-making action in order to enhance his/her self-
esteem, which will result in a “better” ontological security state if the status quo
does not provide him/her with high levels of self-esteem. Rumelili (2014b) and
Browning and Joenniemi (2017) would argue that a being (group or individual) will
be engaged in a change-making behavior in order to have a peaceful relationship with
the Other, even if this change implies a change in the self-identity. An individual
or a group will do so, simply, because a peaceful relation is ethically or normatively
better (Browning and Joenniemi 2017) than an antagonistic one even if that requires
a “painful” change in identity.
This “ethical” or “normative” explanation of why a friendly stable relation with
Others is better than an antagonistic stable relation in terms of ontological security
borrows what is positive and negative ethically from outside the conceptual realm of
ontological security, from the common sense (peace is better than enmity). I argue
that we need to find a mechanism or a conceptual explanation that is incorporated
into our conceptualization of ontological security in order to explain why a peaceful
stable relation is better for ontological security than an antagonistic stable relation.
Moreover, do people seek ontological security in order to keep their self-esteem
high as Flockhart (2016) states? If it is so, then why do we need the concept of
ontological security since identity theories can provide us with enough conceptual
25We see that Flockhart’s argument is very close to Rumelili’s idea of Peace Anxiety as I interpret it in
this thesis, but Flockhart stresses on change, more than Rumelili does, as a way to enhance ontological
security. In other words, for Rumelili, ontological security can be transformed from a negative security to
a positive security in spite of the necessary change, while Flockhart argues change is the way of creating
ontological security (not in spite of it).
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tools to study actions or identity changes in terms of self-esteem. Again, I argue
that understanding self-esteem as the criterion of seeking ontological security is
borrowed from psychology mainly, and it is not well incorporated into the ontological
security framework (see the five basic concepts that form the mainstream ontological
security).
In sum, two main critiques have been presented against the mainstream ontological
security as it is: (1) a negative type of security, and (2) based on stability and fixation
of identity. Many scholars have responded to the former by arguing that ontological
security can be endorsed by making changes in order to open the Self to Others, to
new ideas, and to alter the status quo. On the other hand, others have responded
to the latter by arguing that change is a part or an ingredient of ontological security
state and its seeking behaviors; individuals, for example, change their routine in
order to enhance their state of ontological security. This argument shakes up – to
some extent – the mainstream model of ontological security by “de-emphasizing” the
importance of stable/continuous identity of a being as the cornerstone of ontological
security.
In what follows, I will present how Giddens conceptualizes ontological security be-
cause his works (1984 and 1990) have diffused ontological security in sociology and
socio-psychology, and later in IR and political science.
2.3.3 Giddens’s Ontological Security
The ontological security concept is taken from Anthony Giddens’ writings. Giddens
has introduced this concept in two important books: Modernity and Self-Identity
(1991) and Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (1989
[1984]). Giddens himself borrows this concept from the psychologist Laing, but
he develops it and incorporates it into his theory, Structuration Theory. In what
follows, I will sketch out Giddens’s account, then I will show how it slightly, yet
importantly, deviates from the mainstream conceptualization of ontological security
as mentioned above.
Before probing into ontological security in Giddens’s account, presenting how he
understands societies is crucial because he has developed the ontological security
concept by weaving it within society, roughly speaking.
Society is a whole social system composed of overlapping structures. The struc-
ture concept is the cornerstone in Giddens’s understanding of social system. Every
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structure is a set of rules: how to act; what to do in specific contexts; what the
expected behavior from you is; and the like. Rules, in other words, are procedures
in the life, which guide people’s behaviors in their everyday life, from their private
places to public places. Structure is also composed of resources. Resources refer to:
(1) human resources (or capital) that manifest through managing people’s skills and
knowledge in a society (employees in a factory, for example) and through dividing
labors across different sectors, such as health and military sectors; and (2) material
resources, such as natural resources. Rules and resources function together, giving
a structure its properties. These properties can be grouped into: (1) significance,
referring to cultural meanings, norms, and symbols; (2) power, referring to ability
of managing and seizing both the human and material resources; and (3) legitimacy,
alluding to a formal and informal punitive authority that keeps norms, meanings,
and resources’ control unchallenged (Baber 1991; Giddens 1989; Kim 2004; Stones
2001). To recall, we have seen that a civil war changes structures; namely, it changes
these properties by changing the rules and/or the resources and their holders.
Any social system is also constituted by its individuals; i.e., agents. Agency is an-
other basic concept beside structure in Giddens’s account. An agent is an active
individual; an agent is an actor and the two terms are totally exchangeable. Agency
is founded on the base of reflexivity that an agent exercises to know and under-
stand him/herself, others, and the outside world. Every agent, then, is aware of
him/herself. S/he is able to discursively express what and why s/he does in a way
that imbues his/her life with meaningfulness; i.e., s/he consciously constitutes and
pictures his/her identity and actions (Giddens 1989). 26 The other ingredient of
agency is capability. An agent is always able to “act otherwise” and s/he “ceases
to be such [agent] if he or she loses the capacity to ‘make a difference’ ” (Giddens
1989, 14).
Both agency and structure are inextricable; agents act only within structures, and
out of structure there is no agency27 (Giddens 1989, 1991). This interaction or du-
ality of agency-structure happens through time and space. Our lives are organized
as a set of time-space slices: dinner at home, working time at a factory, hanging out
with friends in streets, watching films in cinema halls are all different time-space
slices, through which an agency is endorsed within structures. Patently, the struc-
ture’s properties of having a dinner with family is different from working in a factory
(in terms of meanings/significance, powerful relations, and legitimacy). Ontological
security in Giddens’s account lends on the concept of time-space, which is formu-
26This reflexivity, however, does not eliminate the unconscious motives Akram (2013).
27This is the fundamental point of Giddens’s Structuration Theory
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lated as the material milieu in which the agency-structure interaction manifests as I
will explain now (Bates 2006; Bertilsson 1984; Giddens 1989, 1991; Southerton 2013;
Storper 1985).
Ontological security is a protective cocoon within which every secure agent exerts
his/her identity, meaning-system, capability, power, reflexivity, and his/her interac-
tions with structures. Protective cocoon, in other words, is nothing more than the
potential time-space in which an agent acts, but this time-space must be saturated
with trust and feeling of being at home: No threat is expected from the outside
world, and everything that can happen is totally treatable, exactly because the pro-
tective cocoon (potential time-space) is formed in a way that turns threatening or
critical situations into absorbable elements into the meaning-system and the every-
day routine of the agent. It is the protective cocoon, not only the strong ego, that
sustains the ontological security; i.e., agency, structures, and time-space together
are responsible to sustain the ontological security state (Giddens 1989, 1991). This
point is what distinguishes the ontological security framework from identity theories
discussed above, which focus on the agent/identity ingredient ignoring the struc-
ture’s and the time-space’s ingredients (when threat is the topic under discussion).
By absorbing the outside world into the meaning-system of an agent, protective
cocoon functions to keep the meaning-system, the everyday routine, and the agent’s
identity unchangeable, stable, continuous, and consistent. Thus, an agent trusts
the world. Up to this point, Giddens’s account is almost congruent with the main-
stream ontological security’s scholars, although those scholars do not pay enough
attention to the capability of agents. An agent is ontologically secure as s/he is
active, protected from anxiety, and almost everything around is answerable.
However, Giddens makes a delicate elaboration on ontological security, which is not
covered enough in the mainstream literature. According to him, ontological security
is a quality that oscillates between two extreme poles of ontological insecurity. The
first pole is having a rigid meaning-system (or identity) that does not change at
all, while the second pole is having an amorphous meaning-system (or shapeless
identity) that fits into any context (Giddens 1991). Giddens (1989, 125) calls these
two extreme insecure poles front region and back region. Front region refers to time-
space in which an agent can express him/herself publicly, while back region refers
to time-space in which an agent reflects on his/her inner realm and does not expose
him/herself to others. Ontological security oscillates between these two regions;
someone should neither project him/herself fully to the public and lose his/her
identity’s boundary (extreme front region), nor does engulf on his/her “omnipresent”
self and become isolated and agent-less or active-less (extreme back region).
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We can see that in-between these two poles or regions, change permanently stands
out contrary to what Giddens himself argues in defining ontological security. That
is, in the extreme front region the Self changes with every context and with every
contact; thus, there is no meaning to talk about change. Differently put, there
is no referential point to which we can compare a changed point. By contrast,
in the extreme back region, no change will happen at all, such that the Self is
totally isolated, therefore, we also do not need to speak of change. Change does
not happen in these extreme two regions, or it has no meaning in these regions. As
a result, if change does not happen, then the Self (or the being more precisely) is
either at its extreme front or back region. But, we know that the telos of ontological
security and the very fundamental base of it is stability, no-change; hence, these two
extreme regions must – according to the definition of ontological security – bestow
the agent with ontological security. Giddens says that ontological security is only
in-between these two region, where there is a valid room for “some” change. Ergo,
a striking contradiction or – at least – inconsistency emerges. 28 This ambiguity
in Giddens’s account is aimed to be demystified in the next section (Ontological
Security: Adjusted Model).
We need to delve deeper and more comprehensive in change. Change is an inher-
ent ingredient of agency and structure. Structures overlap, so: (1) they “borrow”
meanings (the significant property of structure) from each other; (2) power could
be shaken up because of exchanging resources between structures (e.g., replacing
employees) or because of exhausting resources; and (3) legitimacy can be challenged
if an authority from a different structure gains admission from agents instead of
their original structure’s authority (Bertilsson 1984; Giddens 1989; Sewell Jr 1992).
Agents, on the other hand, inherently change the meaning of rules (the structure’s
ingredient) every time they speak on these rules. Furthermore, they re-reinterpret
the rules (and implicitly the sources of meanings/significance) at the base of ev-
eryday routine, so these interpretations are apt to change (Dixon 2011; Giddens
1989; Leydesdorff 2010; Storper 1985). The change of agents is not surprising since
identity and agency of an agent (individual) are entangled(e.g., Flockhart 2016) and
since change is a “natural” quality of identity.
In sum, change is natural and adherent to agency-structure, which is in congruence
with what was depicted in this thesis before: Change is a natural, inherent quality
of identity (cf. Identity Process Theory). Therefore, any act or behavior that aims
at ceasing or resisting a change is an act of change29 (cf. the critique against same-
28Find another critique against Giddens by Bates (2006).
29Hence, speaking on change as something unavoidable is less accurate than speaking on change as a natural
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ness as a conceptualization of continuity). I argue that ontological security seeking
behaviors, which are drawn on non-change and stability, are acts of ontological in-
security. Someone (or a group, as Giddens’s account is also applicable for groups
which interact into a structure (e.g., Wendt 1987).) by resisting changes behaves
in a way that causes a change in his/her identity and meaning-system, but without
being aware of it. Not being aware in this context means that agency is fading
because awareness/reflexivity is one of the basic ingredients of agency.
Let us now discuss what ontological security is based on when stability is ruled out
as its fundamental base.
2.3.4 Ontological Security: Adjusted Model
The “perils” in the mainstream ontological security framework as presented above
emanate – I argue – from what follows. First, change is prevalently incorporated
into the ontological security framework as a quality that an entity (agent/individual
or group) has to dampen it. Change, thus, is seen as the opposite of self-continuity,
the identity principle, and (maybe) of consistency, accordingly. However, this thesis
seeks to show that change is not an opposite to any identity principle (e.g., self-
continuity). Change is a quality of identity (as I tried to prove when discussed the
IPT), and a quality of structure-agency social system as Giddens himself asserts.
Second, continuity, consistency, and control (or in Giddens’s words, the capability of
agent to make a difference) are only three explicit identity principles (out of seven
principles) which score high when someone is ontologically secure. Nevertheless,
the other four principles are ignored in ontological security studies, while all these
principles are associated with ontological security as they guide the individual to
achieve a higher level of well-being (self-esteem, purpose-in-life, belonging, and self-
distinctiveness) as widely discussed earlier. Hence, there is no reason to omit four
principles, leaving only three in “operationalizing” or conceptualizing ontological
security. However, ontological security scholarship does not negate or explicitly
ignore these four remaining principles, but it does not explicitly focus on them as it
does on the first three (self-continuity, self-consistency, and self-efficacy or control
over life). We need to bring all these seven principles into the fore and to focus also
on their inner dynamics and correlations as a guidance for what makes someone
secure.
quality of identity, agency, and structure.
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Third, the mainstream ontological security is based on an identity-agency30 (of an
individual or a group) alone, while three systemized ingredients of a social system fos-
ter ontological security as clearly depicted by Giddens: agency-identity; structures;
and time-space. It is true that we mainly measure or observe ontological security
in the identity (agency) zone, but this means that identity fosters the indicators of
ontological security not the ontological security itself. Measuring the temperature
of a patient from his/her forehead tells us about the degree of the temperature, but
does not tell us the whole quality and the lurking mechanism of this temperature.
If we confine ontological security to the zone of identity (agency), we limit it to a
subjective plane, while expanding it to the zones of structure and time-space makes
it lie at both objective and subjective planes (for a similar argument see, Flockhart
2016).
To clarify the argument up to this point, I will briefly put the its pieces together. The
mainstream scholarship anchors ontological security in a being (individual, group,
or state), and gauges (or observes) it by identity in terms of being consistent and
continuous (Figure 2.10). Between these two pillars (the anchor and the gauge),
three ingredients contribute — essentially -– to establishing the ontological security
concept: routine; relations with Others and with the social world; and meaningful-
ness. Giddens’s ontological security, however, slightly differs from the mainstream.
For Giddens, not agency–identity alone but also structure and time-space are what
form the “gauge” or the observable pillars of ontological security. In other words,
ontological security does not only manifest through the identity–agency of a being
but also through the structure and the time-space, in which this being acts and
exits, because at least these three ingredients are inextricable and not reducible to
each other. Figure 2.11 illustrates ontological security as I interpret it from Giddens,
and I add to it the seven identity principles.
30Identity and agency – of course – are not identical concepts; however, they are inherently interwoven.
In Giddens’s account, it is difficult to split identity from agency: An individual acts in a way that fits
his/her meaning-system (the significance dimension of structure); viz., s/he acts in congruence with his/her
identity, otherwise s/he is agentless. Someone may imagine a slave or a prisoner. S/he cannot develop
and sustain a moral realm of his/her inner Self, neither can s/he develop an authentic meaning-system
of his/herself since s/he is enforced to do what s/he cannot change and to reflect on what s/he does not
choose or believe in. What we do, in other words, is directly reflected in what we believe that “we are” and
vice versa (Juen 2000; Tappan 2000). In this regards, Nelson and Lindemann (2001) explicitly conflate
identity and agency as two dimensions that are inextricable and interactive.
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Figure 2.11 Ontological Security: Giddens’s Account
Ontological security, in the mainstream scholarship, is limited to the subjective
plane, while it belongs to both the subjective and objective planes in Giddens’s ac-
count (Figure 2.11). Hence, in order to know whether a being (usually an individual
in Giddens’s account) is ontologically secure or not, we need to check both planes
not only the subjective one. For example, let an agent X experience an abruptly
event that will harshly distort her daily routine. In the mainstream ontological se-
curity, we check whether X’s identity is still continuous and consistent or not. If
X almost preserves her identity continuous and consistent, then the abrupt change
in the routine does not matter. While in Giddens’s account, as I demarcated it, we
check X identity–agency, the structure, and the time-space. The time-space that
X has got used to act within has changed after the abrupt event; thus, X does
not live anymore in her protective cocoon, and accordingly, her ontological security
is dismantled until she creates a new routine. It is sufficient,31 then, for X to be
ontologically insecure if her time-space is distorted (or the structure is changed) in
Giddens’s account. By contrast, in the mainstream ontological security, a change of
the routine per se is not sufficient for X to be ontologically insecure (a change in
identity that distorts its continuity is required).
The mainstream and Giddens’s ontological security are not contradicted, and the
differences between them are only nuanced, yet important. Someone may argue
what if X indeed did not suffer any inconsistency or discontinuity in her identity
31It is a sufficient but not a necessary condition, logically speaking.
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even if a savage abruption hit her routine (time-space), does Giddens’s account still
consider X as ontologically insecure? The answer is yes, although such a case cannot
happen because identity–agency, structure, and time-space are essentially entangled
in Giddens’s conceptual realm. At any rate, let it happen. Why will X be insecure
if her identity is stable and only her routine is distorted? Because X will be unable
to predict what will happen on the next day, in the next street, in her job, or in her
home. She will be stressed all the time because she is not certain about her ambient
world; threats spurt from every corner of her protective cocoon or her potential
time-space. In order to know whether her identity is still consistent and continuous
after the abrupt event, we need to ask her. This is the only way. In our example, X
will say “yes, my identity is still consistent and continuous.” But, should we trust
her answer if we were in Giddens’s shoes? The answer is no. Firstly, people could
justify their undesirable situation, especially when they are in a weak position (such
as the abrupt change in routine happening out of the agent’s control). This case is
called system justification, and it has been widely discussed in literature (e.g., Jost,
Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Pacilli et al. 2011). Secondly, if a savage abruption hits
X’s routine, then her agency is negatively and severely affected. As a result, her
identity cannot still be as it was before the event. Therefore, the objective plane is
important to analyze and account for ontological security.
Contrary to this argument, Flockhart (2016) and – to some extent – Gustafsson and
Krickel-Choi (2020) assert that a change is not enough to say that an individual
experiences ontological insecurity, but the ability of an individual to cope with this
change is what makes us ascribe ontological security or insecurity to him/her. If
s/he could deal with the change well, then s/he is ontologically secure, otherwise
s/he is not. Nevertheless, Flockhart (2016) assigns a significant heft to the objective
plane, the structure or the social world, because this plane – besides agency – is
what enables or prevents individual (agent) from sustaining an ontologically secure
state after an abrupt change.
Finally, both the mainstream and Giddens’s ontological security are bound to few
criticisms, which emanate from the same source: stability or no-change core concept.
No-change is the cornerstone of ontological security for both scholarships. However,
“no-change” engenders a kind of inconsistency within Giddens’s account, on the
one hand, and makes the mainstream ontological security susceptible to be trapped
within the “negative security” hollowness on the other hand as discussed above.
In order to build a whole coherent model of ontological security, surpassing the perils
and inconsistencies, two conceptual changes should be done in both the mainstream
and Giddens’s ontological security. First of all, and more importantly, change (or
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stability) should not be included in the ontological security model as a criterion.
Stability is not the core of ontological security, which stands in line with what was
discussed in the section of identity: Change is not the opposite of self-continuity
(or consistency, accordingly), and it is not a criterion of gauging the “strength” of
identity, rather it is something natural to identity such that no identity without
change. Similarly, change must not uproot ontological security, neither must sta-
bility foster it, necessarily (similarly see, Browning and Joenniemi 2017; Flockhart
2016). Hence, the contradiction or the inconsistency within the mainstream and
Giddens’s ontological security will not exist anymore, and the ontological security
will be in line with identity theories regarding the self-continuity principle.
Secondly, Giddens builds the Structuration Theory by drawing on an essential idea:
agency and structure are mutually created; there is no agency without structure,
neither is their structure without agency. At the time of writing his books (1991 and
1984), the framework of ontic structural realism as an epistemological and ontological
stance was not developed yet. Ontic structural realism is an epistemological and
ontological framework arguing that relations exist before relata, and only relations
define the relata. In other words, a relation between two things is what creates these
two things, not vice versa. Relata then supervene the relations (Bain 2013; Esfeld
2009, 2013; Esfeld and Lam 2008; McKenzie 2014, 2017; Ross 2008). In the light of
this framework, agency and structure of the Structuration Theory are created by or
supervene the relation that connects them. In order to identify both of them, we
need to look at and define this relation because it is the “real” thing, while agency
and structure (the relata) are the results of this relation. Ontological security can
be understood then as a relation between the Self and the world (the subjective and
objective planes) in terms of the ontic structural realism. Hence, neither the being
nor the world has a priority over the other. That is to say, ontological security is not
anchored in the being (as it is in the mainstream and Giddens’s ontological security)
but it is anchored in the relation between a being and the world. But, since any
relation is difficult to be “grasped” or imagined, we can say that ontological security
is anchored in both the world and the Self (or being).
To build an “adjusted” model of ontological security, we need to see how we can ob-
serve or gauge it in light of ontic structural realism. I will borrow – and reformulate
– a notion from Giddens that he does not use in defining ontological security: the
abstract distinction between space and time (he uses this notion to define globaliza-
tion) (Giddens 1991). Instead of time-space, I will use the term time-place because
“place” is a more concrete concept and is sociologically enrooted in the literature
more than “space” (Daskalaki, Butler, and Petrovic 2016; Kivisto 2003; Pretty,
Chipuer, and Bramston 2003; Sheller 2017). Additionally, “place” is a conceptual
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room, in which Othering, self-conceptualization, self-narrative, and identification
are discussed (e.g., Devine-Wright 2009; Devine-Wright and Lyons 1997; Di Masso,
Dixon, and Pol 2011; Dixon and Durrheim 2004).
Place32 – in its fundamental meaning – refers to the non-shareable. The one squared
meter in which I stand is only mine, it is fully occupied by my body, and neces-
sarily no one else can stand exactly where I do. This uniqueness eliminates every
Other, any other meaning, power, legitimacy, and structure but “mine.” In other
words, place refers to the omnipresent unique agent-structure-place, the absolute
stability, and it is analogous to the Self or being. The ultimate, extreme place can
be represented as a dot or a zero-dimension.
Time,33 on the other hand, refers to the shareable in its fundamental meaning. I talk
to another one in this moment; I communicate with someone who had lived 1000
years ago by reading his book; I can imagine a communication with others in the
future; and unlimited people interact over time. Time, then, eliminates me (in its
absolute nature), and my omnipresent meaning, power, legitimacy, and structure,
but all others’. Differently put, time refers to the omnipresent diverse, plural agent-
structure-time; the absolute evanescence. It is analogous to the world. At the
ultimatum value of time, it can be represented as something of infinite-dimensions.
Figure 2.12 below illustrates time and place as presented here.
Figure 2.12 Place and Time
32Using metaphorical expressions in what follows is useful to elaborate on these complicated concepts. Gid-
dens uses the metaphor of protective cocoon to denote ontological security, and Mitzen (2018b) uses the
metaphor of “hearth” around which people converge, denoting the same concept.
33The metaphor of time, used here, is in congruence with the different definitions of time (subjective or
absolute objective), and especially with Deleuze’s philosophy. However, I cannot say whether the concept
of time here does agree or conflict with Einstein’s Relative Theory because time in his theory is ambiguous
and controversial (Al-Saji 2004; Bunge 1968; de Carvalho 2018; Huijer 2010; May 1996; Radovan 2011).
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Place is wedded to an analogy of an enclosed, protected, and impermeable fortress,
while time is wedded to an analogy of the open, where everyone can meet everyone
else, where no particular idea or power exists, such that this “open” is amorphous.
For the sake of more illustration, place (being) in this adjusted model is represented
as the inner circle (Figure 2.13), while time (world) is represented as the outer one.
Figure 2.13 Ontological Security: Adjusted Model
Ontological security, accordingly, is a state that enables both the being and the
world to manifest ultimately. It is a relation between the two, functioning perfectly
by making them manifest, exist perfectly. The being’s Self has its own “voice,” its
unique nature, and the world is rich, plural, and encompasses the various, infinite
beings’ Selves echoing their own “voices” and the “resulted” voice of the world (which
is vicarious). I will call this relation between the being (or its Self) and the world
the expressive zone. Wide expressive zone is equivalent to ontological security state,
while narrow expressive zone is equivalent to ontological insecurity state, whereby
the relation between the Self and the world does not function perfectly, and it
does not enable them to manifest perfectly. Ontological security, then, is about
expressive-ness, which is not related only to the being and its Self, but also to the
world (that is why ontological security is anchored in both the world and the being).
When the expressive zone is narrow, two alternatives emerge. The first is that the
outer circle, the time, or the world recedes to the inner circle, the place, or the being.
I call this type of ontological insecurity “Type I.” It means that the being’s Self is
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afraid to express itself, so it refuses the world, and prevents any possible interaction
with it, keeping its voice to itself. It is engulfed into its inner realm. The second
alternative is that the inner circle, the place, or the being expands to impinging on
the outer circle, which I call “Type II” of ontological insecurity. It means that the
world absorbs the Self or the being, annihilating any uniqueness, making all Selves
the same. The world, in other words, is repressive, or the being is weak such that it
surrenders itself to the Others and to the social world. The world encapsulates the
being’s Self, preventing it from expressing its own voice since no “unique” entity is
allowed to exist.
At this point, a question arises. What is the difference between the circles of time
and space, on the one hand, and Giddens’s front and back regions, on the other?
Firstly, the front and back regions are psychological concepts, so they are confined
to the subjective plane. While both time and place circles extend to both subjective
and objective planes.
Secondly, the front region according to Giddens refers to an agent’s exposure to the
Others, to the outer world, in a way that him/herself becomes sacked by those plural
others and sucked in different contexts. In other words, no authenticity is sustained
of a Self or a being in the front region (see similarly, Feiner 1970). The time circle in
the adjusted model is different from the front region, however. Front region entails
that the being (the individual) entails a hollow core of Self and a weak ego. S/he
is passive because there is no way to empower the Self. The time circle does not
assume a weak ego necessarily. Rather the being (e.g., individual) can have a strong
ego but s/he chooses to deny any type of categorization or identification, which is
called queer-dilemma in the literature (Gamson 1995; Gatson 2003).34 Therefore,
the time circle implies (includes) the front region, but not vice versa.
Drawing on the expressive zone idea, I argue that ontological security indeed is
exercised and endorsed through change. Since ontological security is anchored in
the relation between a being and the world, and since the world is continuously
changing (because – at least – it is made up of the interactions of multiple actors,
natural factors, and so on), then a being always has to keep the expressive zone
as wide as possible. This understanding implies that a being has to act in, to re-
interpret the world in a way that widens the expressive zone as much as possible,
otherwise the changes in the world may narrow the expressive zone.
As a final note, the adjusted model can show why peace is a place of more ontological
security than enmity (cf. the criticism against the mainstream ontological security).
34queerness refers here to absolving the Self of belonging to any categorization. However, the individual who
belongs to the “queerness” finds him/herself categorized and defined into a category: queer.
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In peace, a being’s Self is not defined primarily by whom one is not (i.e., the Other),
but it defines itself by itself, whereby no an “antipode” Other is there anymore to
be against it (but only to be different from), and the Self has the opportunity to be
richer and multi-dimensional as it is freed from the tows of the hated Other (one-
dimensional relation). It has a wider expressive zone because it does not confine its
ability of expression to “fight” that Other.
2.3.5 Conclusion
Civil war is a social transformation emanating from within the society, causing
changes in the identities and in the structure of societies. These changes can be
traced during a civil war through identity’s changes because changes in identity are
“sedimented.” They last for a loner time than other types of changes, and they
are less conditioned on their contexts. That is, changes in identity means an entity
(an individual or a group) has incorporated these changes into itself and in its
meaning-system. Duration of civil war is imbued with changes in identities (and in
structure) as “conflict ethos,” institutionalized violence, and the need for survival
incite individuals and groups to adapt to these emerging changes by changing their
understanding of the world, their values, and their goals.
Changes in identity, as depicted in a part of the literature, is something natural to
identity. It is not an exterior quality inflicting identity, which should be avoided.
Rather, change is an interior quality of identity, and any endeavor to sustain fixation
in identity, no-change, is only an illusion. Since change is an interior quality, it is
not a threat or weakness. I argued above that change should not be understood as
the opposite to self-continuity. Self-continuity is maintained only through changing
elements of identity such as re-interpreting some values. Resisting such changes
– if someone desires to do – cannot happen without making changes in the Self,
paradoxically.
In the last section of the this chapter, I discussed ontological security. Two main
tenets exist: the first one dwells on the idea of no-change, such that a being is
ontologically secure when its self-identity is perceived as continuous, and when there
is no change in the daily routine. The second one argues that change is not the core
of ontological insecurity; a being can deliberately make a change in order to keep
itself ontologically secure. I extend the latter, arguing that ontological security – in
line with literature on identity – can be endorsed throughout change. I define it as
a relation between a being and the world, which gives rise to both of them. When
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this relation functions perfectly, both of the being (e.g., individual) and the world
exist ultimately (the being’s Self as unique, and the world as plural), and this is
the state of ontological security. When the being’s Self or the world is prevented
from being manifested ultimately, then the relation between them does not function
perfectly, and this is the state of ontological insecurity. To make this definition more
attainable, I use the term “expressive zone,” which demarcates the relation between
a being and the world. Ontological security then is about the expressive-ness. The
wider the expressive zone is, the more a being is ontologically secure, and vice versa.
Thus, change is not a part of the definition. Only if a change makes the expressive
zone narrower, then it causes ontological insecurity.
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3. METHODOLOGY
Civil war is a complex phenomenon in its nature as some scholars have asserted
(Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Kalyvas 2003; King 2004). This complexity imposes
a serious challenge on academic research and has caused an inconsistency within
the civil war scholarship (Kalyvas 2003). Complexity means that the phenomenon
under study functions as a whole–organic system, whereby every variable or factor
of it impacts the rest, and there is no way to seclude one variable since, in complex
phenomena, there is no room for “ceteris paribus”. Taking complexity into account
is, therefore, useful in this thesis. Accounting for complexity requires: (1) analyzing
the phenomenon at the micro-level (Little 1993, 2015), at the meso-level (Hedström
and Ylikoski 2010; Jepperson and Meyer 2011), and at the macro-level (Elster 1982);
(2) accounting for the interactions between these levels; and (3) looking at the
relations between the variables (at each level) as interactive not one-way relations.
I discuss complexity in more detail in Appendix A.1
Practically, adopting qualitative methodology fits into studying complex phenomena
more than the quantitative. Qualitative methodology, generally, allows researchers
for digging deeply into the phenomenon under study and to encompass numerous
variables that interact in one case study (Neuman 2014). Besides that, the researcher
will be able to adjust his or her theoretical model, variables, and the ex ante designed
theoretical relationships as the qualitative research progresses (Neuman 2014).
Additionally, a small-N research design is more suitable to study complexity than
large-N design (Smith and Little 2018). A small-N design allows researchers for
probing comprehensively into the complex phenomenon; thus, relationships and in-
teractions between the various variables are observable at a more nuanced level.
Qualitative methodology, generally, fits into conducting a small-N design more than
quantitative methodology. In sum, taking into account what have mentioned above,
1Indeed, saying that complexity is an essential nature of civil war may be criticized. That is, complexity is
not simply an objective quality adhering to an object or phenomenon, but also complexity is a perspective
that the researcher casts upon the phenomenon under study (Alhadeff-Jones 2008). At any rate, either
complexity is a quality adhering to a phenomenon or a perspective casted upon it, I adopt it in this study
as the theoretical framework clearly requires.
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this thesis will adopt qualitative methodology, therefore.
Accounting for the three levels altogether is an arduous task, and it goes behind
the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I will analyze only the micro-level by analyz-
ing individual narratives, and the meso-level by analyzing public Facebook pages’
narratives of Salamiyah (the city under study). It is important to understand the
data that will analyzed as narrative not, merely, interviews or Facebook posts; that
is, identity, Self, and ontological security are all discursive in their nature, and si-
multaneously are – at least theoretically – captured through narratives. I discuss
narrative, for a theoretical sake, in Appendix A.
The data will be analyzed using the framework of thematic analysis as will be
discussed below.
3.1 Collecting Data
The main research question is “what is the relation between identity change and
ontological security during civil war?” This thesis aims at exploring the potential
relationships between ontological security, on the one hand, and identity change, on
the other. The researcher seeks to reveal how individuals’ identities change as they
adopt/abandon certain behaviors to sustain, endorse, and enhance their ontological
security during the tragic events of a civil war. The literature does not provide us
with robust knowledge on the relationship between these two concepts, ontological
security and identity change; so, it is important to assert the explorative task of this
thesis.
Data will be collected at the micro-level by conducting semi-structured interview
with individuals from Salamiyah City (see later the universe and the sample of the
study), and at the meso-level by collecting public Facebook pages that function as
“media outlet” to serve Salamiyah City.
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3.1.1 Collecting Data at the Individual Level
With respect to collecting data methods at the micro-level, semi-structured interview
is widely used. Semi-structured interview equips the researcher with a flexible, yet
organized means to interview respondents and gain their subjective understandings
of the phenomenon under study (Dilley 2004; Kallio et al. 2016; McIntosh and Morse
2015).
While conducting the interviews, no “very” direct questions will be asked because
I seek to gain “stories” more than “analysis” by the participants about the reality.
People tell their personal stories easier than answering direct questions, and more
importantly people can give “thick description” (i.e., in-depth data and comprehen-
sive accounts) by telling or narrating their stories more than by answering direct
questions (Savin-Baden and Niekerk 2007). This way of asking becomes critical when
the studied phenomenon is abstract, such as ontological security, identity, the like.
For example, asking a respondent about his/her thoughts of the state legitimacy
(which is a concept in this thesis theoretical framework) is not proper especially if
the respondent is not well educated. Lightly impinging upon the themes and leaving
a – relatively – free room for the participants to answer form the main guideline for
the interviews.
On the other hand, it will be useful if the researcher actively engages the respondent
in a reflection on his/her own story (this technique is borrowed from in narrative
inquiry, Bates 2004; Ollerenshaw and Creswell 2002; Wang and Geale 2015) by
acknowledging his/her intelligence and probing deeper in what s/he says. The re-
spondent is not anymore a passive source of data, from which a researcher extracts
his/her desired information. The respondent starts by narrating his/her stories and
telling his/her observations or opinions on the topics of the questions, then the
researcher has to discuss with him/her on some topics to explore and clarify them
more. Hence, follow-up questions are critical for a successful interview (Savin-Baden
and Niekerk 2007).
Practically speaking, the researcher should prepare a guideline of the semi-structured
interviews by writing down the main questions, and by familiarizing her/himself with
the main themes and their operationalized terms in order to explain them properly
and constantly for all respondents when it is necessary (see Appendix B). As the
respondents speak and answer the questions, the researcher can – and indeed has
to – ask follow-up questions to incite the respondents to clarify more and explain
better and deeper their stances. The follow-up questions must be open questions
(Hollway and Jefferson 1997) in order to ignite the respondents to speak more and
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“truely” reflect on themselves.
The interviews’ guideline is provided in Appendix C.
3.1.2 Collecting Facebook Posts: Meso-level Analysis
Social media, especially Facebook, is widely used by Salamiyah inhabitants (and
Syrians as well), and various Facebook public accounts are informally utilized by
the Ba’ath Party Branch (the ruling party in Syria) in Salamiyah to deliver daily life
news and major news (e.g., the news on battles, Israeli strikes, etc.) to the citizens.2
Opponent people from Salamiyah (either they are inside the city or abroad) also
had run Facebook accounts to criticize the regime before their pages were closed.
Besides that, few Facebook accounts are placed in between the previous two clear-cut
categories; they are neither totally pro-regime nor entirely opponent.
Analyzing Facebook accounts will help us to understand the “milieu,” in which
Salamiyah people act, function, and form their understandings of the current civil
war. This “milieu” is precious for this research because it impinges on everyday
life such that sometimes only Facebook delivers the necessary information to people
(e.g., battles close to the city, locations of distributing humanitarian aids, and the
like) since formal media outlets are either untrusted or do not cover this type of
nuanced and detailed information3. Hence, Salamiyah people are widely immersed
in reading Facebook accounts to manage their daily life or to know what is going
on in the city (especially for those who are refugees abroad). As a result, they
are exposed to the ways these various Facebook accounts “frame” the daily and the
major (e.g., the civil war itself) issues. In other words, Facebook could be considered
as an online medium of social representations.
On the other hand, Facebook represents the meso-level of the society in Salamiyah.
Since these pages I will analyze are public pages, and they are designed to “talk”
to people, then they try to – in a way or another – impact the people and to reflect
the reality (maybe to change it). They also reflect people opinions, otherwise they
will lose their followers. Besides that, these pages are almost run by semi-official or
non-official “institutions,” such as the Ba’ath Party Branch in Salamiyah for the pro-
regime accounts, and intellectuals’ groups that manage their own neutral Facebook
2This information is supported by an interview with an NGOs’ leader.
3Interview with an NGOs’ leader
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pages (however, someone cannot prove that since the neutral and the opponent
pages’ admins are kept anonymous, but my knowledge of Salamiyah society pushes
me to think in this way). All these factors justify why we can consider Facebook
pages as representative of the meso-level.
3.2 The Research Universe and the Sample
3.2.1 The Research Universe
The research universe of this thesis is Salamiyah City, Syria. Salamiyah City lies
close to the center of Syria and it is considered as the stronghold area of Ismaili
minority in Syria and in the Middle East. Ismaili sect is a branch of Shia Muslims;
its members live in various countries around the world; they believe in a living Imam
who – they believe – descends back to Ali Bin Abi Taleb (the cousin of Prophet
Mohammad) and to Fatimid Empire’s Caliphates; and their general teachings are
different from the mainstream of both Shia and Sunni Islamic traditions as they
focus on esoteric meanings of Quran. There is only one Imam at one time, and
they count now 49 (the first Imam in Ali Bin Abi Taleb). The current Imam is
Aga Khan IV, who runs besides his work as an Imam the Aga Khan Development
Network (AKDN). Generally, Ismaili women do not put on headscarves, men and
women do not fast in Ramadan, and they do not do pilgrim in Macca4.
No official statistics exist on Ismailis who live in Salamiyah City. However, people
estimate then to be 150.000 or 200.000 ones 5, composing around 70 percent of the
city inhabitants, while the remaining 30 percent consists of Sunni people in addition
to a small portion of Alawite people. All of the city’s population is Arab, with very
few Kurdish, Armenian, and Caucasian inhabitants.
Temporally, the scope of this thesis is limited between 2011 and the end of 2019.
The research universe, fits into the research question and goals because of a set
of factors presented as follows. Firstly, changing the relationship between the Self
4The Institute of Ismaili Studies: https://iis.ac.uk/.
5Interview with an NGO’s leader.
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and the Other (in terms of the identity’s boundary) is a basic dimension of identity
change, and Othering is a main pillar of any civil war. The city’s inhabitants provide
us with a good opportunity to study the Self-Other relationship (or the identity
boundary). At the level of “inside” the city, Ismaili, Sunni, and Alawite individuals
interact with each other, while Ismaili individuals form the majority (70 percent)
of the “inner” space of the city. At the level of “outside” the city, we see that
Salamiyah is surrounded by Sunni cities and Sunni rural areas. The city floats
in space of a majority of Sunni people. The Other, then, is multiple. An Ismaili
individual – for example – can have multiple Others, with whom s/he can directly
interact: Sunni-Other inside the city; Sunni-Other outside the city; and an Alawite-
Other inside the city. The same is to be said for other individuals from Salamiyah
City. A Sunni individual can have an Ismaili-Other, an Alawite- Other (both inside
the city), and a Sunni-Other outside the city. In the case of the multiple-Other,
the Self has 3 alternatives: to distance all Others; to create a “coalition” (i.e., to
reduce the thickness of the Self’s boundary) only with some Others; and to create a
coalition with all Others in a way or another. While having one Other (instead of
multiple) in a context of war will not create a wide room for us to check the identity
boundary’s change since the Other is almost the abhorrent enemy. It will be fixedly
defined and distanced from the Self as long as the civil war is flaming. For example,
we can think of Idlib City, which is inhabited by majority of Sunni people. There is
only one Other – compared to Salamiyah City6 – who is the Alawite living next to
them, to the west (in the Syrian coast). The identity boundary in this case is not
expected to vary, contrary to the situation of Salamiyah City.
Secondly, Salamiyah people have experienced the war in different ways (killings,
kidnappings, arrests, and rocketing), but the city has not been destroyed as other
cities. This case makes the city suitable to study the effect of the war on its people.
Had the city been destroyed to a wide extent by the ongoing war, little room would
have been left to study identity change and ontological security since the mere
“physical security” will be persistent and prioritized over any other types of security.
Ethically speaking, a researcher cannot question people whose homes are leveled to
the ground and those who escape death sleeping in the open about their ontological
security and identity change (hence, Idlib City for example is not suitable for this
research).
To mention only few scars of the war on the Salamiyah’s society: Salamiyah City falls
under the ISIS and al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda branch) siege from west and east (2013-
6Someone may argue that within each sect in Salamiyah (Alawite, Sunni, etc.) there is various Others, which
is true. However, this categorization is priori designed and it follows the conventional lines that demarcate
an ethnic identity from another. During data analysis, potential, various Others could be revealed.
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2017); they bombed the city with rockets and mortars in many occasions, causing
tens of casualties and deaths. ISIS also perpetrated two massacres in near villages
of the city (2015 and 2017), whose victims were Ismaili, Alawite, and some Sunni
people. On the other hand, people in the city have suffered from arbitrary arrests
perpetrated by the regime, and from kidnappings perpetrated by the paramilitary
(Fakher El-Dein, Shabo, and Mirza 2015; Mirza and al Khateeb 2015).
Thirdly, city’s inhabitants participated in demonstrations against the regime in 2011
and 2012, while a notable bulk of the inhabitants have joined the Syrian army and the
paramilitary (known as Shabiha). Many people have emigrated to Turkey, Europe,
Canada, and the other Arabic countries such as Lebanon and Iraq. Therefore, the
researcher can find pro-regime, neutral, and anti-regime individuals to interview
them, in principle (I will discuss this issue in detail below).
In sum, the research universe is Salamiyah City’s inhabitants who have been born
or lived in Salamiyah for relatively a long time before and/or during the war; either
they are still in the city or they are refugees. Neither their sectarian belongings, nor
their political attitudes do matter in terms of defining the research universe.7
3.2.2 The Research Sample
The research sample was purposive and designed by using the snowballing technique.
The researcher met the first respondents using his own social network and by getting
help from some NGOs’ leaders in Salamiyah. The researcher is from Salamiyah, so
building a trustful relationship with the respondents was not that arduous. Besides
that, the Consent Form (see Appendix D) made the respondents feel more comfort-
able as their personal information is highly secured. The first respondents guided
me to others and so on until I interviewed 32 persons between March and April,
2020. All the interviews were held via WhatsApp application because all the inter-
viewees were living in Europe as refugees or students, and others were visiting their
relatives in Europe or in Istanbul, so I interviewed them via WhatsApp when they
were waiting in airports. Those who were living in Europe at the time of the inter-
views were labelled as individuals living in Europe, while those who were visiting
their relatives (either in Istanbul or in Europe) were labelled as individuals living in
7Several NGOs’ leaders in the city have advised the researcher not to confine his sample to one sect because
such a deed will be almost confusing and difficult. That is, many people could be “officially” Ismaili, for
example, but they may define themselves as atheists, communists, and so on. Additionally, many families
have mixed belongings such as one brother is a Sunni while his sister is an Ismaili.
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Salamiyah because they came soon back to the city (some of then spent less than
15 days in Istanbul or Europe, and some of them were captured for few days due to
the Covid-19 pandemic).
The researcher sought to make the sample representative to the research universe as
much as possible. The sample included: 9 individuals who were living in Salamiyah
(they were interviewed when they visited their relatives abroad); and 23 individuals
who were living as refugees or students in Europe. Regarding the gender, 11 women
and 21 men were interviewed. 26 participants belong to Isamili families (regardless
of there beliefs at the time of the interviews), 3 participants are Qadmousi (branch
of Shia), and 3 are Sunni. 23 participants had studied after they finished the highs
school in universities or high institutes, and 9 of them did not finish the high school
or did not continue studying after it. However, all of them got the basic learning.
Regarding the political stances, 16 ones expressed clearly that they were opponents,
while the rest were not that clear in expressing their political stances explicitly as
opponents (they blamed both the regime and the opposition); however, no one was
supporter of the regime. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 7 hours, and
all the interviews were recorded, stored in the researcher’s computer, and analyzed
later using the Microsoft Expression Web 4 software. The names of the participants
were kept anonymous, and only aliases were used according to the following coding
system. Each alias has three units: the first one is either F (for female) or M (for
male); the second unit is the age of the participant (e.g., 40, 30); and the last unit
is the place of residence, E for those who were living in Europe and S for those who
were living in Salamiyah. For example, M57E stands for a male, who was aged 57
years at the time of the interview, and was living in Europe.
With respect to the sample of the Facebook posts, I collected around 1000 posts from
12 Facebook public accounts according to a set of criteria between February 2019
and March 2020: (1) all the Facebook accounts, which their posts were collected,
covered news from Salamiyah city mainly; (2) they defined themselves as Facebook
pages representing the city; and (3) published news that were related to the public
affairs at different levels: political, social, economic, and everyday life events. Thus,
Facebook accounts that defined themselves as representing Salamiyah but did not
tackle public affairs (such as Facebook pages publishing only songs) were excluded
from the sample. It is important to mention that the sample of the posts was
designed as purposive; everyday I was reviewing what these pages published, and
taking screenshots using the Evernote software.
Collecting the posts was conducted according to certain criteria as well, not all posts
were collected. The post has to include social, political, economic, or meaning-
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system (e.g., discussing marriage vs. “adultery”) dimensions. Thus, a post dis-
cussing a religious meaning or a political meaning was included in the Facebook
sample, but a post that mentioned condolences to a lay person was not. Regarding
the everyday events, a post that included something on the economic crisis (e.g.,
boycott of sugar) was included because it signaled a collective action, i.e., it embed-
ded political and social dimension. Also, since this study is qualitative, repeated
posts were not included (this study does not primarily care about the frequentness
of the posts). For example, a post published in 12 / 2 / 2019 on the battles in
Idlib was included, but a post on the same topic and with the same “frame” in
20/2/2019 was not, if both posts were published in the same Facebook account. No
personal comments were included in this Facebook sample, and only the posts that
were written in the public pages were targeted.
Table 3.1 The Facebook Pages
The name of the page Description The number of the followers
Salamiyah Ehbaria Criticizes the government and the opposition 30.000
Salamiyah Hadath Pro-regime 20.000
Salamiyah Now Criticizes the government, supports the army 100.000
Ahbar Salamiyah and Rief Pro-regime 16.000
Wikileaks Salamiyah Criticizes the regime (sometimes) but does not support the opposition 12.000
Barai Sharqi Pro-regime 40.000
Salamiyah Haqiqa Criticizes the regime (sometimes) but does not support the opposition 16.000
Ahbar Salamiyah Pro-regime 16.000
Salamiyah Mubasher Pro-regime 700.000
Salamiyah 24 Criticizes the government and supports the army 20.000
SAWA Group Supports the regime and criticizes the government 22.000
The Media Body for Salamiyah and its Suburb Opposition 4.000
3.3 Analysing the Data and the Limitation
The collected data were analyzed thematically. In light of the theoretical background
that was introduced in the Literature Review chapter, I used the thematic analysis
method to analyze the data (Clarke and Braun 2017; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane
2006; Tuckett 2005). Themes are repeatable meanings or patterned signs or ideas
that appear in the data. In this thesis, themes were detected, and linked to each
other to build a whole meaningful thematic picture. For example, under the “big”
theme of legitimacy (on which I asked the participants), I searched for repeatable
ideas and patterned notions that the participants mentioned during the interviews;
when I found them, sub-themes of legitimacy were revealed. When the first themes
were determined, I continued the analysis digging for other themes (every theme
appeared changed the other themes) until no other themes could be detected.
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The methodology used in this thesis is not without shortcomings and challenges.
Qualitative and thematic analysis generally suffers from lacking the external validity,
i.e., we cannot easily generalize the research findings out of the research universe and
perhaps the research sample, because this type of methodology depends essentially
on subjective analysis (Josselson 2006). Besides that, an individual narrative is
highly affected by the researcher who conducts the interview. The narrative is in its
nature a story told to someone. Therefore, how the narrator perceives the researcher
will impact how s/he will narrate (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann 2000; Mankowski
and Rappaport 1995). The narrator would exercise a bias in depicting his/her own
collective group according to how s/he thinks of the researcher: an enemy or a friend
(Sahdra and Ross 2007).
Also, I expect that if the researcher conducted an interview with the same narrator in
two different spans of time, the researcher would likely get two different narratives.
Narratives change every time they are told, especially when we are interested in
nuanced details (Bsumeister and Newman 1995). This case challenges the internal
validity of this method.
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4. DISCUSSION
The main research question in this thesis is: What is the relation between ontological
security and identity change during civil war? In order to answer this question, two
sub-questions have to be tackled firstly. The first sub-question explores how a society
changes as it endorses a civil war. Thus, we need, first of all, to answer the sub-
question: What are the changes happening during a civil war in a given society? In
doing so, this thesis will explore the case of the Salamiyah society (a city in Syria)
in the midst of the current civil war.
The second sub-question we have to deal with is identity and identity change during
the war. Identity is important because changes that are observed in identities (either
collective or individual) are not easily erasable after the war ends. Someone may
argue that the changes traced down in a society suffering a war are temporarily
emerging, and when the war ends, these changes will disappear. Hence, we need to
trace the changes that are triggered in a society by a civil war in the identities of its
collectives and individuals because a change in an identity is not easily erased when
the context is altered. I called these changes sedimented changes in the literature
review chapter, which I will explore more in depth in this chapter.
Identity theories, which will be used to answer the second sub-question, do not in-
herently incorporate the structural dimensions into analyzing and conceptualizing
identity and identity’s changes, while ontological security theory inherently does (to
varying extents). Therefore, I will use the mainstream ontological security theory,
as depicted in the literature review, and trying to develop the adjusted model of
ontological security as this thesis suggests in order to bring the identity and struc-
ture together; hence answering the main research question by using the ontological
security concepts.
Since this thesis adopts complexity as an epistemological stance, showing the inter-
action between the collective/meso-level (data collected from public Facebook pages
and groups) and individual/micro-level (data collected by interviews) is critical and
worthy. Therefore, I will start by analyzing the meso-level, which will also help us
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to answer the first sub-question.
4.1 Changes in Salamiyah Society during the Civil War at the
Meso-Level
In the literature, duration of civil war has been depicted as a function of three
elements or factors: survival, cultural/meaningful features of the society, and actors
or the civil war parties. The three factors can be sketched out and put together as
follows. Violence during civil war becomes institutionalized through organizations,
such as paramilitary groups, which start to spread violence in the society, and also
the already existing institutions become more violent such as using violent languages
and corroborating harsher masculine values.1
This type of institutionalized violence, hand in hand with violence applied by the
state and the rebels, leads to changes in the social norms, the expected behaviors in
the public spheres, and changes in the personal values as well. These changes ensue
because groups and individuals adapt to the new circumstances, seeking survival at
the physical level and seeking consistence at the meaning-system level. The con-
flict parties imbue the society with conflict ethos, i.e., a master narrative, aiming
at changing the mind-set of people regarding the war. Hence, meaning-system at
the collective and the individual levels changes. All these changes, finally, result
as observable sediments in both collective and individual identities and in the soci-
ety structure (meaningful or symbolic dimension, power relations, and legitimacy).
The new emerging actors challenge the omnipresent power-holder, the state, and
thus, the state’s legitimacy could be changed, and new legitimized actors or entities
emerge. Analyzing the Facebook posts can provide us with the necessary data on
such changes at the meso-level.
1For example, theories of continuum violence argue that a continuum spectrum of violence bridges violence
in everyday life (e.g., domestic violence) and violence in the battle ground (Celik 2016; Krause 2015;
Viveros-Vigoya 2016).
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4.1.1 Threats and Struggling for Survival
Patently, civil war imposes direct, physical threats to life and uproots the stability
of communities in terms of the economic activities, the traditional power relations
and the like. Therefore, we need, firstly, to depict these direct effects of civil war.
Analyzing the various Facebook posts reveals three types of threats to the collectives
experiencing a civil war: enemy(ies), paramilitary, and the economic crisis. Besides
these three specifics, a fourth type of threats unfolded: an unbearable situation and
helplessness, whereby we cannot find a specific reference to a specific type of threat;
rather, the situation as a whole is provoked as a bad, menacing, abhorrent situation.
In response to these threats, various reactive narratives are found. In what follows,
these threats and related responses will be depicted and analyzed.
4.1.1.1 The Enemy
Because of the fact that all the Facebook pages, except for one anti-regime Facebook
page, are either pro-regime or neutral, the enemy is almost always bounded to the
oppositions. Sometimes, however, the enemy is not clearly addressed, but it is left
as an amorphous entity although the opposition or the rebels are implicitly recalled
to be in the background of this amorphous enemy. In response to the enemy and the
imposed threat it poses, the Syrian (governmental) military is immediately invoked
in the narrative. In other words, both the Syrian military and the enemy are two
wedded themes, which are never split from each other. Although Salamiyah City
was far away from any battle front during the period of collecting the data, we see
that military is praised as the glorified protector against terror.
For example, a post from Salamiyah-Hadath Facebook page shows how much soldiers
sacrifice to protect civilians (signified by a child) from the enemy, which is not clearly
addressed in this post (Figure 4.1).
- To where are you going dad? [A child asks]
- I am going to buy a safe night for you. [The father replies]
- Do you have money, dad?
- I will buy it with my blood.
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Figure 4.1 Terrorism and the Role of Military- Terrorists are amorphous
Another post (from Salamiyah-Now Page) shows a group of soldiers shaping with
their bodies a Christmas Tree, which could be understood as a symbol against the
enemy, who is the Islamist opposition (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Christmas Tree Facing Islamists
Military men are sometimes glorified not only by their role in protecting “us” from
the terrorist opponents, but also by showing their superiority over the lazy civilians,
who do everything to avert the military service. The following post from Salamiyah-
Huna is a case in point, naming the enemy clearly as ISIS and the armed rebels:
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O civilian, listen! There is always a soldier whom you do not want to
take into your car when you see him awaiting on a road. Listen, thanks
to this soldier, your sister, mother, and wife are not taken hostages to be
fucked by ISIS and the armed groups... This soldier is hungry and tired,
poor and his shoes are mudded. This soldier did not steal your homes
when the army liberalized your villages from ISIS because he knows that
these homes belong to his brothers in Syria.
Few other “neutral” pages, however, present the military as a threat, not as a
protector. For example, the following post (Figure 4.3) compares between the army
of other countries, staying outside the home, and the army of Syria, occupying the
home and ousting the civilians outside. However, no one of these neutral pages
glorifies the rebels and the opposition because – more likely – Islamists dominate
the oppositions and Ismaili people will not welcome such oppositions.
Figure 4.3 Military is a Threat
In sum, military is represented as a protector against the enemy which is the rebels,
or as a protector against the enemy that does not have a clear shape or object. In the
former case, the military could be interpreted as a functional state apparatus, while
in the latter as a value by its own (glory). However, military is also represented
as a threat per se because it functions in the wrong way (by occupying civilians’
homes, Figure 4.3). It is worthy to note that the enemy, when it is explicitly
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named, is labeled as ISIS, rebels, opposition, terrorists, Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-
Qaeda branch). It seems that all of these actors form one enemy–Other, not multiple
ones, in the Facebook pages. This type of simplifying the enemy, the opposition,
could be interpreted as a way to simplify the conflict itself; this war is between
two groups (the patriotic or the regime supporters and the the rebels), and only
one group is “good” (us, the patriotic), while the other group (them, the rebels)
is “bad.” The enemy is rhetorically “made” bad by consciously or unconsciously
conflating multiple actors together, ISIS with the Free Syrian Army, for example.
4.1.1.2 Paramilitary
Paramilitary, which is the pro-regime militias, has been created since 2011 in
Salamiyah. When it is negatively represented, as a threat, it is called Shabiha,
which means literally “ghosts,” and associated with bad terms, such as smuggling,
kidnapping, and looting. The paramilitary is called the National Defense Apparatus
when it is positively represented, however.
By some, paramilitary is widely represented as a source of unsafety, threat, and
chaos in the city as a post from Salamiyah Ehbariah reads:
“Paramilitary members are thieves generally, and they just steal money,
loot resources [. . .] they are not heroes. They became very rich. Can
you become rich while you are fighting in battles?”
Another post from Salamiyah al-Hadath mentions a specific accident that paramili-
tary’s members were responsible for. A gang of young people got engaged in a street
fight with each other, and one of them threw a grenade; as a result, a young man
– who was passing by – was killed. This event enflamed a huge debate in the city.
The post clearly condemns the paramilitary and the no-reaction of the state (police)
towards them.
“Those who carry up weapons without thoughts will be burglars. Those
paramilitary members are the real terrorists; the state deliberately does
nothing to stop them or to arrest them, in spite of the many warrants
against them.”
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To face this type of threat, we find two types of calls or imploring claims, which I will
call mobilizing narrative. The first is celebrating the state when the police arrests
some paramilitary members by announcing their names or the first letters of their
names and saluting the police officers who did the arresting. The second is calling
for the Ba’ath Battalion (which indeed is another branch of the paramilitary, but
totally run by the ruler party) to impose security in the city. For example, a post
from Salamiyah al-Hadath reads, “Ba’ath Battalions will keep control over the city
to fight against the troublemakers [paramilitary], and some actions such as firing
into the air at night.”
We also find another type of response to the paramilitary threat, which I will call
descriptive narrative. Contrary to the mobilizing narrative, descriptive narrative
just claims about the paramilitary without asking for solutions or mobilizing any
actors to deal with this threat. In other words, the descriptive narrative does not
imply any survival strategy at the rhetoric level.
4.1.1.3 Economic Threats
The war and the economic embargo that is imposed on the regime by many inter-
national actors, especially the US, have left a significant damage on the economy.
Suffering is clearly expressed in the Facebook pages. For example, you can find
many posts describing how much the Syrian Pound (Lira in Arabic) is valueless
now, such as: “Two million Lira should be your salary to eat fruit [The average
salary is 50.000 Lira],” and, “All people now think of suicide.”
In response to this economic crisis, as life seems to be impossible, we can find a
theme that promotes resistance against those who imposed the economic embargo.
For example, Barai Sharqi page posted:
“You [international actors] cut water, food, oil... it is OK, but I will
never surrender my dignity to a betrayer Kurdish [who are supported by
the US] or whatever [. . .] I can resist hunger, but I will protect my
dignity.”
Another response towards the economic crisis is blaming the regime and its govern-
ment, and calling for defying them (instead of defying the US). Salamiyah Ehbaria
used the demonstrations in Lebanon (2019) to call for a similar collective action in
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Syria, “What is the solution for the economic crisis? General strike and overthrow-
ing them ALL [the officials] as Lebanese people said: [by] all, we mean all. Because
all of them are corrupted.” Other posts try to mobilize emigrants/refugees to remit
money to Syria in order to support the value of the Syrian Lira. Barai Sharqi page,
for example, posed:
“The migrants will help us to support Lira [they mean the economy],
they can transfer 50 dollars and that will be helpful. As our men were
lions on the fronts, the migrants will be the best supporters.”
All these posts form a mobilizing narrative, similarly to the mobilizing narrative
in the previous threat. Many other posts, however, are only descriptive narratives.
They describe the economic situation without narrating a possible action to fight it.
4.1.1.4 Helplessness
This type of threat is neither reduced nor is it confined to a specific threat, such
as the economic crisis or the enemy. It is rather about the whole situation, the life
conditions, and circumstances as they became – after 9 years of the war – unbearable
and nothing can be done to face them. The situation is described as saturated
with debilitation and tiredness; the Syrians are seen as exhausted, damaged, and
suffocated. The following post from Salamiyah al-Haqiqa describes, “Syrians citizens
are surrounded from all sides,” as the picture shows (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 Debilitation
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Another post from Salamiyah Mubashar describes the situation of the Syrians by
using a photo (shown in Figure 4.5) as a signifier; the annotated text explains:
“The mother of this girl is dead, her father is imprisoned. She smelled
nitrocellulose adhesive, and threw herself in Barada River [in Damascus].
A soldier, whose leg is wounded, is using his walking stick to pull her
out of the river basin.”
Figure 4.5 Debilitation
The general situation is, then, ultimately unbearable; citizens are the only victims
who can do nothing but to weep their fate. In front of this heavy, tough situation,
only descriptive narrative is found.
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4.1.2 Conflict Ethos
Conflict ethos is a basic and essential pillar of any conflict because it explains the
unprecedented violence and justifies the war. Men do not go to fight only with arms
and weapons, but be backed with master narratives that can justify their death and
harming of the enemies. Two main sub-categories are identified in this regard. The
conflict ethos of the Syrian civil war has been represented by spinning narratives on:
(1) why this war happened; and (2) the Self-image.
4.1.2.1 Why this War
Each party in a conflict struggles to impose only its own explanation of the war
(e.g., Adisonmez and Onursal 2020). Put differently, every conflict ethos addresses
the question of why people go to war and what their fight is about from a normative
perspective. From the Facebook pages, we can identify four narratives on such
questions: (1) the war is a plot against Syria and the ruler Ba’ath party; (2) the
war happened because of the brutal actions conducted by the Islamist oppositions;
(3) the war happened because Syria (as a country) could not develop a national
morality; and (4) this war is a result of the manipulations by the international and
regional powers. I will explain these narratives (sub-conflict ethos) one by one.
When the conflict is explained as a plot against Syria, it is usually attached to
the Ba’ath Party’s narrative. Ba’ath Party argues that it has a mission to rebuild
one Arab Nation, and in doing so, it is fought by essential enemies (e.g., Israel).
“This war against Syria is partly targeting the Ba’ath party and its principles,” a
post from Salamiyah al-Hadath reads. These enemies sometimes are presented as the
Islamists, non-Arab countries (usually Turkey), and the Jews who established Israel.
The following post from Salamiyah al-Hadath can be considered as an example to
this understanding:
“Ba’ath party is interweaved into our society, and it has sacrificed to
keep our home and the Arab Ummah [nation] protected [. . .] we will
still march behind our leader, and the Leader of the Party, the Arab
Leader, the great Bashar Assad, to whom we sacrifice our souls. Now
we are fighting against the new Ottoman invasion in this war.”
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According to this narrative, this war is not a civil war; rather it is a national war to
protect the Arab soul, represented by the Ba’ath Party.
Other narratives focus more on the role of the opposition, delegitimizing their po-
sitions, because they attack the state and the civilians. Therefore, they argue that
the state was enforced to use violence to protect the civilians. A post from Shabaka
Salamiyah and Reif reads, “How did the war happen? they [the opponents] stoned
a soldier [. . .] they, the peaceful demonstrators, killed other innocent governmental
employees.” Moreover, when the opposition is Islamist, that means that the state has
to fight it because Islamists are Zionists in their essence, as this post from Salamiyah
Huna argues:
“This is not a revolution, it is a plot woven by the Zionists and the
imperials against Syria. What is the substitute of the regime? Islamists?
Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood. Those who have left the country
and call for democracy are the sons of whores.”
The third type of narratives on explaining the civil war attributes it to the failure
of having a healthy state or a national community. The state is mainly to blame
because it failed to achieve its tasks. This explanation is more structural and digs
deeper into the “morality” of being Syrian. In this regard, a post from Salamiyah
al-Haqiqa explains:
“The reason of this war is that we failed to establish a political regime
that protects the rights; we failed to make any development; and properly
plan the economy. All of that happened because of some ‘ideological’
doctrines that prevented us from making a good life.”
In line with this type of narratives, the failure of the state is attributed to the flawed
morality of the people. “Why is this war? Because we do not listen to each other.
We need to integrate the Other into our system by force,” a post from Salamiyah
Ehbaria reads.
The fourth and final narrative about the conflict is one that attributes it to the
international and regional conflict over the Syrian lands. According to this narrative,
Syria (as a state and a people) does not have its destiny. It is worthy to note that
this narrative represents both the Syrian state’s allies (Russia) and the enemies (e.g.,
the US and Turkey) at the same footing. For example, it is common to read a post
such as: “The US, France, Britain, and Russia are trying to recreate the Middle
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East. Do not believe that they fight against terrorism.”
In sum, there is no one single conflict ethos narrative explaining why this war is
fought. Moreover, the various narratives of the causations of the current conflict
swage between asserting the essential, superior identity of Syria as led by the Pan-
Arabist Party to presenting Syria as a doll manipulated by others; partly because
“we,” the Syrians and the state, failed to create a healthy national community. The
identity in these narratives is always Syrian (not Ismaili, for example); it can be clas-
sified as: (1) Hero-Self bleeding and standing strongly against essential enemies; (2)
Plagued-Self failing to build strong country and strong morality that bring Syrians
together; and (3) Agent-less-Self that is manipulated as a doll by other powers.
4.1.2.2 Self-Image and Collective Identity
In the Facebook pages, the Self is represented at two levels: the Syrian Self or
Syrian identity and the Salamiyah Self or Salamiyah collective identity. However,
only the former is represented in terms of the war-related themes and topics. In
other words, Salamiyah Self is represented as isolated from the war theme(s). It is
interesting that the Salamiyah Self is almost positively represented, sometimes as a
nostalgic topic, while the Syrian Self is represented both negatively and positively
only in relation to the war.
The positive presentation of the Syrian Self is confined to two themes: the first
is achieved only by comparing the Syrian Self to others, such as the Arabs of the
Gulf, who are pictured as degraded, and the second is built by praising the sacrifice
of the Syrian soldiers. Put differently, the Syrian Self is good because it is better
than degraded Others and because of the generous sacrifice during the war. This
limited way of creating a positive image of the Self will become important when it
is compared to how Salamiyah Self is represented.
The following post is an example of how the Syrian Self is represented as superior
to the uneducated, uncivilized Arabs of the Gulf. However, this Self is not put in a
comparison with westerners, Turks or Israelis.
“A Syrian teacher in Arab Gulf comes into his classroom and finds some-
one that has written the following: Syrian + Falafel =? The teacher
writes: Syrian + Falafel = Professor teaching you, doctor curing you,
etc. Then he writes: Arab Gulf person - Oil=?”
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This post is trying to say that the Syrians are famous only by making Falafel,
which the teacher takes as an offense and responds by saying that Falafel has made
professors from Syrians, but you, the Arab Gulf citizens, are equal nothing when
the oil runs out.
The Syrian Self is also resistant. It can bear sanctions and stands against the war
by unlimited attitudes towards sacrifice. A common post reads, “Syrians teach the
world the art of resistance [attached a photo of Trump. He is angry and saying,
‘Syrians drive me crazy.’]”
Other narratives depict the Syrian Self negatively. Contrary to the positive image of
this Self, the negative narratives of the Syrian Self vary a lot. While there are 2 types
of posts describing the Syrian Self as positive, there are multiple types negatively
representing the Syrian Self. Two examples will be given below.
A post from Wikileaks Salamiyah describes how Syria is dead now and no one wants
to bury it:
“Firstly, we need to mercifully bury the Syrian national dignity, which
is dead amidst the interests, the hatred, and greed, but no one wants
to bury it, none wants to pay the costs of the burial or carry upon his
shoulders the sin of this burial. Our country became a yard that is
exploited by everyone. Death, poverty, and damage haunt every Syrian
now. The bounties of Syria have become the bank check in the Imperial
and Zionist banks; everyone [namely, the Syrian officials] flags out the
banner of fighting, but no one does. Syrians kill each other for the
sake of the foreigners: Russia, Iran, the US, Turkey. . . The national
institutions and resources are sold cheaply, and no hope is left for the
next generations. Only sectarianism and corruption are left for us. Our
fate is decided out of Syria, by the US, Russia, and Turkey. . . Sorry Syria,
the beloved, we are now only numbers on the death lists, humanitarian
aid lists, detainees and enforced disappeared persons lists, refugees lists,
and we are numbers on the list of job-seekers.”
Another post from Salamiyah Ehbaria describes how much the Syrians are not eth-
ical:
“After the last earthquake in Japan, people returned to police centers
huge amounts of money that they found in corpses’ pockets. If that had
happened in our country, only stealing will thrive.”
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On the other hand, Salamiyah Self is not confined to the war when it is narrated.
Sometimes, it goes deeper and earlier in history. Salamiyah Self is an Ismaili city,
which historically and recently is distinguished from other cities in Syria as this
post shows, “[. . .] and after the independence [of Syria], it [Salamiyah] became the
best city in Syria in education thanks to Imam Sultan Muhammad [the 48th Imam
of Ismaili].”2 Another post from Sawa Group celebrates the cooperation between
people of Salamiyah, “A group of teachers are ready to give private lesson for free
or symbolic fees.”
This image of Salamiyah Self is also boosted by celebrating and praising the current
Ismaili Imam’s thoughts. For example, some posts represent Imam’s thoughts as
calling for diversity, tolerance, and helping all regardless of their identities. A posts
from Salamiyah Wikileaks Facebook reads:
“Imam is a person who works for all, regardless of their religions, race.
He calls for love and tolerance to all; he spreads tolerance; he does not
work in politics because he knows how dirty it is. He tries to protect and
glorifies the human lives by deeds not merely speeches; he gives a good
example of Islam; he calls to celebrate the intellect and to help others,
all others.”
They sometimes go further by shedding light on and diffusing Ismaili beliefs, which
differ radically from the mainstream Islam. The following post from Salamiyah 24
denies the Hell and Heaven, adopting the esoteric interpretation of Ismailism and
referring to this interpretation as Jalaluddin Rumi’s.3 “Hell and Heaven are here.
Do not think of them as existing up there. Every time we love, we enter the heaven,
and every time we hate, we are burnt in hell.”
This positive Ismaili-related identity of Salamiyah counters the war narrative in
Syria, as this post reads from Salamiyah Ehbaria, with an attached photo of the
Ismaili Imam, “They are busy with death, with annihilation; we are busy with
survival. They kindle war, we kindle peace. Peace upon Syria and all the world.”
Although “they” is not clear in its reference, this post implies that the Ismaili people
support peace, while “others,” whoever they are, know only killing. Then, peace,
not war, is what the Ismailis should seek.
2There is only one Ismaili Imam at one time. Every Imam before his death has to nominate either his son
or his grandson as the next Imam. All Ismaili Imams are – believed to be – linearly descended from the
first Imam, who is Ali bin Abi Talep. The current Imam is the fourty-ninth one, and his name is Karim
Shah Aga Khan IV.
3However, the researcher does not know whether this quotation is true or not.
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Beside this positive image of the Salamiyah Self, it is very common to show a
discrimination conducted by the government (and sometimes the state) against this
city, without showing a reason. A post argues, “The government, with the power-
holders, do not want to reward the city for its sacrifice in the war and its standing
with the state; thus, the government refused to build factories near the city for no
reasons but discrimination.”
Contrary to the negative image of the Syrian Self, which is decaying to ashes,
Salamiyah Self is represented in light of nostalgia to an intimate past. A post
reads, “In the past, Salamiyah was [unified as if it were] one family. Now, it is not
the case: in weddings, people try to show off by bringing the most expensive wine
[instead of showing solidarity].” We can interpret such posts as that the Syrian Self
is decaying consciously or unconsciously at the narrative level (as represented in
the Facebook). That is, at best, this Self is good when it is bleeding (sacrificing)
and when it is compared to others who – allegedly – are uneducated. At worst,
the nature of this Self is disappearing; Syrians are bad morally and Syria itself is
buried, it is finished. Contrary to this image, Salamiyah Self is, at worst, a topic of
a nostalgic memory of an intimate social relations and a strong social capital. And,
it is at best an Ismaili City that once formed an empire (Fatimid). In other words,
Salamiyah Self is – more than the Syrian Self – stands by itself and not confined to
others nor to the war narrative.
4.1.3 The State Legitimacy
This part will discuss how the state legitimacy (the idea that the regime is righteous
and the state’s apparatuses are trusted)4 is affected by the current conflict as it
is depicted in the Facebook pages. It is very prevalent that state legitimacy is
predominantly anchored in the personality of the president, Bashar Assad, and his
father Hafez Assad. Personal cult is what legitimizes the state, and exaggerating the
praise of Bashar Assad is a common rhetoric such as describing him “the lord of the
world.” A post from Salamiyah al-Hadath shows this exaggeration in the following
quote: “Hafez Assad, the greatest man of this Ummah (the Arabs), the Leader, the
Founder, the Eternal forever in our hearts.”
Another post was written by a journalist from Salamiyah and published across many
4For more discussion about legitimacy, see (Gilley 2006; Kratochwil 2006; Stillman 1974; Topal 2009; Van der
Toorn, Tyler, and Jost 2011; Weatherford 1992).
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pages after Syrians have criticized the government’s decision of renting Tartous Port
to Russia, which has been seen as an action of selling the home:
“After the decision of renting the Port to Russia, swarms of ravens started
to voice badly. O stupid! This is a way to avert the severe economic
sanction. All states’ ports are run by private companies. And, do not
think that our ‘leadership’ core would make this decision if it were not
useful for the people and home. Our trust in our leadership core is great.
The coming days will prove that. Allah, may you protect and take care
of my lord, the president.”
Beside the prevalent personal cult as a source of legitimizing the state, few posts
pointing to the state’s efforts to counter corruption as a proof of legitimization. For
example, posts were celebrating the state confiscating of the wealth of Rami Mahlouf,
the president’s cousin. However, this type of legitimization is still essentially based
on the personal cult as the following past from Salamiyah al-Hadath shows:
“[Quoting a president’s saying] The Comrade, Doctor, the General Sec-
retary of the Ba’ath Party said, ‘corruption is the biggest challenge for
every state. The administrative and financial corruption stems out from
the ethical corruption. Both of them lead to a more dangerous corrup-
tion, which is the patriotic corruption steering someone to sale his home
to who pays more. We need to crash every corrupted person with an
iron fist.’ ”
Against this legitimizing rhetoric, there is a significant delegitimizing rhetoric with
various reasons and various types. Some narratives delegitimize the state itself,
not the government due to the bad economic performance or general dysfunctions.
Rather it is the state itself (which is not a clear concept, and seems to be melted
with the notion of home) is stripped from its acceptance by the Syrian people due
to the whole structure of autocracy as this post from Salamiyah Wikileaks shows by
quoting Magout, who is a famous poet and writer from Salamiyah:
“ ‘Home is sold only for 5 Lira.’ Magout wrote a book titled ‘I will
betray my Home.’ Which Home someone may publicly betray? It is the
home of the tyrants, while the real home is the home of the free people.
Those who betray a home of a tyrant are truly devoting themselves to
the human beings.”
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Other narratives of delegitimization are centered around the failure of the regime
to protect the honor of Syria, the home, especially in vein of the frequent Israeli
airstrikes. This type of delegitimizing narrative differs from the previous one by
specifying a clear reason and a specific object of delegitimization: the regime failed
to protect our home (while home, in the previous narrative is melted with the state
and the regime by an enrooted fear). Put differently, this type of delegitimizing
narrative admits a home to be protected, while the previous delegitimizing narrative
does not admit such a home (since the home is gone with fear). For example, a post
from Salamiyah Ehbaria ironically states, “Syria will avenge the Israeli airstrike ...
by bombing Idlib [a province in Syria].” And another post from Salamiyah Wikileaks
reads, “They [the regime] have given up the remnant of Eli Cohen’s corpse [a famous
Israeli spy who was executed in the 1960s] to Israel in return of nothing. It is a
shame.”
Another type of delegitimizing narrative is stemmed out from the dysfunctional
economic performance and the corruption of the government, and it is clearly named:
the government, not the regime, is dysfunctional. It is very common to read a
post such as: “After 8 years of the war, the government still hires, firstly, the
officials’ relatives in the public positions!” Additionally, this type of delegitimization
is expanded to the flaws in the government’s performance in terms of providing
security and controlling the paramilitary, as the following quote from Barai Sharqi
argues: “After defeating the ISIS and liberalizing the suburb, the authority does not
allow the people to come back to their villages because of corruption, they [corrupted
officials] want to steal and exploit [the lands].”
In sum, we see that legitimizing the state is weaved, almost, around one reason:
personal cult of the president, while the delegitimizing narratives swing from dele-
gitimizing the idea of home (by denying Syria as home, it is gone, dead) and the
existence of the state itself, through delegitimizing the regime because it does not
protect “our” honor, to delegitimizing the government for specific reasons, such as
the failed economic performance.
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4.1.4 Power Relations
Power relations, in this part, refers to how those who control power in Syria and
Salamiyah are seen in the Facebook pages. Usually, power is depicted as the ability
to impose threat or control over the body, for example by arresting, and controlling
knowledge and the source of information (Giddens 1991; Hinkin and Schriesheim
1989; Pierro, Cicero, and Raven 2008; Van der Toorn, Tyler, and Jost 2011). It is
surprising that the military is not represented as a power-holder, rather it is seen
as poor and devoted for protecting home. It is exploited by those who have power.
During the period of analysis, there was a campaign, covered by the Facebook pages,
imploring the president to end the obligatory military service for those who have
served for six or seven years. This campaign was embarked on by soldiers themselves,
and it is common to see planks held by a child calling for his father return from the
front as a photo or a Facebook post.
Even the most radical stance against the military, which pictures it as a problem not
a solution, does not narrate it as a power-holder in Salamiyah, at least. It can be
a de facto power-holder in the provinces where it fights (as the post below shows in
Idlib where the soldiers are stealing people’s goods), but not in Salamiyah, which is a
city out of direct clashes since 2017. However, it is worthy to note that even the pro-
regime pages do not deny lootings committed in the “liberated” areas, and explicitly
they condemn it. One of the Facebook groups (SAWA), for example, clearly says
that it does not advertise any looted goods and the goods – to be advertised – should
have a clear source.
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Figure 4.6 Syrian Army Steals Civilians’ Goods when it Imposes its Control on their
Villages (Source: Hiea I’lamiyah)
In sum, and in terms of Salamiyah’s social and political space, military is like “us,”
poor and pure; steals like us and bleeds like us, “we,” the civilians. No power is held
by it, so it implores the president to end the soldier’s services begging its “mercy,”
although no hope is there: “My Lord, Mr. President, you are our only hope. We
need to finish our military service,” is a common post.
The state itself (even in the vaguest terms) has no power in specific events. For
example, when it is related to paramilitary, it seems that the state can do nothing,
and that is why not only police but also the Ba’ath Battalion (another branch of
paramilitary) is called to control these paramilitary members. Sometimes, however,
police arrest few paramilitary leaders and the Facebook pages celebrate that.
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4.1.5 Reflection on the Meso-Level Narratives
In this part, I seek to build a whole picture of the collective/meso-level narratives;
that is, I will try to explain how these different and multiple categories are connected
together and how we can understand the duration of civil war phenomenon by
digging into the meso-level narratives.
First of all, tangible threats, not abstract entities (such as identity), menace the
everyday life and these threats are almost congruently represented in the various
Facebook pages. Some threats invoke mobilizing narratives; viz., survival strate-
gies that are implored to save “us” from the threats. Other threats, however, do
not. They are simply narrated through descriptive narratives, whereby no way of
surviving is seen.
Military is widely narrated as successful in countering the enemy and protecting the
civilians from them (military as a functional state apparatus), or it is glorified by its
own without explicitly mentioning its function (the military as a value on its own).
Military is seen also as a pure giver, devoted for “us,” and it occupies a low rank
in the power relations spectrum, suppressed by the “state” and/or the corrupted
government. Moreover, when the causes of the war are narrated (conflict ethos),
sometimes a Hero-Self emerges bleeding, suffering, and roaring in pain in order
to protect the Arab Ummah. The actualization of this Hero-Self is the military,
which has a lot of martyrs. This actual Hero-Self encapsulates a significant part of
narrating the Self, the identity: Syrian-Self is partly a bleeding Self. The military,
then, becomes an essential ingredient of narrating “our” identity, the Syrian identity.
This combination of “pure,” “devoted,” “repressed in the power relations,” “the
bleeding Hero-Self,” of “being Syrian” into one entity, which is the military, results
in contradictions. The Self, as a collective identity, is represented as the Syrian Self
and the Salamiyah Self. The former is represented only in relation to the war; it does
not exist in the narratives out of the war frame, contrary to the latter. The Syrian
Self, also, is positively seen only when it is compared to the Other, the degraded
Other (it is seen as poor, bleeding, and suffering when it is represented by its own
without bounding it to the Other). Then, the military (which forms or embodies
this bleeding) is very essential in actualizing and creating the Syrian Self as I will
try to explain.
In order to establish the war as a narrative frame onto which the Syrian Self is
“positively” built, the war should be narrated as a duty, an honor for protecting the
Syrian existence. The war must not be seen as a mistake, a result of the failed state,
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or a game played by international and regional powers while “we,” the Syrians, are
not more than a doll. Building the narrative of war as an honor is what the conflict
ethos struggles to do. However, we saw that the conflict ethos fails to establish one
hegemonic narrative on the war. When the war is narrated, three main narratives
emerge: the war is due to our plagued-Self (the state failed to create a national
morality); the war is due to our agent-less-Self (the war is nothing more than a play
between international powers); and the war is a plot against the great Syria, Ba’ath
Party, and against the Arab Ummah (nation) launched by essential enemies (e.g.,
Jews, Ottomans, etc.). Against these essential enemies, our Hero-Self is fighting,
bleeding, which is only actualized by the military. This last sub-conflict ethos is only
what can build a positive Syrian Self, therefore. Who actualizes this “positive” sub-
conflict ethos? The military. However, this only pillar of the Syrian Self (military)
– as positively represented by its own (not bounded to the derogated Other) – is
poor, has no power; it is like “us,” repressed and implores the “state” and Ba’ath
Party to help.
These inconsistencies between the first and second arguments (military as essen-
tial to the positive Self and its weakness, simultaneously) make the Salamiyah Self
appear as a solution to avoid this contradiction. Salamiyah Self, compared to the
Syrian Self, is much wider (it is not confined to the frame of the war) and it has
its own positive values without being bounded to a derogated Other and without
making it bleed and suffer. In other words, the Salamiyah Self is thicker and more
complex than the Syrian Self. I interpret this thick identity as a salvation of the
inconsistency plaguing the Syrian Self; a space to which the narrator escapes to find
a positive, coherent Self s/he can adopt. At the same time, this inconsistency could
explain, I argue, the representation of the Syrian Self as dead.
In this line, we see also that the legitimizing narrative is thin; it is (almost) solely
confined to the personal cult. The president is the only source of legitimization, and
he, the super hero, the sacred man, never errs. On the contrary, the delegitimizing
narrative is very much thicker; the home/state itself is delegitimized alongside with
the regime and the government. The reasons of this delegitimization vary from au-
thoritarianism that destroyed the feeling of being Syrian, through the coward regime
which does not react to the frequent Israeli airstrikes, to the miserable performance
of the government. This wide or thick delegitimizing narrative is logical since the
other threats (paramilitary, economic crisis, the situation of helplessness) are not
solved and there is no one survival/mobilizing narrative about them. Rather, we
see that a descriptive narrative about these threats is prevalent. Thus, who is to be
legitimized, who is called to be the saver? No one. On the other hand, the scattered
power relations mean that the state itself is weak, and implicitly the “adored” tyrant
94
is such. That is why the delegitimizing narrative is thicker and more complex than
the legitimizing one. Simply, there is a lot to be said on delegitimization than on
legitimization.
Another note can be useful to support the interpretation presented above. The
narrative of war against the essential enemies and – accordingly – the Syrian Self
which bleeds to protect the Arab Ummha are indeed full with false assumptions.
In order to protect the Arab Ummah, you should like this Ummah, which is not
the case as these examples from Barai Sharqi show: “O Arab Ummha! Fuck you”;
“[Arabs are] a group of animals. An Ummah whom all nations mock”; and:
“Teach your children that the conqueror of Homs is the Leader, the
Prince of martyrs, the Hero Ali Hozam [a Syrian soldier], and let your
legends [namely, Khalid bin Walid, a very important symbol of Arabs
and Muslims] go to hell. And, teach them that the Tiger Suhil Hasan’s
[a Syrian officer] victories have passed all the Islamic concurrences that
lost Spain. And, teach them that Fadi Zidan [a Syrian soldier] who has
stood bravely in front of a tank is more important than Abbas Bin Fernas
[an Islamic scientist who is considered to be the first person who tried
to fly], who fly for his own personal glory."
Up to this point of analysis, we see that two types of narrative unfold: thick and thin
narratives. Thick narrative refers to complex narrative that says multiple things at
the same time; it is rich with themes or concepts and can be read or interpreted
in various ways because it is based on multiple premises. On the other hand, thin
narrative says one thing at a time; it is simple, narrow, and represents the reality
in a tough way, such as black and white. In thin narratives, a reader can easily
extract only one premise lurking behind its logic. The delegitimizing narrative,
the Salamiyah Self narrative, the survival narrative are all thick; while legitimizing
narrative, Syrian Self narrative, and the threats narrative are thin.
This distinction between thin and thick narratives is inspired by many scholars.
For example, Abend (2011) establishes a distinction between thick morality and
thin morality; Franzosi, De Fazio, and Vicari (2012) distinguish between simple
series of actor – verb (action) – object and multiple series in newspaper narratives;
Strömbom (2014) discusses thin and thick recognition of the Other; and De Groot,
Goodson, and Veugelers (2014) elaborate on thick understanding of democracy as
a complex system and thin understanding of it as a simple political system. All of
these examples show that thick narrative is more positive, more complex, and can
deal with the reality better.
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I argue that tracing thick and thin narratives during civil war may be useful because
of three reasons. Firstly, the co-existence of thick and thin narratives “proves” that
civil war is not simply a dispute spring up only across two shores of the battle front.
Indeed, the battle front, the fighting, or the conflict between, say, the government
and the rebels occupies only a part among many other disputes in a civil war. As
the analysis shows, there are disputes everywhere: in legitimacy, in power relations,
in conceptualizing the Self, etc. During a civil war, disputes and cleavages diffuse
among the society and across its layers in all directions; they are never limited
to a dispute between two conflicting parties. This understanding is in line with
what is theoretically argued in the literature review: Civil war is inner structural
transformations in a society and it is not simply a rebellion emerging suddenly. Thick
narrative is what enables the multiple disputes to spring up in the society. Thirdly,
thick narrative is aligned with positive cognitive notions contrary to thin narratives
as the literature shows. Accordingly, does a thick narrative support ontological
security more than thin narratives or not? I will come back to this question after
ending the analysis of the individuals’ narratives, because this question may help us
to bridge the meso- and micro-levels of analysis.
4.2 Changes during the Civil War at the Individual Level
The thesis seeks to probe into the changes that are endorsed by individuals during
the civil war after analyzing the changes at the meso-level. The aim is to understand
how individuals adapt to, interact with, and are impacted by a civil war while it is
happening; viz., how individuals change during a civil war compared to the pre-war
era is what sought to be discussed. Such possible changes between pre- and during-
civil war eruption will be studied throughout the lens of individual identity: how
individuals’ identities change, and why.
Ontological security framework is adopted in order to systematically explain the
changes in individual identity. That is, on the one hand, change in identity is be-
lieved to be a source of threats and anxiety (ontological insecurity), and on the other
hand, we know that a civil war imposes myriad and strenuous strains and impacts on
individual identities (changes in norms, meaning-system, othering, etc.); therefore,
we need to unearth how individuals “manage” their identities during civil wars in
relation to their ontological security statuses. In other words, the civil war–identity
change–ontological security nexus is probed into. Drawing on the ontological secu-
96
rity frameworks (both the mainstream and the adjusted model), three domains are
demarcated to study this nexus. They are: everyday activity (action, and interaction
with others); structure (legitimacy, power relations, and social representation,thanks
to Giddens); and Self (self-identity and agency). While identity theories apparently
focus more on the last domain (Self), ontological security framework as depicted
in the literature review focuses more on the interaction between all of these three
domains as they will be briefly summarized below.
The interviews held with individuals from Salamiyah City help us to check the
differences between the pre-war and during war periods along these three domains.
Therefore, the changes in identity and ontological security of individuals will unfold.
In this vein, it is worthy to note that, in this section, how an individual reports
his/her identity’s change(s) is what matters more than (but not instead of) what
his/her identity is/was. Before analyzing the interviews, it would be useful to briefly
recall the concepts and theories that are used to demarcate both of identity and
ontological security.
Individual identity should not be understood as an antipode of collective identity,
rather an individual conceptualizes his/her identity by incorporating personal fea-
tures (e.g., personal goals, values, and cognitive skills to form his/her meaning
system) and collective features (e.g., meanings that are inherent in the collective
of belonging). Identity Process Theory (IPT) amply shows this inseparability be-
tween the personal and collective identities when individual identity is studied. IPT
also provides us with a useful conceptual framework to comprehend how individuals
continuously form their identities. IPT determines seven identity principles that ev-
ery individual seeks to sustain a “high” status. These principles are: self-continuity,
self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-consistency, self-distinctiveness, purpose-in-life, and be-
longing (to a group). Individual is always engaged in forming his/her identity in
order to maintain these principles or some of them; sometimes, however, individual
has to sacrifice some principles in order to keep others. The overall mechanism be-
yond these principles is that individual needs to keep his psychological well-being
“intact,” supported, and protected as s/he changes his/her identity.
Besides the IPT theory, Mercia Model is used to shed light on the formation of
individual identity in a closer way. Individual identity according to Mercia Model
changes along four statuses: (1) diffusion which means that a person does not care
about his/her identity and his/her conceptualization of the Self; (2) foreclosure
which means that a person adopts without a deep thinking the identity s/he inherits
from his family or in-group; (3) moratorium referring to endeavors to explore values
and meanings that can be adopted by an individual to form his/her identity without
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deciding yet who s/he is; and (4) achievement which alludes to building a strong
identity after conducting a laborious effort to explore the possible components of
identity. The first two statuses are labeled as regressive identity statuses, such that
they do not provide an individual with a strong ego and s/he will be more vulnerable
to trauma and shocks when a crisis happens (e.g., civil war). On the contrary,
the latter two statuses are labeled as progressive statuses because they provide an
individual with a strong ego and with a complex-self that shelters him/her from
radical, uprooting changes and traumatic events.
Individual identity, finally, changes because every individual is immersed into var-
ious social representations that are continuously formed and re-formed among the
collective(s) s/he belongs to and interacts with. Therefore, we need to check what
the collective, in which individuals live, includes of attributes, meaning-systems, val-
ues, and so on. That is why analyzing the meso-level is important. Individuals do
not create their own identities in void, rather they recompose them from “elements”
that exist in the collective milieu. The discussion of identity in the Literature Re-
view chapter ended by arguing that change is a natural part of identity, and it is
not – per se – a threat. Self-continuity and change are not two opposite poles.
Ontological security is depicted in the literature review in two ways. Firstly, I sum-
marized and sought to systematically (as much as possible) determine the “com-
ponents” of ontological security theories as they appear in scholarship generally,
and I call this “tenet”: the mainstream ontological security framework. The main-
stream ontological security framework depicts that an individual is ontologically se-
cure when his/her identity is continuous, so his/her self-narrative is not interrupted;
his/her Self or reflecting on his/her identity is consistent, and no contradictions are
endorsed within the Self; and – in line with these two points – the routine of indi-
vidual is not radically interrupted as well. In few words, the mainstream ontological
security is concerned with no-change in the Self and its narrative.
Secondly, this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate on ontological security by
suggesting that continuity of the self-narrative is not the cornerstone of ontological
security (especially when self-continuity is seen as equivalent to no-change), but the
expressive relationship between a being and the world is what demarcates ontological
security status. Simply put, if someone changes his/her identity perception, s/he
is not necessarily ontologically insecure. I call this conceptual model of ontological
security: adjusted model. This model can be seen as an extension of Flockhart
(2016) work.
According to the epistemological and ontological stance of ontic structural realism,
the relation between a being and the world exists prior to the existence of that
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being and the world (relation exists priori to relata, and relata supervene after the
existence of the relation). To simplify, there is no world without beings, neither
is there a being without the world; they exist together thanks to the relation that
creates them and links them; and finally, neither the world nor a being exists prior
to the other, the relation between them is what exists prior to both of them, making
them manifest.
This (constitutive) relation between a being and the world is the anchor of ontolog-
ical security in the adjusted model. It is not, then, the continuity or the routine of
a being which ontologically securitizes the being’s Self. Drawing on this short intro-
duction, the being—world relation is ontologically secure if and only if it “enables”
both the being and the world to be “expressed” or manifest as much as possible;
neither the being is engulfed on its own denying or fearing the world, nor the world
absorbs the being into itself, annihilating the distinctive beings’ selves. The being’s
Self echoes its own voice and enriches the world with its own distinctive features as
well as the world thrives as multiple different Selves are voiced into its own entity.
Thus, ontological security is labeled as an expressive zone.
Since imagining a relation as priori existing to the relata is difficult, Figure 2.12
above helps us to understand the ontological security relation. The inner circle
stands for the absolute “place,” whereby only “me,” but nothing else exists. The
being (and its Self) is foreclosed on its own as a fortress preventing any effects from
the world, from others to penetrate the heavy impermeable walls. This inner cir-
cle, accordingly, represents toughness, self-anchoring, self-omnipresence. The outer
circle, on the other hand, stands for the absolute “time,” whereby every other and
every different entity exits but “me.” The world is omnipresent, analogous to the
open, non-walled space, in where the being’s Self is not distinguished form others.
The outer circle represents, therefore, amorphousness, absolute equality, without
any borders, whatever these borders are.
Ontological security is the expressive zone between the inner and the outer circles;
the wider this expressive zone is, the more the relation between the being and the
world is ontologically secure. The expressive zone is wide when the inner circle is
small as much as possible and the outer circle is big; i.e., the being’s Self has its
own strong conceptualized and robust “foothold” and the world is rich and enables
the Selves of multiple beings to be expressed. Ontological insecurity, on the other
hand, has two types. When the outer circle recedes to the inner circle, the Self
blocks the world and refuses to be opened to Others in order to keep its own realm
closed to its own existence (Type I). The second type (Type II) holds when the inner
circle expands to the outer circle; i.e., when the world absorbs the being’s Self, and
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nothing pertaining to the being’ Self is sustained since everything is mutual.
Analyzing the interviews revealed three main categories demarcating the ontological
security of individuals: everyday activity, action space, and Self.
4.2.1 Everyday Activity
Everyday activity refers to the daily movements, actions, and interactions of an
individual with others and with his/her social milieu. It is space of actualizing the
Self and agency of an individual: working to make money, traveling to enjoy various
social or economic activities, running voluntary projects to influence the society,
having free time to read books are all examples of activities that form the everyday
activity. Giddens (1991) asserts the role of routine in sustaining ontological security
and agency of an individual; Giddens’s conceptualization of routine is a type of the
everyday activity, which – in other words – points to the actual (physical) bio space
of an individual to be active or to express him/herself across time and place.
Civil war impacts the everyday activity in various ways. The analysis of the inter-
views shows that individuals before the war have endorsed three types of everyday
activity: restricted, routinized, and developing activities.
Some individuals expressed their activity as restricted when they believe that they
have the potential ability to act in a better way had the conditions been different.
They are restricted from doing actions they believe they can do, or from having an
effective interaction with others if the contexts in which they live were different. In
other words, their Selves and agencies are refrained from actualizing their potential
abilities. More importantly, they can easily define the cause(s) of this refrainment.
M57E5 is a man in his 50s living in Europe as a refuge when I interviewed him. He
was a political activist and a pro-human rights defender in Syria; therefore, he was
restricted by the regime and its security apparatuses. He described how his fear
from the security apparatuses restricted his everyday activity, such that this fear
prevented him from performing what he believed he could do. He said:
“My life, my daily life was restricted by [political] fear. I was terrified
all along my life. I did not care about my rights; I just wanted not to be
5M/F stands for male/female, the number refers to the age, and E/S refers to the place of settlement,
Europe or Salamiyah. If another letter is added such as “a” or “b,” then it is meant only to distinguish
similar aliases from each other.
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terrified. A soldier could beat you in a street and you could do nothing.
I do not exaggerate. I was terrified [he reasserts with a bold voice].”
Another participant, F50S, is a woman in her 50s living in Salamiyah. She was
married to a Sunni conservative man when she was 18 years old and had given birth
to 6 children. She belonged to an Ismaili family, but later her husband enforced her
to bend to conservative Sunni life styles. She did not specify what the issues that
she had to obey and follow, but during her narration she gave a glance:
“I was a housewife and I have 6 children. I got married when I was 18
years old. I did not work because my husband’s income was good . . .
I had to take care of my children because I wanted them to achieve my
dreams, the dreams that I could not make . . . he [husband] became
religious and committed to the religion . . . he did not force me to pray,
for example, but I obeyed him in some issues that I was convinced with
. . . and some problems happened between us . . . but eventually,
you had to obey or to be divorced . . . I chose to continue [with the
marriage].”
Taking into our account that the fertility rate in Salamiyah is about 3 children
for each woman (even for F50S’s age groups6), and what she mentioned about her
relations with her husband, it seems that she was enforced to stay at home to only
take care of her children. In other words, her everyday activity was restricted due
to masculine normative power in the society.
F33E’s (a woman in her 30s, living in Europe during the interview) narrative on
her everyday activity shows how it was restricted due to a weak ego. When she
was in her 20s, she managed her program in Damascus University where she was an
undergraduate student in a way allowing for her to spend all week days in Salamiyah
except for one day. She did not want to leave Salamiyah and change her everyday
life in Salamiyah although studying and living in Damascus would have given her a
strong experience. Moreover, her sister suggested that she can take her to Europe
to complete her study, but F33E refused and stopped learning English to block any
chance for visa.
“I did not have the courage to leave Salamiyah . . . I even stopped
studying English not to go abroad. I was studying in the university, and
I tried a lot not to leave Salamiyah by choosing all of my lectures in the
6An interview with M, who works in the health care sector.
101
same day. . . I was very active in Salamiyah, and I was working with
the Ismaili Council . . . I mean, I was going out a lot and moving a lot
inside Salamiyah.”
Some other individuals reported a routinized everyday activity. It means that an
individual acts and functions in the daily life in a routinized and repetitive way.
More importantly, she or he lives everyday as it is expected; i.e., as it is drawn
by the routine which is created and embedded in the social, economic, and even
political structure. An individual does not seek to challenge this routine, no matter
whether s/he is happy or not. Contrary to the restricted type of everyday activity,
the routinized type does not allude to potential ability that is restricted.
M40S, a man in his 40s living in Salamiyah, described his experience of routinized
everyday activity before the war as an inertia sphere in which he was living. “
Besides some readings, I was almost in a status of inertia,” he said. M40S annotated
negative feelings to this inertia, everyday activity, while F30E (an Ismaili woman in
her 30s, living in Europe as a refugee) was happy before the war with the routinized
everyday life. She had a normal life, and this normal life was – simply – happy (for
M40S, the normal life is inertia not a happy life). She said:
“I was living in Homs . . . and I studied in a Christian school [the
schools also accepts non-Christians]. Expect very few religious accidents,
we shared all events with the Christian people. So, I did not care about
religion. I finished the high school and got a good tertiary education .
. . and during my study in the university, my life was very nice . . .
normal . . . I had great friends . . . We were having nice days and we
are still friends until now.”
Similarly, M40Eb, who is a man in his 40s and living in Europe as a refugee at
the time of the interview, experienced routinized everyday activities before the war
and he was happy. He used the word “normal,” as F30E did, in order to describe
this routine. “It [my life] was a normal life, everything was normal . . . I was an
employee and had another private job. I had a wide social network . . . and I was
happy with that,” he said.
Finally, other individuals narrated their everyday activities before the war as devel-
oping activities. This type of everyday activity means that an individual struggles
to widen her or his own “bio” area, to widen her or his ability of mobility; to en-
hance her or his action in the life in terms of strengthening her or his job, education,
the impact s/he has on the society; or to enrich her or his Self even by changing
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and challenging the routine. Struggle is the main theme in this type of everyday
activity. That is, every endeavor to widen or strength the everyday life needs efforts
to be achieved. As a feature of this struggle, we see that some individuals sacrifice
certain aspects of their lives for the sake of a better life in the future or to satisfy
their understanding of themselves. What distinguishes this type from the routinized
everyday activity is the fact that the latter does not imply or indicate a development
in job, education, or the personal life generally.
M32E is a man in his 30s who was living in Europe as a refugee at the time of
the interview. He clearly described the type of developed everyday activity before
the war; that is, he preferred to stay in Damascus in spite of the difficulties he had
there, while he could easily live in Salamiyah in a comfortable way. Additionally,
he preferred to work as a fake doctor in order to keep his ability to move highly,
although working as an employee was better for him economically but not better
in terms of mobility (which was more important for his plans). His decision to
struggle emanates from his desire to enhance his life in the future even by sacrificing
temporarily. He said:
“I was planning to continue my life as any person: to build home, to
establish a career in Damascus because it is better than Salamiyah. And,
also I was planning to marry my girlfriend. I was not planning to go
abroad, or to study outside Syria. My dreams were the dreams of 80
percent of the youth in Syria before the war. However, life was difficult
especially during the [tertiary] study. Sometimes I worked as an annual
worker, and other times I was working as a doctor. I preferred to live in
Damascus more than Salamiyah because I liked to have a wide social ties,
and to have many social activities, although in Damascus, my economic
situation was very bad compared to my life in Salamiyah. The ability of
mobility was good and important for me. Therefore, I preferred to work
as a fake Doctor not as an employee although working as an employee
was economically better for me.
The Researcher: How did you work as a doctor and you did not study
medicine?
– I worked using my friend’s name who was a doctor and worked in
marketing medical products. This work provided me with ability to
move around very well.”
F60S is a female Marxist teacher in her 50s, who was living in Salamiyah at the
time of the interview. She said that she has worked in Salamiyah’s schools for years.
At the first glance, her everyday activity before the war seems to be routinized; she
was working a teacher which is a very routinized job. However, a deeper probing
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into her narrative shows that her everyday life before the war was indeed developing
because she was struggling to influence the social milieu with her ideas in spite of
the significant difficulties.
“We had good relationships with our friends. . . we were talking about
policies and discussing public issues a lot. I was trying to implement my
ideas [in the work], for example, by cleaning the school with the students
to educate them how to cooperate. Teaching was my way to apply
my values. I was very effective in terms of impacting the students and
until now my old students contact me. Although I was not responsible
officially on the psychological support, I was doing that a lot in my school.
Students were coming to me asking for help, not to the psychological
consultant.”
After the war’s outbreak, however, some participants reported that their everyday
activity transformed from restricted to developing activity, which – at the first glance
– contradicts our expectations in a context of civil war.
M57E is a man in his 50s who was living as a refugee in Europe at the time of
the interview. He expressed explicitly that he was feeling free, and the fears that
were ambushing him all the time in Syria before the war and after its outbreak (he
was afraid of arresting because he was an active opponent) disappeared. He now
could do what was difficult in Salamiyah (his jobs were not mentioned to keep him
anonymous).
“[After the war outbreak] the war restricted my mobility for a wide
extent such that I was afraid of being arrested all the time. However,
after migration to Europe, I became more free to act and interact. For
example, I am now free from fear in terms of the everyday life.”
F33E, who was living in Europe at the time of the interview (she is not a refugee),
has a similar experience to M57E. Her everyday life activity was restricted due to
her weak ego and her fear to leave Salamiyah, her physical cocoon. However, her
father pushed her to leave after the war, because – at the beginning of the war
– kidnapping was prevalent in Salamiyah and women were a clear target. After
fleeing the country to Emirates, she finally was accepted in a university in Europe
for her master study. She finished her study few months before the interview and
was working in Europe when I interviewed her. She explained her story:
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“Because of kidnapping of women in Salamiyah, my father did not allow
for me to go out of home. So, I had to leave Salamiyah to the Emirates.
[There] I got a deep depression, I became no one . . . all my social
relations disappeared. I missed the life that I had in Syria. I had worked
for 4 years in the Emirates, but I was sad. I am happier here in Europe.
It [Europe] is another type of exile. . . it is better than Dubai, but it is
still difficult, because I am feeling that I am alone and far away from my
family. It is very difficult; I was writing my thesis while I was crying.”
Both F33E and M57E are enabled in Europe to have developing everyday activities
that they could not have in Salamiyah before migration, and before the war. The
war played a direct role in pushing them to flee Syria; they found themselves in
Europe where the “system” or the structure in Europe kindled their potentials.
Their everyday activity now is developing because both of them struggle: while
M57E diffuses his ideas through his work and develops himself, F33E stands the
difficult life and isolation in Europe to develop herself and her skills.
Emigrating to Europe is not an omnipresent “cause” of the transformation from
restricted to developing everyday activities. F50S (the woman who is married to a
Sunni man), for example, endorsed a transformation in her everyday activity from
restricted to developing although she still lives in Salamiyah. She never worked out
of her home before the war, and her agency was totally anchored into her children
as she was living in a patriarchal family. However, her husband was arrested after
the war and disappeared since 2013, so she found herself enforced to work in his
shop, and more importantly to face the patriarchal extended family which – as she
glanced – was not welcoming her to take her husband’s shop. She annotated positive
meanings to her experience as someone becoming independent and strong, and she
regretted that she did not persist to work before the war.
“My husband was arrested in 2013, and then disappeared, and my chil-
dren are [until now] studying in the university. I started working in my
husband’s shop after his arrest. It was the first time that I had ever
worked. After the arrest of my husband, we could not move easily inside
Salamiyah; the children’s father was taking them inside the city, in the
car . . . now I cannot. Our mobility has shrunk a lot in Salamiyah.
[Nevertheless] now, my work in my husband’s shop has given me strength
. . . I feel that I became productive . . . it was really good . . . someone
must be strong to protect himself [she used “him” not herself] and his
children [she means from the extended family].”
Another participant transformed from restricted to developing everyday activity
105
although the dominant patriarchal man was not absent after the war – as the case
of F50S – but rather he became stronger. F35S is a woman, who was in her 30s, living
in Salamiyah at the time of interview. She was restricted to act and interact with
others because of a patriarchal family. However, only a brother was helping her to be
more free. Her agency was conditioned on his existence; thus, she did not “possess”
her own agency and independent Self. After the war, her “good” brother fled the
country to Europe, and she found herself alone in front of her tough, patriarchal
brother. Her situation became worse after her divorce as she became “stigmatized.”
The war created significant obstacles in her life as her good brother was enforced to
flee the country and the other patriarchal brother was wounded during a battle and
became more patriarchal than before (as he feels almost disabled). In spite of all of
these difficulties, she started to rely on herself, to challenge all these difficulties to
act and interact within the society by her own.
“My brother was taking me to different social and art activities; I was
protected by him [before the war]. Now, I just think to emigrate even
crawling. I just want to escape. The economic situation is incredible.
Very harsh. Very bad. The very simple things such as tissues are now
very luxurious and affluent things. However, and in spite of that, now
there are many cultural hubs that are run in Salamiyah even more than
those before the war. Now, I am working in a theater as well in spite of
my tough brother who wants to prevent me.”
Europe, contrary to what presented above, is perceived by some participants as
a place of routine which is annotated negatively. Some individuals had develop-
ing everyday activities before the war, but their migration to Europe turned these
activities into routinized.
M50E is a man, who was in his 30s and living in Europe as a refugee during the
interview. He was very active in his life before the war, and he had all conditions to
have a developing everyday activity; he was studying, working, and also politically
active seeking to influence the society and change it into democracy. However,
his daily life activity changed into a restricted one after the war due to the fear
of intelligent security, and then, after fleeing the country to Europe, it became
routinized which he hates. He said that he felt safe in Europe but entrapped into
a meaningless routine that he had to obey. This routine transformed him from a
political activist to merely a worker.
“I was working in the political field. You know . . . the civil society
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was very active. So, we were working with NGOs and also with Hu-
man Rights Organizations. I participated in sit-ins, in some demonstra-
tions in 2004 and before 2004. They were very timid activities, however.
What was called Damascus-Declaration has formed a strong platform
for Salamiyah people to participate in the political activities calling for
democracy and enforcing the role of human rights and civil society. I
was working in this atmosphere. I continued studying . . . and my life
was active, politically and socially. . . we were, for example, publishing
remarks promoting human rights.
[After the war] I was arrested. Then, after my release, I hid until I
left Salamiyah. Friends have disappeared. The social ties have decayed.
2013, that year was very bad . . . they started severe arresting cam-
paigns, and some people started to die under torture. [After living in
Europe] in Europe here, I am just a worker. From a political activist to
a worker.”
Before reflecting on this analysis, needless to say that many other individuals ex-
pressed a transformation to a restricted everyday activity in Salamiyah as someone
can easily expect in the context of a civil war. For example, M40S, who described
his daily life before the war as a life of inertia (routinized), described the everyday
activity after the war as restricted due to fear. He nicely conceptualized his daily life
as a zone shrinking to the current, instantaneous moment of his existence whereby
the next moment is not guaranteed. His everyday activity was “instantiated” with-
out a root, neither in his willing to be developed nor in the society’s structure to be
routinized.
“[After the war] I was in the heart of death, at least psychologically. I
accepted it, and losing hope became a source of happiness. When you
are immersed in the details of everyday life, your intellect does not help
you. Someone may be alive, and suddenly dies. Look at my sister for
example. She was going to her work. She was killed. Disappeared. So,
I think that living the moment is the only right thing to do.”
This analysis shows that neither Europe nor Salamiyah (i.e., the place per se) is
what determines the type of everyday activity. As presented above, some individu-
als transformed from a restricted to a developing everyday activity when they fled
to Europe while others experienced the opposite (more precisely from developing to
routinized everyday activity). Similarly, in Salamiyah, some individuals were expe-
riencing restricted everyday activity before the war and transformed to developing
one after the war, while others transformed to a restricted activity. Therefore, I may
cautiously conclude that individuals’ personal features or aspects play a crucial role
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in this regard more than the place/structure itself.
Besides that, a pattern of transformation to a developing everyday activity ensues.
Those whose activities were restricted before the war (regardless of their social, ed-
ucational, and economic statuses) and found themselves – after the war’s outbreak
– harshly threatened to lose everything struggled to improve their everyday activity.
This pattern appears only with women participants, which indeed supports this con-
clusion. Women (such as F50S and F35S) found themselves in front of a huge threat
that could destroy their selves and agencies. For example, F50S was enforced to
improve her activity, otherwise her children would starve. In few words, individuals
can improve their everyday activity to a developing one if they feel that they are
ambushed with significant threats. If, on the other hand, a little surviving window
is opened for these individuals (e.g., emigrating to Europe), they may surrender to
a restricted or routinized everyday activity. The latter case may explain why some
participants transformed from developing to routinized activities in Europe: They
were psychologically tired, and they did not face a threat of arrest or hunger in
Europe (although they are not happy with the routine), hence, they simply gave
up to the current structure and the routine. Those who transformed to developing
activities in Europe are “lucky” in terms of finding jobs that helped them to develop
their agencies and skills, as someone may conclude initially from the interviews.
Regarding the adjusted model of ontological security, we can see that developing
everyday activity boosts a wide expressive zone between an individual and the world;
that is, an individual diffuses his/her idea, activity-laden notions, and meanings
through his/her activity. Thus, s/he influences the others and the structure; s/he
voices him/herself within the atmosphere of the world. However, the restricted
everyday activity boosts ontological insecurity because it hinders the expressive
relations between an individual and the world. The individual’s Self is engulfed
onto itself (Type I) living (or it is enforced to live) into its own foreclosed realm.
The routinized everyday activity also tends to boost ontological insecurity because
it weakens the Self of an individual and strengthens the world, such that the latter
“devours” the former (Type II).
The participants’ narratives show that the developing activity was associated with
bride, happiness, and with tiredness sometimes. It was clearly shown that individ-
uals choose to be in a developing everyday activity in spite of the tiredness because
they want to widen their “bio” areas. In other words, they want to widen the ex-
pressive zone. On the contrary, the restricted and routinized everyday activities are
associated – sometimes – with negative feelings and with agency-less-ness. Even
those who were “satisfied” psychologically with their routinized or restricted every-
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day activities became happier and more satisfied with the developing activity when
they transformed to it after the war (the case of F50S, for example).
Drawing on these notes, breaking down and radically uprooting the routine does
not necessarily trigger ontological insecurity as the mainstream ontological security
framework argues (thanks to this interruption in the routine, some individuals trans-
form to a developing activity (Flockhart 2016; Gustafsson and Krickel-Choi 2020)).
To elaborate more on this point, another narrative of a participant will be useful.
M27E is a man who was in his late 20s and living in Europe as a refugee at the time
of the interview. He had a routinized activity before the war and was happy with it:
“I had a normal life; I was studying, and working. And, I had a good career, so I was
happy, also I had a wide array of social relations.” After the war, he fled Salamiyah
to Europe, where he endorsed a harsh working environment, yet he was happy, as
he explained: “I hate the routine [here in Europe]; from work to home, and vice
versa . . . but this routine gives you meaning of life.” His usage of routine in this
context does not have the same semantic meaning of my usage of it in this thesis.
In M27E’s narrative, it means a struggle; he develops his career which is difficult,
hence, he experiences a developing activity now (his career is not mentioned to keep
him anonymous).
This example shows that although M27E was happy with the routinized everyday
activity in Salamiyah before the war and although he was tired in Europe, his life
had a meaning. This is to say, routine may not be taken for granted as the only
anchor of ontological security. I may argue according to the adjusted model that
M27E is more ontologically secure now (in Europe) than his case before the war; the
developing everyday activity has a wider expressive zone than the routinized one.
In sum, the various types of everyday activity have different “values” of the ex-
pressive zone: developing everyday activity has a high value of the expressive zone;
restricted everyday activity has a low value; and routinized everyday activity has
a moderate value (because some individuals, who experienced a routinized type of
everyday activity, were happy and other not).
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4.2.2 Action Space
Action space can be understood as the meta-everyday activity, and is close to Gid-
dens’s concept of structure. Action space is the set of factors that enables or hampers
an individual from being active in the world. An individual may express him/herself
“perfectly” in the social world when a set of factors are met, and s/he may with-
draw or feels that s/he is suppressed otherwise. In what follows, I will elucidate
how the respondents expressed the action space. Mainly, two categories unfolded:
open action space, which refers to a set of factors making an individual active in
the social world where s/he lives; and closed action space, which refers to a set of
factors enfeebling an individual’s ability to activate him/herself in the social world.
Some respondents were acting in Salamiyah, before the war, in an open action
space, such that they could diffuse their ideas, could try to influence the society,
and actualized their ideals and potentials. The social relations they had, their jobs,
or the knowledge they obtained helped them to “find” themselves in an open action
space. For example, F60S, who was a woman in her 60s living in Salamiyah at the
time of the interview, was working as a teacher in a local school, and she had a good
relationship with her students, which enabled her to be active. In other words, her
career and her good relations with the students made her work in an open action
space, in spite of the obstacles imposed by the Ba’ath Party. She explained:
“For example, I made a questionnaire for students about [the following
question:] ‘how do you want your teachers and family to deal with you.’
The school refused to use this questionnaire. You know . . . the Ba’ath
[ideology]. So, I forgot it and did not repeat it. 3 years later, I met the
same students again when they came to the high school, and they told
me that they liked the questionnaire idea – 3 years ago – and then I
repeated this questionnaire again and had continued using it every year
[before the war].”
Another respondent, M55E (a man in his 50s, living in Salamiyah at the time of
the interview) was also acting, performing himself in an open action space. He was
developing a project to interpret the Quran by using the esoteric Ismaili teachings.
He could influence many people, and he was satisfied with this project. What helped
him to be active in such a way is that he was not seriously fought by the Ismaili
Council (the official body representing Ismaili people). Additionally, Salamiyah’s
atmosphere was seen by him as unique, intellectual, and fertile to receive any new
ideas. He said:
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“Policy is a pandemic, I have decided that for a long time. This project
[re-interpreting Quran] was welcomed by the people of Salamiyah . . .
I was working on it intensively although people-in-charge in the Ismaili
Council did not help me, but they did not negatively affect me. Simply,
they found this project as menacing to their knowledge-power . . .
Salamiyah had different features from other cities in Syria. Salamiyah
had no barriers preventing freedom. Of course you had to respect the
norms, but these norms were more advanced than other [Syrian] cities.
For example, our women can lead the prayers [in the Ismaili traditions]
and in Salamiyah every Ismaili may have a different understanding of
the God.”
Other respondents were living in a closed action space, whereby they found no
reason to act, or they were suppressed to perform their Selves. In other words,
their agencies were restricted and suffocated not to be active in the social world for
multiple reasons. M42S (a man in his 40s who was living in Salamiyah at the time
of the interview) explained that he was not interested in the public issues. He was
focusing primarily on himself, his education, and his career. Salamiyah as a social
space of potential action did not mean a lot to him; he simply was not interested in
being active in the social world. He attributed that to the fear or poverty, hence,
focusing on work and education was essential to him to avert poverty in the future
as he explained to me.
“I was very much focusing on my education and my career. I was not
interested in social issues. I was isolating myself, you can say . . . con-
fined only to my education and my career. When someone asks me, I was
defining myself as a person from Salamiyah, but I was not religious, and
not interested in knowing the religion [the Ismailism] which Salamiyah
is known for.”
Another individual M57E (a man in his 50s, who was living in Europe at the time
of the interview) is a human rights defender. He said that he was restricted in
Salamiyah before the war due to terror, to fear of being harmed by the regime. The
fear ambushed him in a closed action space. He did not know his rights as a human
since everything was existing at the bay of death. Acting, therefore, as an expression
of being alive is a dance with death. He said:
“We were in fear, in terror. We were terrified [he asserted]. You feel
that you were always a target. Before the revolution, we did not enjoy
[or know] any rights. So, we could not understand the rights, and hence,
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the legitimacy because we do not experience these rights. The revolution
happened to re-take the rights; which rights? I did not know. But what
I know that I had no rights, I did not have the right of life. Only death
had the legitimacy. If someone invited you to food and poisoned you,
you could not sue him. I did not know and I could not get my rights.
Neither did the judiciary nor others sustained our rights . . . the state
had no institution; terror annihilated every institution. I was terrified
all along my life. I did not care about my rights, I just wanted not to be
terrified.”
After the outbreak of the war, many individuals experienced transformations to a
closed or open action spaces regardless of their types of action space before the
war. M57E, for example, transformed from experiencing a closed action space due
to fear to experiencing an open action space that is “created” by the “revolution.”
He actively participated in the demonstrations against the regime, and attributed
positive values and meanings to this collective action (the demonstrations) and to
Salamiyah City as an intellectual, civilized city to which he was proud to belong.
In sum, after the war broke out, he found himself acting in an open action space
allowing for him to preform and actualize himself in a way that he could not do
before the war. He explained in detail:
“There was a huge response of millions of people [the demonstration],
resonating with the desire to make a change in all Syrian cities. The
basic norm [of the demonstrators] was to sustain the peaceful feature
of the demonstrations although the regime started to kill people. The
[demonstrations’] leaders, the coordinators across Syria, have decided
that the demonstrations must stay peaceful, in spite of the incentives to
carry up weapons. Even when the Free Syrian Army was formed by the
soldiers and officers, who were working with the Syrian Army and then
defected, it was basically trying to protect the demonstrators [not topple
down the regime by violence.]”
“The Researcher: Do you think the majority of those people – in
Salamiyah – who have participated in the demonstrations were Ismaili?
And, were not the Ismailis afraid of the revolution as the majority of the
‘revolutionaries’ were/are Sunni?
-No. They were not afraid. Salamiyah, after 40 years of this ruling
regime, was harmed; it was neither supported nor protected by the
regime. Salamiyah, historically, was a political spot of resistance against
the regime. Most of the people in Salamiyah belonged to the leftist
powers, politically. Most of the political powers in Salamiyah indeed es-
tablished the political life in Syria . . . I mean the people in Salamiyah
were mainly engaged in these powers. These powers [the political parties]
were assassinated by Hafez Assad, later. And, they [Salamiyah people]
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considered Hafez Assad as the assassin of this active political life. So,
in Salamiyah, there was an awareness that fostered our belonging to the
nation [Syria] above belonging to the sectarian group [Ismaili].
The Researcher: But you say something interesting. Sociologists can
expect that authoritarian countries/states may not help to develop a
national belonging, and sectarian or tribal belongings are above or more
important than the national one, especially in times of crisis!
-I do not want to describe Salamiyah as an Ismaili city. Because the
religion and the social awareness were different. The social awareness
distinguished the society in terms of how much it [the people in the city]
was reading [books], joining parties and so on.”
Others, on the other hand, experienced a transformation from an open action
space to a closed one after the war. M55E, who was working on the project of
re-interpreting the Quran in light of the esoteric teachings of Ismailism and expe-
riencing an open action space transformed to endure a closed space after the war.
This change happened because he lost his belief and his pride of Salamiyah society
and its people. He was arrested after the war, and when he was released people did
not pay attention to him, which negatively impacted him.
“I told people in Salamiyah that I am emigrating not because of fear but
because I hate you. Salamiyah will never return to the case of intellec-
tuality that it had before the war, so I will not go back. Brotherhood
decayed after the war. In the same family, disputes were erecting . . .
and no discussion was formed to solve them. . . hatred only . . . people
became selfish. Even my old friends did not visit me when I was released
from the prison. I discovered that they were exploitative.”
Other individuals experienced a closed action space before and after the war. M50E
(a man, who was living in Europe at the time of the interview) said that he did not
think to be active in the public sphere because every action for people is a waste
of time; hence, he was focusing only on his own family, withdrawing totally from
the society. Interestingly, he described Syria as an “ugly” place, which implies that
he was living in a place he hated. This ugly place is an aesthetic expression of the
closed action space since no one desires to work in an ugly, hated place. He stated:
“Any action you wanted to do for the society [in Salamiyah, before the
war] was a waste of time; everyone in the society thought that he was the
most important and the smartest one. Also, security [people] is the only
power-holders in Salamiyah before and after the war and they control
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everything . . .
The tragedy in my life is that I was born under an era called the Ba’ath
[ideology and rule]. Every time I come back to home from the Soviet
Union or from Saudi Arabia I found that our home is the worst . . . it
is highly polluted at all levels . . . everything is ugly [not was, but is
which points to something perpetual].”
Finally, it is obvious that the open action space provides wide expressive zone; i.e.,
it represents an ontologically secure relation between a being (individual) and the
world. An individual in an open action space can express him/herself well, and
his/her identity and agency-related “uniqueness” is more likely to manifest in the
world, which will be enriched with multiple actions, in turn. On the contrary, the
closed action space provides a narrow expressive zone, and a low value of ontological
security of the relation between a being and the world.
4.2.3 Self-identity
After interrogating the everyday activity and the action space, self-identity is left
as the last dimension that demarcate the ontological security relation between a
being and the world. In this part, I will discuss how the participants reported their
identities and how the war impacted them. While doing so, I will compare between
the three theoretical models: the identity theories, the mainstream of ontological
security, and the adjusted model of ontological security as it is unfolding.
Before stepping into the analysis, it is important to introduce three concepts because
they are not set forth in the literature review: cosmopolitanism, universalism, and
negative identity. Cosmopolitan identity, or cosmopolitanism, refers to a disposition
adopted by the Self towards Others, all different Others in the world. A cosmopolitan
Self does not only and simply tolerate Others, but it celebrates the differences and
joyfully searches for more differences as a source of its own thriving. All human
beings, in this vein, are seen as equal in their humanity and worthy because of,
not in spite of, diversity and differences. Hence, cosmopolitanism does not uproot
the local, particular identities; quite the reverse. Cosmopolitanism is a call for
celebrating diversity, which necessarily implies particular, local identities (Abizadeh
2005; Corpus Ong 2009; Gustafson 2009; Holliday 2010; Karlberg 2008; Pichler 2009;
Saroglou and Mathijsen 2007; Schiller, Darieva, and Gruner-Domic 2011; Skrbis,
Kendall, and Woodward 2004). Cosmopolitanism, furthermore, is a moral stance
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such that it does not passively celebrate the different Others, but shows active
solidarity with them since we all belong to the same planet and our struggle is
one (Durante 2014; Vieten 2006). It manifests at the everyday life level (Skrbis
and Woodward 2007) as a social and cultural capital possessed by the individual
(Daskalaki 2012; Skrbis, Woodward, and Bean 2014), and is not confined to elite
thinking or macro-level discourses. Thanks to internet and social media, people
in remote, isolated cities, such as Salamiyah, can be cosmopolitan even without
travelling or trading (Kwak, Poor, and Skoric 2006; McEwan and Sobre-Denton
2011; Schiller, Darieva, and Gruner-Domic 2011).
Universalism, on the other hand, is inherently different from cosmopolitanism. Uni-
versalism is a concept evoking rights for all people regardless of their particular
identities, cultures, or races (Lott 2000); however, universalism eliminates particu-
lar identities, such that one over-arching universal identity, a hegemonic culture will
prevail (Sayyid 1998). That is, universal identity is an expression of failed particular
identities, and it is adopted to cover the distorted particular belongings. Universal-
ism emerges “[as] an incomplete horizon suturing a dislocated particular identity”
(Laclau 1992). In this vein, universalism is the opposite of cosmopolitanism since
the former apprehends particulars as threats to one thriving humanity, while the
latter celebrates these diverse particulars as the source of such thriving.
It is worthy to note that a damaged particular identity leads to universalism and it
may also lead to cosmopolitanism (Chin 2006): When someone feels that her or his
identity or the collective meaning to which s/he belongs is dotted with contradic-
tions, s/he abandons this belonging and re-addresses him/herself with cosmopolitan
identity according to (Chin, 2006) or with universalism according to (La-clau, 1992).
This note brings us to elaborate on negative identity.
Negative identity is a psychological concept referring to internalizing negative at-
tributes into the Self, such as racist stigma, homophobia, etc. If a person includes
these negative attributes into her or his Self, s/he loses her/his self-esteem, hope,
and satisfaction of life (Bals et al. 2010; Flanders et al. 2016; Kappler, Hancock, and
Plante 2013; Mashiach-Eizenberg et al. 2013). After explaining these three concepts,
I will analyze the participants’ identities as they were reported in the interviews.
The participants expressed six categories of identity as I will explain them below:
active humanitarian, Ismaili, leftist, passive humanitarian, amorphous, and non-
reflexive.
Some participants expressed their identities as active humanitarianism, which is
very close to the cosmopolitanism concept. The participants, in this thesis, have
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not used the concept of cosmopolitanism but they used “humanitarianism,” (insani,
in Arabic) so I adopted their own words. Additionally, I found that the adjective
“active” is useful because it asserts the struggle and the effortful disposition towards
the humanity. Believing in humanitarianism is not, in this case, an escape of a
failed or disappointing local identity. M57E gives us a clear expression of active
humanitarianism as he expressed:
“[Before the war] my identity was formed by my readings. It is about
humanitarianism [insani]. It meant that what is done at the particular
level must impact the collective level or the whole. I thought that if you
have a will to do [something], then you can do.”
On the other hand, some participants expressed what can be called as passive hu-
manitarianism, which is closer to universalism conceptually. Individuals of passive
humanitarianism withdraw from their particular identities as they think that they
are false identities, and engulf their belief-systems and Selves into the notions of
one human species. All cultures and races are nothing more than superficial (and
sometime harmful) boundaries dividing us. Accordingly, human beings are either
merely biological entities evolving as all biological creatures (such that there is no
boundary between a dog in Syria and a dog in Argentina) or they are physical pow-
ers. Therefore, an individual can do nothing at the collective level since s/he is
limited by this super power (collective biological or collective physical).7 M50E has
never belonged to any particular identity and until the time of the interview, he
was seeing human beings as powers looming into this universe. His goals were very
limited to his own family as he said.
“I am human, all human beings are the same . . . we all are powers in
these universe. I just wanted to live in dignity and to be tolerant towards
others and my omnipresent goal was to educate and raise my daughters
in a good way [before the war].”
Other participants are leftists since Salamiyah is inhabited with notable leftist pow-
ers. They belonged to the Marxist or other leftist ideologies; some of them were
organized formally in these parties while others were not because being a member
in a leftist party could cost a Syrian years of his/her life in prison. F60S was raised
7Both passive humanitarianism and active humanitarianism are transcendental universal understanding of
the world. However, it is worthy to note that this understanding does not necessarily stem out from
spirituality.
116
up within a communist family, who was their neighbor, because her mother was busy
and her father was dead. This family affected her and she became leftist. Later she
was married to a leftist person and both of them – still – incorporate the Marxist
principles in their life. She said:
“I am leftist, Marxist, not religious, but I like Ismailism; however, I am
not proud [of being Ismaili]. I and my husband were believing in a good
and thriving society . . . and I was applying the Marxist ideas in my
teaching and my work.”
Ismaili is the other type of identity that was reported by the participants. F56E,
who was a woman in her 50s living in Europe as a refugee when I interviewed her,
had endorsed multiple identifications before she upheld an Ismaili identity although
her family was Ismaili. She was, in other words, searching for an identity especially
that she was repressed by some people from Salamiyah (because she was rich and
they were poor leftists) and by her mother.
“I was building my female identity after being suppressed [by my
mother]. . . it was very important to feel again as a beautiful woman.
At that time, I was not believing in Ismailism and in any religion, but I
was believing in God. It was an inner conflict, and I was thinking that
the Imam is not sacred and he is not the source of wisdom . . . Later, I
started believing in Ismailism again because of a special experience.”
Notwithstanding these previous clear identities, I found that some participants ex-
pressed an amorphous identity; an identity that is not formulated yet, but the indi-
vidual is aware of this amorphousness. M40S expressed clearly this type of identity
before the war:
“My beliefs were oscillating between a thing and its antipode. This was
happening according to the psychological state and the readings. They
[the beliefs] were not ideas that I believed in, they were corresponding to
the psychological status. Immediate responses. I was adopting to these
ideas to relieve myself of pressures and impasse.”
Finally, some individuals werenon-reflexive; they did not reflect on their Selves,
usually, because they do not care about knowing and expressing who they are, or
because they want to escape from contradictions and conflicts of identifications.
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Hence, their identities are blurry. It is observed that the non-reflexive individuals
focus intensively on practical goals and assign significant heft of their lives on achiev-
ing material, daily goals. M40Eb, a man who was living in Europe at the time of
interview, did not think before of describing his identity although he belongs to an
Ismaili family. For him, being good – in the common sense – in dealing with people
is enough to identify himself. he asserted, “Working was all my life . . . and I was
dreaming to have a farm and to have everything there, to live in it with my wife and
my children. Religion for me is how you deal with people, simply.” Similarly, M31E
(he belongs to an Ismaili family) did not reflect on himself since he was isolated from
the society in Salamiyah. “My goal was to attain a good education; I did not belong
to anything . . . I was feeling that I am ousted from the society.” M27E belongs
to a Sunni family, and when I was trying to push him to give me an identification
of himself, he defined himself as a person who was laughing a lot; i.e., he could not
have a clear conceptualization of himself.
“I am Sunni, Muslim but all my friends are Ismaili. I do not care about
religion . . . and I drink alcohol . . .
The Researcher: So, again who were you [before the war]?
[silence] hmm . . . I was happy, laughing a lot, now that changed [in
Europe], now I do not laugh as I got used to do.”
Regarding the expressive zone, we can see that active humanitarian, leftist, and
Ismaili are clear identities (and they can be classified in the achievement status of
Marcia Model because it seems that the participants have developed these identities
after making efforts to explore possible identities and to commit to them). They
provide individuals with a strong and clear Self that can identify itself and interact
with the world without being absorbed by it. Hence, they foster wide expressive
zone. However, amorphous and non-reflexive identities as not formed yet, so the
Self will be weak without its own “home” that distinguishes it in the world from
others. Hence, they foster a narrow expressive zone. Finally, we can consider passive
humanitarianism as in-between in terms of the expressive zone (having a moderate
value); it is a clear identity, but it implies a withdrawal and agentless-ness.
In what follows, I will present how the war impacted the participants’ identities, if
any. While doing so, I will compare how the identity theories (especially IPT), main-
stream ontological security, and the adjusted model approach the ensuing changes
in individuals’ identities.
M29E was an Ismaili before the war, and he proudly described thoughts of Ismailism
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as follows:
“Ismaili religion taught us how to think and it does not have rigid in-
structions . . . it taught us a method [not a list of dos and do nots] . .
. In Syria, I was feeling more comfortable when I was hanging out with
Salamiyah [Ismaili] people.”
However, after he emigrated to Europe after the war, he changed radically. When I
asked him about his identity and how he conceptualized himself, he answered:
“Now, I belong to myself. I am focusing on myself, on my future. I
belong to nothing but myself. My belonging is to my future . . . to
make a family, have a good job, etc. My identity is related to what I am
doing [namely, to work and everyday life]. I do not care about belonging
seriously. I will not go back to Salamiyah, but maybe I will go back to
Syria to invest if that is possible. But, not to Salamiyah. I will not go
back at all. Never. In Salamiyah, people do not support investment.”
M29E abandoned belonging to the Ismaili identity and became non-reflexive; iden-
tity does not matter for him, only working and daily goals matter, which is a common
feature of non-reflexive individuals (he is not amorphous because amorphousness im-
plies searching for a new identity and endorsing a formulation of the identity not
careless-ness). Identity Process Theory8 in M29E’s case may not provide us with a
satisfying explanation for why he made this transformation in his identity. He as-
signed more heft to the principle of self-efficacy (by asserting the importance of work
and future), but – objectively, from the researcher’s viewpoint – there is no reason
to sacrifice other principles such as belonging since there is no contradiction between
his belonging and self-efficacy principles. IPT expects individuals to sacrifice some
identity principles when they cannot keep all of them highly maintained, which is
not the case of M29E. Moreover, even if he hated Salamiyah as a source of collective
identity, he had lived for a long time in Damascus and was Ismaili, and many Is-
maili people live in Europe, so he has all reasons to sustain his belonging. So we do
not know why he became non-reflexive according to the identity theories. Indeed,
according to the basic assumptions of identity theories, M29E became void of mean-
8The seven principles of identity are important here to discuss the psychological well-being; they are:
self-esteem, self-continuity, self-efficacy, self-consistency, belonging to a group, purpose-in-life, and self-
distinctiveness. People may sacrifice some principles for the sake of supporting others; see for example,
(Bardi et al. 2014; Breakwell 2010, 2014b; Jaspal 2013; Jaspal and Breakwell 2014; Jaspal and Cinnirella
2010a, 2012; Jetten et al. 2015; Mitha, Adatia, and Jaspal 2017; Ryeng, Kroger, and Martinussen 2013;
Vignoles, Chryssochoou, and Breakwell 2000, 2002).
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ings, which is nothing more than losing identity (identity is a struggle for meaning,
a process of self-awareness as Erikson and Marcia have stressed (cf. Cieciuch and
Topolewska 2017)). The identity theories (and particularly IPT) face difficulties in
explaining this case especially that he is happy and seems to be satisfied with his
own job in Europe as he told me.
From the perspective of mainstream ontological security, I argue that M29E became
ontologically insecure after that transformation in identity because his self-narrative
was totally disrupted. However, the mainstream ontological security does not pro-
vide us with an explanation on why he chose such an insecure transformation. The
adjusted model, on the other hand, may reveal why he made such a transformation.
According to this model, M29E did not endorse a significant transformation in his
ontological security before and after emigration to Europe as I will explain in what
follows.
Before the war, he had a clear and well defined identity (wide expressive zone at the
identity dimension), and he endorsed relatively an open action space (he was a stu-
dent, volunteering in the Ismaili Council, and pride of the intellectual atmosphere of
Salamiyah), but his everyday activity had a narrower expressive zone as a routinized
activity (due the fact that he was a student) compared to his identity’s and action
space’s expressive zone. After he emigrated to Europe, he suddenly had a wider
expressive zone at the dimension of everyday activity, transforming from routinized
to developing (to a high value of expressive zone); that is, he had his own job and he
was developing his work when I interviewed him. In other words, he became onto-
logically more secure at the dimension of everyday activity. However, he abandoned
his “strong” identity becoming non-reflexive; i.e., he became less ontologically secure
at the dimension of identity, while the action space – Europe in this case – was still
open. In few words, his expressive zone shrunk at the dimension of identity, but
expanded at the dimension of everyday activity. This case compensated the “lose”
of the expressive zone. Thus, his ontological security did not change radically as the
mainstream ontological security framework suggests.
What supports this interpretation is that he said that he is happier in Europe
than he was in Syria; this statement does not contradict what the adjusted model
shows of his ontological security state (because his expressive zone widened on the
everyday activity dimension), while his statement about happiness contradicts the
mainstream ontological security since a radical change only in identity is enough to
make him, totally, insecure ontologically.
Why did he transform his identity to a non-reflexive one then? one possible expla-
nation, driven from the expressiveness idea, could be as follows: He might feel that
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remaining an Ismaili implied some sort of contributing to the Ismaili community in
Salamiyah, or entailed acting in a way that would keep his Self “expressive” within
the Ismaili milieu (Salamiyah collective) as it was before the war. If it was so, then
he would be under pressure, and he needed to make laborious efforts to keep the
same level of expressiveness – as an Ismaili – in Salamiyah collective because he
was physically far away and he did not find any tool to be effective/expressive in
Salamiyah (as he was in Europe during the interview). Therefore, and in order to
absolve himself from such “burden” and efforts, he chose to strip himself from the
Ismaili identity.9 This explanation has to be taken very cautiously to be developed
and tested in further research. However, it is in line with the main assumption
beyond the adjusted model of ontological security (and also the mainstream one, to
some extent): psychological well-being (happiness) and ontological security are not
totally identical; the latter usually entails efforts because it is about widening the
expressive zone between the being’s Self and the world.
Another case that can help to elaborate more on the difference between the three
theoretical frameworks is M33E. M33E had an achieved Ismaili identity; he read,
researched on Ismaili doctrine, and worked with Ismaili institutions in Damascus
during his tertiary study there before the war. He also had a sublime goal, which was
establishing a scientific journal explaining the complex physical concepts to people
in a simple way. “I was very much believing in Ismailism and I was reading a lot in
this regard and also I had a religious position. I was interested a lot in Ismailism,”
he explained. After the war’s outbreak, he was working with the Ismaili Council. He
was focusing on helping Ismaili people who lived in Damascus and its suburbs (where
Sunni people form the majority); so, he was in a close contact with many of them.
In 2012, a very tragic event changed his life and his identity. Islamist rebels attacked
a suburb near Damascus (called Adra Amaliyah) where many Ismaili people lived.
They kidnapped and killed many Ismaili people who were there including women
and children (and – of course – other minorities, especially the Alawite people).
M33E, before this event, was warning the Ismaili Council that there were significant
indicators of a soon withdrawal of the regime army from Adra Amaliyah to allow the
rebels to break into. He was calling the Ismaili Council to take an action in advance
to protect these Ismaili people, and he provided the Council with the necessary
statistics and information. However, the Ismaili Council did not cooperate with him
and refused to listen to him and his evidence. Moreover, some people-in-charge in
the Council threatened him to stop working on these issues.
9What may support this argument is that he said that he does not belong to Europe as well. Ergo, the
“world” for him is still Salamiyah – unconsciously – and he could not keep “widening” the zone between
his Self and this world due to the physical distance, then he abandoned this belonging and his identity.
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At the night of the rebels’ attack on Adra Amaliyah, he received a call from his
Ismaili friend, who was living there with her husband. On the phone, she told him
while crying, “They [the rebels] killed my husband, and they will rape us . . .
pray for us . . . God may help us.” This abrupt call propelled him to rethink of
the Ismaili doctrine totally and fundamentally. “I thought how the Imam assigned
the position of the presidency of the Council to someone who did not care about
anything but himself. It means that the Imam is not sacred,” M33E said. He started
to critically think about religion, and switched from Ismaili to be a skeptic, then to
be an atheist. He added:
“I became non-religious then an atheist. However, I am continuing to
study these issues. Even the Imam, I do not think he is sacred anymore
. . . After the war, my goal became just to help people. Now in
Germany, my only goal is to be non-forgotten, victims’ voice should
never be forgotten.”
He refused to annihilate religious identities of people, although he was an atheist.
For him, this is an extreme atheism which is not different from extreme Islamism,
as he explained to me. His “sublime” goal after the war (victims should never
be forgotten) and his belief in plurality of the one human community (thanks to
atheism) figured his identity as an active humanitarian; he belonged to the humanity
with its diversity. In sum, he transformed from an Ismaili to an active humanitarian.
The identity theories (especially IPT and Marcia Model) interpret M33E’s iden-
tity as a movement from an achieved status, a clear identity to another achieved
and clear identity that is laboriously (“I am continuing studying [identity–related
issues],” he said) carved out when the “old” one was plagued with contradictions
and dotted with conflicts between the ideal and the actual. M33E’s psychological
well-being, accordingly, did not change between before and after the war in terms of
his identity change (however, the traumatic event badly affected him). Contrary to
the identity theories, the mainstream ontological security would classify him as onto-
logically insecure because of the radical change from an Ismaili to an atheist/active
humanitarian.
The adjusted model, however, is different in analyzing M33E’s case. In the early
period of his trauma after Adra Amaliyah event and abandoning Ismailism, his
expressive zone did not change, and did not become narrower. It is true he changed
his identity, but he was still having a clear and well defined identity (unique Self that
can easily express itself in the world). Additionally, he actively continued his work to
help people who were affected by the war (developing everyday activity, high value of
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expressive zone); and his action space was still open because he was acting under the
umbrella of the opposition – to some extent – and he had sufficient tools to actualize
himself as a “helper” of the victims. Nevertheless, after he emigrated to Europe,
his expressive zone deteriorated radically, and he became less ontologically secure
but not because of the change in his identity. Rather, his everyday activity changed
from developing to routinized, which he hated a lot because this type of activity
refrained him from achieving his potential as he explained (narrower expressive
zone). Additionally, he experienced a transformation from an open action space
(where he could act and fight for his beliefs and ideas) to a closed action space,
where he found himself totally paralyzed and hampered from helping those who was
helping in Syria due to the physical distance mainly. In sum, the expressive zone
was narrow – when I interviewed him – since both of the everyday activity and the
action space changed from supplying a wide expressive zone to a narrower one. That
is why he became less ontologically secure.
4.2.4 Linkages between the Meso- and Micro-Level
When the narratives at the meso-level/collective level were analyzed using data from
the Facebook public pages, two types of narrative imbuing the duration of civil war
unfolded: thick narrative and thin narrative. These two narratives wrap up multiple
topics related to the civil war, including identity, conflict ethos, state legitimacy,
threats, and surviving rhetoric.
Thin narrative refers to a discursive space that says one or few things at the same
time, contrary to thick narrative which refers to a wide and rich discursive space
saying multiple things at the same time. The literature that uses thick and thin
narrative concepts (or discourses) assigns positive, fruitful cognitive abilities to the
thick one and negative, futile cognitive abilities to the thin. The analysis of the meso-
level narratives shows similar results: Thick narrative has been created or emerged
at the meso-level (most probably, unconsciously) to avert the deep contradictions
in the thin narratives. In other words, when the Syrian Self is recalled and invoked
in the narratives, it appears full of deep contradictions of the assumptions which
are lurking behind this Self; and this Self is narrated only in a narrow, thin way
(Syrian Self is bleeding and it is better than the derogated Other; i.e., Arab Gulf).
However, when the Salamiyah Self is invoked, it appears free from contradictions
and it includes wide and complex ways to be described as a thick narrative (maybe
the wide narrative space allows for various representations to seem different not
123
discrepant).
Resting on these observations and on the adjusted model of ontological security, I
argue à la the literature of thick/thin narratives and the literature of self-complexity
(in psychology) that at the meso-level, thick narrative fosters ontological security
more than thin narrative does. Put differently, thick narrative signals ontologi-
cal security of that collective, while thin narrative indicates ontological insecurity,
patently because the former allows for a wider expressive zone than the latter. How-
ever, some scholarship of the mainstream ontological security may lead us to think
that the thin narrative fosters ontological security more than the thick one because
simplifying the Self is a way to sustain a high level of ontological security (since
ontological security is mainly based on the idea of continuity or no-change). A sim-
ple Self can be kept continuous better than a complex one, especially when this
simplicity is stemmed out from Othering.
At this point, a worthy note can be added. In civil war literature, we know that
essentialist scholars argue that people hyper-identify themselves with their in-groups.
Hence, can we consider the thick narrative of Salamiyah Self, which is contrasted by
a thin narrative of the Syrian Self, as a hyper-identification with the in-group in line
with the essentialist scholarship? At the first glance that may be right. However, I
argue that this is not exactly the case. Narrating the Self of Salamiyah in a thick
narrative (and in a positive term compared to the Syrian Self) results from the
fact that the Syrian Self is dotted with contradictions as I widely discussed when
I analyzed the meso-level. Salamiyah Self is positively represented as a shelter for
identity (more than the Syrian) not because of engulfing the Self into the in-group
due to fear per se (as the essentialists argue), but because the Salamiyah Self allows
for a wider array of expressive abilities without falling into contradictions.
Regarding self-identity at the micro-level, the individuals, I met, did not show at
all that the Syrian identity is more important than the Salamiyah-identity. Quite
the opposite. All interviewees expressed that either they are Ismaili, belonging to
Salamiyah and only to Salamiyah (not to Syria), or they are Syrians and Salamiyah-
ones. In other words, every individual who said that s/he belongs to Syria also said
that s/he belongs to Salamiyah but not vice versa. This is in line with the analysis
at the meso-level. That is to say an analogy manifested between the meso- and
micro-level regarding the identity, which can be interpreted as that the individuals I
interviewed tend to associate themselves with an identity that fosters a higher value
of ontological security.10
10The interviews showed that being a leftist or an active humanist, for example, does not contradict belonging
to Salamiyah.
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However, we need to take this comparison between the micro- and meso-level cau-
tiously because most of the individuals I met are opponents, while most of the
Facebook pages are either neutral or pro-regime except one anti-regime, roughly
speaking.
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5. Conclusion
This thesis probed into the relations between ontological security and identity change
during civil war, questioning this relations, and seeking to unearth its nature. In
order to discover this relation, which is the main research question, I firstly dis-
cussed and analyzed changes that happen during civil war. Since there is a very
wide array of such changes, I argued – depending on the relative literature – that
tracing changes in individual and collective identities is useful because changes in
identity last for a longer time than other types of change. I called the changes in
identity “sedimented changes”; changes in identity imply incorporating new norms,
meanings, and goals into the personal and collective self, so such changes are not
conditioned “temporarily” on the duration of civil wars, and they can last for a long
time. Other changes, however, may disappear as soon as the war ends or when their
contexts are altered. Regarding identity, I reviewed the literature that has dealt
with the topic of identity at the individual (psychological) level, at the collective
level, and at the intersection level between the two (Identity Process Theory). In
line with some scholars, I argued that change is a “natural” part of identity, and it is
not the opposite of “self-continuity.” Indeed, it is impossible for someone (or a group)
to sustain her (its) identity fixed, non-changeable. Change in identity happens all
the time, and maintaining a sense of continuity (which is something discursive in
nature) necessarily implies making change.
Then I discussed the ontological security framework and found that it can be classi-
fied in two wide sub-frameworks. The first one is mainly based on idea of no-change;
viz., to be ontologically secure, a being (individual, group, or state) must keep its
identity non-changeable. I called this framework the “mainstream ontological se-
curity.” Patently, this mainstream tenet suggests (implicitly) that change is the
opposite of self-continuity, and (explicitly) that change is an exterior quality that
can inflict identity or the Self, so the Self can and has to avoid it. The second
framework has been less discussed in the literature, and it – contrary to the first one
– depicts the idea of change not as an opposite to self-continuity, and argues that
change can, indeed, enhance the ontological security state of a being. Change, in this
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vein, is an interior quality of identity. This thesis extended the second framework
by suggesting the “adjusted model” of ontological security.
Ontological security, in the adjusted model, was defined as an expressive zone demar-
cating the relation between a being and the world. In order to make this definition
understandable, I explained ontic structural realism. As an epistemological and on-
tological stance, ontic structural realism means that relations precede relata in their
existence. Relata supervene relations; i.e., they exist only after, ex post, the rela-
tions exist. Thus, ontological security, as an expressive zone, is a relation between
two relata: a being (e.g., individual) and the world. Both a being and the world
exist because they are related to each other through the expressive zone; a being’s
Self exists and manifests as unique, having its own voice into the world, and the
world exists as it is composed of multiple Selves, each has its own voice being echoed
into the milieu of the world. When the being’s Self and the world are enabled to
manifest ultimately (i.e., the relation between them functions perfectly), we say that
the expressive zone is wide, and we have a case of ontological security. By contrast,
when one of them (either the Self or the world) is prohibited from manifestation
ultimately, the expressive zone (the relation between the two relata) is narrow, and
we say that we have a case of ontological insecurity. In the case of ontological inse-
curity (or narrow expressive zone), either a being’s Self is engulfed into itself, folded
onto its own realm, without an interaction with the world (Type I of ontological
insecurity), or the world absorbs the Self into its realm annihilating its own, unique
“voice” (Type II of ontological insecurity).
This expressive zone was measured or observed along three dimensions or domains:
(1) everyday activity, referring to the physical action, interaction, and mobility of a
being in the world; (2) action space, referring to the set of factors that enables or
hampers a being from being active in the world, and to express its potentials; and
(5) identity, which is about how a being conceptualizes him/herself. Each one of
these dimensions can foster a wide or narrow expressive zone, and it can boost an
ontologically secure relation or insecure relation between a being and the world.
These theoretical arguments were developed by conducting a qualitative study on
Salamiyah City, Syria as the war was still ongoing.
In order to capture the changes during civil war at the meso-/collective level, I
analyzed the data that were collected from Salamiyah Facebook pages. The analysis
showed many types of threats and – resonating – survival rhetoric. These threats,
which are perceived at the meso-level, were: (1) “enemy,” referring to the rebels
and the opposition; (2) paramilitary causing chaos and turmoil; (3) economic crisis,
which is attributed to the failed performance of the government, corruption, and
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the international embargo; and (4) “helplessness,” which is a general description of
the general, unbearable situation without assigning any specific type of threats. As
a response to these threats, two types of narrative unfolded: mobilizing narrative
and descriptive narrative. The former implores certain actors and suggests specific
actions to face the threats, for example, by calling the police to arrest paramilitary’s
members. The latter, on the other hand, only describes the threat without calling
for any action or actor to face the threat; patently, this type of narrative does not
believe in any actor (i.e., delegitimizes it) and in any possibility to avert the threat.
The analysis of the meso-level also revealed the “conflict ethos.” The analysis showed
no “hegemonic” conflict ethos during the Syrian civil war, while multiple, contra-
dicting narratives were competing to “explain” the current war and to conceptualize
the “Self.” For example, some narratives attributed the war to a plot conducted
by “essential” enemies (e.g., Israel) against the “great” Ba’ath Party and the Arab
Ummah (nation), while other narratives attributed the war to the failed Syrian
regime, which could not establish a healthy state and a patriotic identity.
More importantly, I found that two identities were represented in the narratives
at the meso-level: Syrian Self and Salamiyah-Self. The Syrian-Self was almost
negatively represented, and was usually framed within the discourse of the war (i.e.,
whenever the Syrian Self was mentioned, the discourse of the war formed the topic
of the narrative or the background for it). It was seen as a Self that is “gone,” weak,
and exists only when it bleeds and suffers. However, some narratives positively
represented the Syrian-Self, but only by comparing it to a degraded Other (e.g.,
Arab Gulf). Contrary to the Syrian Self, Salamiyah Self seemed to be positively
represented: It was not confined to the discourse of the war, it was not compared
to Others to show its “greatness,” and it was represented in multiple ways, not in
few ways as the Syrian Self.
I interpreted the difference in representing the “patriotic” or national Self (Syria) and
the local Self (Salamiyah) as follows. Firstly, I dwelled on the distinction between
thin and thick narratives: The former alludes to a narrow space of discourse, whereby
one or few things can be said or are said; while the latter refers to a rich space of
the discourse, whereby multiple things can be said or are said. Thin narrative is
associated with a futile cognitive quality, while thick narrative is associated with
a fruitful cognitive quality. Secondly, I argued that the local Self was represented
within a thick narrative during the time of conducting the study because there
were many things to be said about it. However, the national Self was represented
within a thin narrative because only the war, basically, was the associated topic to
it. The local Self was a shelter for the narrators (Facebook pages) to protect and
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exercise their identity because the national Self was plagued with contradictions;
that is, when the national Self was positively narrated, deep contradictions were
immediately emerging.1 By using ontological security framework, I argued that
thick narrative fosters wide expressive zone, contrary to thin narrative. Hence,
local identity fostered a higher level of ontological security than the national one.
Differently from the essentialist scholarship (which argues that civil war increases
in-group identification due to a fear from Others), I argued that narrating the local
Self thickly was not due to fear per se, but due to the fact that the national Self was
dotted with contradictions. Using the local Self, therefore, was a way to increase
the ontological security at the meso-level.
The interviews with individuals and analyzing the collected narratives showed that
they have experienced three types of everyday activity: (1) restricted everyday ac-
tivity, which means that an individual is restricted from achieving his/her potential
at the everyday level; (2) routinized everyday activity, referring to repeatable activ-
ities that encapsulate individuals; and (3) developing activity, namely, an individual
makes a notable effort in order to enhance his/her life and to widen his/her “bio”
area. I argued that the first activity provides only a narrow expressive zone, the
third one supports a wide expressive zone, while the second one lies in-between
(moderate expressive zone). The analysis showed also that some individuals have
transformed from restricted everyday activity before the war’s eruption to develop-
ing activity after the outbreak when their Selves and agencies were harshly harmed
by the war, and when only struggling was the way to survive. On the contrary,
those who found a window of hope to survive (such as emigration to Europe), have
transformed from developing everyday activity to routinized one, which – in turn –
harmed their psychological well-being.
The second dimension of the expressive zone is action space, which refers to the
environment enabling or hindering an individual from being active in the world
where she lives. Open action space means that an individual has the tools, the
chance, and the environment’s elements that enable her to manifest her agency and
Self in the world. She, accordingly, can express herself well achieving her potentials.
This type of action space fosters a wide expressive zone, therefore. On the other
hand, close action space means that an individual lacks the ability, the tools, the
chance, or the environment’s elements that are necessary to manifest and express
her agency and Self in the world. Thus, this type of action space has a narrow
expressive zone.
1the positive image of the national Self was a Self that could resist the “enemies,” and indeed the army was
what actualized this resistance, but it was repressed by the state itself, at the same time. Additionally,
the state was seen as an entity that lost its legitimacy, and as a weak state in terms of power
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Finally, self-identity is the last dimension of the expressive zone. Analyzing the
interviews showed that some individuals had clear, strong, achieved identities (Is-
maili, leftist, and active humanitarian), so they could express themselves clearly and
they had a unique position in the world; thus, these clear identities fostered a wide
expressive zone. Others, however, did not reflect on their Selves (non-reflexive iden-
tity) or they did not yet form a clear identity (amorphous identity); in both cases,
they had a narrow expressive zone since their Selves did not have their own voices in
the world. Some individuals endorsed a clear identity, but this identity pushed them
to withdraw from the world, because you can do nothing (passive humanitarian);
hence, this identity fostered a moderate expressive zone.
The analysis showed that individuals have transformed from a type of identity to an-
other as the war erupted. The comparison between identity theories, the mainstream
ontological security, and the adjusted model of ontological security suggested that
these three tenets agree with each other on some cases of transformation in identity
and contest on others. More importantly, whereas the mainstream ontological secu-
rity suggests that an individual endorses an ontologically insecure state when s/he
changes his/her identity, the identity theories do not agree in all cases. If such an
individual transforms from an achieved, clear identity to another after s/he labori-
ously carves out the new one, then s/he has a high level of well-being according to
the identity theories. The change in identity itself does not matter in this case. The
adjusted model, on the other hand, agrees with the identity theories that change
per se is not enough to say whether an individual has a higher or lower ontolog-
ically secure state (proxied by psychological well-being), but it differs from both
the identity theories and the mainstream ontological security by accounting for the
other dimensions (everyday activity and action space). Accordingly, I found that
some individuals changed their identities without becoming less secure ontologically
because they enhanced other dimensions. Moreover, some individuals changed their
identities in order to increase their ontological security because their old identities
did not support an enhancement in the other dimensions of the expressive zone. As
an example, someone may change from being X to be Y when X does not help her to
have a developing everyday activity and substitutive challenging of power relations
(wide expressive zone), while Y does.
130
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abend, Gabriel. 2011. “Thick concepts and the moral brain.” European Journal of
Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie 52(1): 143–172.
Abizadeh, Arash. 2005. “Does collective identity presuppose an other? On the
alleged incoherence of global solidarity.” American political science review 99(1):
45–60.
Adisonmez, Umut Can, and Recep Onursal. 2020. “Governing Anxiety, Trauma and
Crisis: The Political Discourse on Ontological (In) Security after the July 15 Coup
Attempt in Turkey.” Middle East Critique online: 1–16.
Akerlof, George A, and Dennis J Snower. 2016. “Bread and Bullets.” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 126: 58–71.
Akerlof, George A, and Rachel E Kranton. 2000. “Economics and Identity.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 715–753.
Akerlof, George A, and Rachel E Kranton. 2002. “Identity and Schooling: Some
Lessons for the Economics of Education.” Journal of Economic Literature 40(4):
1167–1201.
Akerlof, Robert. 2017. “Value Formation: The Role of Esteem.” Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 102(November): 1–19.
Akram, Sadiya. 2013. “Fully Unconscious and Prone to Habit: The Characteristics
of Agency in the Structure and Agency Dialectic.” Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour 43(1): 45–65.
Al-Saji, Alia. 2004. “The Memory of Another Past: Bergson, Deleuze and a New
Theory of Time.” Continental Philosophy Review 37(2): 203–239.
Alhadeff-Jones, Michel. 2008. “Three Generations of Complexity Theories: Nuances
and Ambiguities.” Educational Philosophy and Theory 40(1): 66–82.
Amiot, Catherine, and Rusi Jaspal. 2014. ““Identity Integration, Psychological Co-
herence and Identity Threat: Linking Identity Process Theory and Notions of In-
tegration”.” In Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change,
ed. Rusi Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge
pp. 155–173.
Årseth, Annie K, Jane Kroger, Monica Martinussen, and James E Marcia. 2009.
“Meta-Analytic Studies of Identity Status and the Relational Issues of Attachment
and Intimacy.” Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research 9(1):
1–32.
Baber, Zaheer. 1991. “Beyond the Structure/Agency Dualism: An Evaluation of
Giddens’ Theory of Structuration.” Sociological Inquiry 61(2): 219–230.
131
Bain, Jonathan. 2013. “Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural
realism.” Synthese 190(9): 1621–1635.
Bakke, Kristin M, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee JM Seymour. 2012.
“A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars.”
Perspectives on Politics 10(2): 265–283.
Balcells, Laia. 2018. “Dynamics of Internal Resettlement During Civil War: Evi-
dence from Catalonia (1936–39).” Journal of Peace Research 55(2): 236–251.
Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N Kalyvas. 2014. “Does Warfare Matter? Severity,
Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(8):
1390–1418.
Bals, Margrethe, Anne Lene Turi, Ingunn Skre, and Siv Kvernmo. 2010. “Inter-
nalization symptoms, perceived discrimination, and ethnic identity in indigenous
Sami and non-Sami youth in Arctic Norway.” Ethnicity & Health 15(2): 165–179.
Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2017. “Self-Censorship as a Socio-Political-Psychological Phe-
nomenon: Conception and Research.” Political Psychology 38: 37–65.
Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Ilai Alon. 2016. “Sociopsychological Approach to Trust (or
Distrust): Concluding Comments.” In The Role of Trust in Conflict Resolution,
ed. Daniel Bar-Tal, and Ilai Alon. Springer: Cham, Switzerland pp. 311–334.
Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Yigal Rosen. 2009. “Peace Education in Societies Involved
in Intractable Conflicts: Direct and Indirect Models.” Review of Educational Re-
search 79(2): 557–575.
Bar-Tal, Daniel, Eran Halperin, and Joseph De Rivera. 2007. “Collective Emotions
in Conflict Situations: Societal Implications.” Journal of Social Issues 63(2): 441–
460.
Bar-Tal, Daniel, Neta Oren, and Rafi Nets-Zehngut. 2014. “Sociopsychological Anal-
ysis of Conflict-Supporting Narratives: A General Framework.” Journal of Peace
Research 51(5): 662–675.
Bardi, Anat, and Robin Goodwin. 2011. “The Dual Route to Value Change: Indi-
vidual Processes and Cultural Moderators.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
42(2): 271–287.
Bardi, Anat, Rusi Jaspal, Ela Polek, and Shalom H Schwartz. 2014. ““Values and
Identity Process Theory: Theoretical Integration and Empirical Interactions”.”
In Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change, ed. Rusi
Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge pp. 175–
198.
Barnett, Julie, and Glynis M Breakwell. 2001. “Risk Perception and Experience:
Hazard Personality Profiles and Individual Differences.” Risk Analysis 21(1): 171–
178.
132
Barnett, Julie, and Glynis M Breakwell. 2003. “The Social Amplification of Risk and
the Hazard Sequence: The October 1995 Oral Contraceptive Pill Scare.” Health,
Risk & Society 5(3): 301–313.
Bates, Jessica A. 2004. “Use of Narrative Interviewing in Everyday Information
Behavior Research.” Library & Information Science Research 26(1): 15–28.
Bates, Stephen R. 2006. “Making Time for Change: On Temporal Conceptualiza-
tions within (Critical Realist) Approaches to the Relationship between Structure
and Agency.” Sociology 40(1): 143–161.
Berger, Lars. 2019. “Democratic Values and the Microfoundations of Arab Support
for Peace with Israel.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 36(3): 270–290.
Bertilsson, Margareta. 1984. “The Theory of Structuration: Prospects and Prob-
lems.” Acta Sociologica 27(4): 339–353.
Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2011. “The Logic of Political Violence.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(3): 1411–1445.
Bhavnani, Ravi, Dan Miodownik, and Hyun Jin Choi. 2011. “Violence and Control
in Civil Conflict: Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.” Comparative Politics 44(1):
61–80.
Bilsker, Dan, and James E Marcia. 1991. “Adaptive Regression and Ego Identity.”
Journal of Adolescence 14(1): 75–84.
Bloom, Peter. 2013. “The Power of Safe Resistance.” Journal of Political Power
6(2): 219–239.
Braithwaite, Alex, Niheer Dasandi, and David Hudson. 2016. “Does Poverty Cause
Conflict? Isolating the Causal Origins of the Conflict Trap.” Conflict Management
and Peace Science 33(1): 45–66.
Bramoullé, Yann, and Rachel Kranton. 2007. “Risk Sharing Across Communities.”
American Economic Review 97(2): 70–74.
Braumoeller, Bear F. 2003. “Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics.” Political
Analysis 11(3): 209–233.
Breakwell, Glynis M. 2001. “Mental Models and Social Representations of Hazards:
the Significance of Identity Processes.” Journal of Risk Research 4(4): 341–351.
Breakwell, Glynis M. 2010. “Resisting Representations and Identity Processes.”
Papers on Social Representations 19(1): 6–1.
Breakwell, Glynis M. 2014a. ““Identity and Social Representations”.” In Identity
Process Theory: Identity, social action and social change, ed. Rusi Jaspal, and
Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge pp. 118–134.
Breakwell, Glynis M. 2014b. ““Identity Process Theory: Clarifications and Elab-
orations”.” In Identity Process Theory: Identity, social action and social change,
ed. Rusi Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge
pp. 20–37.
133
Brockmeier, Jens, and Rom Harre. 2001. “Narrative: Problems and Promises of
Alternative Paradigm.” In Narrative and Identity: Studies in Autobiography, Self
and Culture, ed. Jens Brockmeier, and Donal Carbaugh. John Benjamins Pub-
lishing pp. 39–58.
Browning, Christopher S. 2018. ““Je suis en terrasse”: Political Violence, Civi-
lizational Politics, and the Everyday Courage to Be.” Political Psychology 39(2):
243–261.
Browning, Christopher S, and Pertti Joenniemi. 2017. “Ontological security, self-
articulation and the securitization of identity.” Cooperation and conflict 52(1):
31–47.
Brubaker, Rogers, and David D Laitin. 1998. “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence.”
Annual Review of Sociology 24(1): 423–452.
Bruner, Jerome. 2001. “Self-Making and World-Making.” In Narrative and Iden-
tity: Studies in Autobiography, Self and Culture, ed. Jens Brockmeier, and Donal
Carbaugh. John Benjamins Publishing pp. 25–37.
Bruner, Jerome Seymour. 1990. Acts of Meaning. Vol. 3 Harvard university press.
Bsumeister, R.F., and L.S. Newman. 1995. “The Primacy of Stories, the Primacy
of Roles, and the Polarizing Effects of Interpretive Motives: Some Propositions
about Narratives.” In Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story, ed. R.S. Wyer.
Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbuam Associates, Inc. pp. 97–108.
Bunge, Mario. 1968. “Physical Time: The Objective and Relational Theory.” Phi-
losophy of Science 35(4): 355–388.
Byrne, David. 2005. “Complexity, Configurations and Cases.” Theory, Culture &
Society 22(5): 95–111.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Manuel Vogt. 2017. “Dynamics and Logics of Civil War.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(9): 1992–2016.
Çelik, Ayşe Betül, Rezarta Bilali, and Yeshim Iqbal. 2017. “Patterns of ‘othering’in
Turkey: a study of ethnic, ideological, and sectarian polarisation.” South European
society and politics 22(2): 217–238.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2000a. “Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic Societies.” Asian
Survey 40(5): 836–865.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2000b. “The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The
Decline of Congress and the Rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur.” The
Journal of Asian Studies 59(1): 26–61.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “Mechanisms vs. Outcomes.”Qualitative Methods Newslet-
ter, American Political Science Association 4(March): 6–13.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2012a. ““Attributes and Categories: A New Conceptual Vocab-
ulary for Thinking about Ethnic Identity”.” In Constructivist Theories of Ethnic
Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Oxford University Press pp. 97–131.
134
Chandra, Kanchan. 2012b. ““How Ethnic Identities Change”.” In Constructivist The-
ories of Ethnic Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Oxford University Press pp. 132–
178.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2012c. ““Introduction”.” In Constructivist Theories of Ethnic
Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Oxford University Press pp. 1–47.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2012d. ““What Is Ethnic Identity? A Minimalist Definition”.”
In Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Oxford Uni-
versity Press pp. 51–96.
Chandra, Kanchan, and Cilanne Boulet. 2012. ““A Combinatorial Language for
Thinking about Ethnic Identity Change”.” In Constructivist Theories of Ethnic
Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Oxford University Press pp. 179–226.
Chandra, Kanchan, and Steven Wilkinson. 2008. “Measuring the Effect of “Ethnic-
ity”.” Comparative Political Studies 41(4-5): 515–563.
Chin, Siew Sim. 2006. “I am a human being, and I belong to the world: Narrating the
intersection of spirituality and social identity.” Journal of transformative education
4(1): 27–42.
Cieciuch, Jan, and Ewa Topolewska. 2017. “Circumplex of Identity Formation
Modes: A Proposal for the Integration of Identity Constructs Developed in the
Erikson–Marcia Tradition.” Self and Identity 16(1): 37–61.
Clarke, Victoria, and Virginina Braun. 2017. “Thematic Analysis.” The Journal of
Positive Psychology 12(3): 297–98.
Collier, Paul, and Marguerite Duponchel. 2013. “The Economic Legacy of Civil
War: Firm-Level Evidence from Sierra Leone.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
57(1): 65–88.
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2004. “On the Duration of Civil
War.” Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 253–273.
Corpus Ong, Jonathan. 2009. “The cosmopolitan continuum: Locating cosmopoli-
tanism in media and cultural studies.” Media, Culture & Society 31(3): 449–466.
Côte, James E, and Charles Levine. 1983. “Marcia and Erikson: The Relation-
ships among Ego Identity Status, Neuroticism, Dogmatism, and Purpose in Life.”
Journal of Youth and Adolescence 12(1): 43–53.
Coutant, Dawna, Stephen Worchel, Daniel Bar-Tal, and Judith van Raalten. 2011.
“A Multidimensional Examination of the “Stereotype” Concept: A Developmental
Approach.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35(1): 92–110.
Creppell, Ingrid. 2011. “The Concept of Normative Threat.” International Theory
3(3): 450–487.
Crocetti, Elisabetta, Luigia Simona Sica, Seth J Schwartz, Toni Serafini, and Wim
Meeus. 2013. “Identity Styles, Dimensions, Statuses, and Functions: Making Con-
nections among Identity Conceptualizations.” Revue Européenne de Psychologie
Appliquée/European Review of Applied Psychology 63(1): 1–13.
135
Cunningham, David E, and Douglas Lemke. 2014. “Beyond Civil War: A Quan-
titative Examination of Causes of Violence Within Countries.” Civil wars 16(3):
328–345.
Cunningham, David E, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It
Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil war Duration and Outcome.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 53(4): 570–597.
Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2012. “Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions
Favoring Insurgency Onset in Colombia, 1964–1984.” Journal of Peace Research
49(3): 473–491.
Daskalaki, Maria. 2012. “Personal narratives and cosmopolitan identities: An au-
tobiographical approach.” Journal of Management Inquiry 21(4): 430–441.
Daskalaki, Maria, Christina L Butler, and Jelena Petrovic. 2016. “Somewhere in-
between: Narratives of Place, Identity, and Translocal Work.” Journal of Man-
agement Inquiry 25(2): 184–198.
David, Ohad, and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2009. “A Sociopsychological Conception of Col-
lective Identity: The Case of National Identity as an Example.” Personality and
Social Psychology Review 13(4): 354–379.
de Carvalho, Eugênio Rezende. 2018. “Norbert Elias and the Philosophical Contro-
versy Surrounding the Nature of Time.” Time & Society 27(2): 155–175.
De Groot, I, IF Goodson, and W Veugelers. 2014. “Dutch adolescents’ narratives
about democracy:‘I know what democracy means, but not what it means to me’.”
Cambridge Journal of Education 44(2): 271–292.
de la Sablonnière, Roxane. 2017. “Toward a Psychology of Social Change: a Typol-
ogy of Social Change.” Frontiers in Psychology 8(March): 1–20.
De la Sablonnière, Roxane, and Francine Tougas. 2008. “Relative Deprivation and
Social Identity in Times of Dramatic Social Change: The Case of Nurses.” Journal
of Applied Social Psychology 38(9): 2293–2314.
de la Sablonnière, Roxane, Francine Tougas, Donald M Taylor, Jonathan Crush,
David McDonald, and Onon Radchenko Perenlei. 2015. “Social Change in Mon-
golia and South Africa: The Impact of Relative Deprivation Trajectory and Group
Status on Well-Being and Adjustment to Change.” Social Justice Research 28(1):
102–122.
Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. 2018. “The Aesthetics of Ritual–Contested Identities and
Conflicting Performances in the Iraqi Shi’a Diaspora: Ritual, Performance and
Identity Change.” Politics 38(1): 68–83.
Demeritt, Jacqueline HR, Angela D Nichols, and Eliza G Kelly. 2014. “Female
Participation and Civil War Relapse.” Civil Wars 16(3): 346–368.
Devine-Wright, Patrick. 2009. “Rethinking NIMBYism: The Role of Place At-
tachment and Place Identity in Explaining Place-Protective Action.” Journal of
Community and Applied Social Psychology 19(6): 426–441.
136
Devine-Wright, Patrick, and Evanthia Lyons. 1997. “Remembering Pasts and Rep-
resenting Places: The Construction of National Identities in Ireland.” Journal of
Environmental Psychology 17(1): 33–45.
Di Masso, Andres, John Dixon, and Enric Pol. 2011. “On the Contested Nature of
Place:‘Figuera’s Well’,‘The Hole of Shame’and the Ideological Struggle over Public
Space in Barcelona.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 31(3): 231–244.
Dilley, Patrick. 2004. “Interviews and the Philosophy of Qualitative Research.”
Journal of Higher Education 75(1): 127–132.
Dixon, John, and Kevin Durrheim. 2004. “Dislocating Identity: Desegregation and
the Transformation of Place.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 24(4): 455–
473.
Dixon, Kevin. 2011. “A ‘Third Way’ for Football Fandom Research: Anthony Gid-
dens and Structuration Theory.” Soccer & Society 12(2): 279–298.
Dixon, Thomas M, and Roy F Baumeister. 1991. “Escaping the Self: The Moder-
ating Effect of self-complexity.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17(4):
363–368.
Dunkel, Curtis S, Leslie Minor, and Maureen Babineau. 2010. “The Continued
Assessment of Self-Continuity and Identity.” The Journal of Genetic Psychology
171(3): 251–261.
Durante, Chris. 2014. “Toward a cosmopolitan ethos.” Journal of Global Ethics
10(3): 312–318.
Elster, Jon. 1982. “The Case for Methodological Individualism.” Theory and Society
11(4): 453–482.
Esfeld, Michael. 2009. “The modal nature of structures in ontic structural realism.”
International studies in the philosophy of science 23(2): 179–194.
Esfeld, Michael. 2013. “Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum
mechanics.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3(1): 19–32.
Esfeld, Michael, and Vincent Lam. 2008. “Moderate structural realism about space-
time.” Synthese 160(1): 27–46.
Fakher El-Dein, Yousef, Rateb Shabo, and Garib Mirza. 2015. Warlords’ Era and
Reviving of Protectorates and Tutelages: Shia Militia. Democratic Republic Stud-
ies Center.
Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. 2000. “Violence and the Social Construction
of Ethnic Identity.” International Organization 54(4): 845–877.
Feiner, Arthur H. 1970. “Toward an Understanding of the Experience of Inauthen-
ticity.” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 7(1): 64–83.
Feldman, Carol. 2001a. “Narratives Integrity.” In Narrative and Identity: Studies
in Autobiography, Self and Culture, ed. Jens Brockmeier, and Donal Carbaugh.
John Benjamins Publishing pp. 75–99.
137
Feldman, Carol. 2001b. “Narratives of National Identity as Group Narratives.”
In Narrative and Identity: Studies in Autobiography, Self and Culture, ed. Jens
Brockmeier, and Donal Carbaugh. John Benjamins Publishing pp. 129–143.
Fereday, Jennifer, and Eimear Muir-Cochrane. 2006. “Demonstrating Rigor Using
Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and
Theme Development.” International Journal of Qualitative Methods 5(1): 80–92.
Flanders, Corey E, Margaret Robinson, Melissa Marie Legge, and Lesley A Tarasoff.
2016. “Negative identity experiences of bisexual and other non-monosexual people:
A qualitative report.” Journal of Gay & Lesbian Mental Health 20(2): 152–172.
Flesken, Anaid. 2018. “Identity Change in a Context of Intergroup Threat: Regional
Identity Mobilization in Bolivia.” Politics 38(1): 51–67.
Flockhart, Trine. 2016. “The problem of change in constructivist theory: Ontological
security seeking and agent motivation.” Review of international studies 42(5): 799–
820.
Flury, Judith M, and William Ickes. 2007. “Having a Weak versus Strong Sense of
Self: The Sense of Self Scale (SOSS).” Self and Identity 6(4): 281–303.
Franzosi, Roberto, Gianluca De Fazio, and Stefania Vicari. 2012. “Ways of mea-
suring agency: An application of quantitative narrative analysis to lynchings in
Georgia (1875–1930).” Sociological Methodology 42(1): 1–42.
Galtung, Johan. 1990. “Cultural Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 27(3): 291–
305.
Galtung, Johan. 1995. “Nonviolence and Deep Culture: Some Hidden Obstacles.”
Peace Research 27(3): 21–37.
Gamson, Joshua. 1995. “Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer
Dilemma.” Social Problems 42(3): 390–407.
Gatson, Sarah N. 2003. “On Being Amorphous: Autoethnography, Genealogy, and
a Multiracial Identity.” Qualitative Inquiry 9(1): 20–48.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. NY: Basic Books, Inc.
Gerring, John. 2010. “Causal Mechanisms: Yes, But. . . .” Comparative Political
Studies 43(11): 1499–1526.
Giddens, Anthony. 1989. Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Struc-
turation. polity press.
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late
modern age. Stanford university press.
Giles, Graham, and Cristina Delgado Vintimilla. 2007. “The Opacity of the Self,
Sovereignty & Freedom: In Conversation with Arendt, Butler & Derrida.” Philo-
sophical Inquiry in Education 16(2): 35–44.
138
Gilley, Bruce. 2006. “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for
72 Countries.” European Journal of Political Research 45(3): 499–525.
Gilligan, Michael J, Benjamin J Pasquale, and Cyrus Samii. 2014. “Civil War and
Social Cohesion: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from Nepal.” American Journal of
Political Science 58(3): 604–619.
Gramsci, Antony. 1999. Prison Notebooks. New York: International publication.
Granzow, Tanja, Andreas Hasenclever, and Jan Sändig. 2015. “Introduction: Fram-
ing Political Violence–A Micro-Approach to Civil War Studies.” Civil Wars 17(2):
113–119.
Gurr, Ted Robert, and James R Scarritt. 1989. “Minorities rights at risk: A global
survey.” Human Rights Quarterly 11(3): 375–405.
Gustafson, Per. 2009. “More cosmopolitan, no less local: The orientations of inter-
national travellers.” European Societies 11(1): 25–47.
Gustafsson, Karl, and Nina C Krickel-Choi. 2020. “Returning to the roots of on-
tological security: insights from the existentialist anxiety literature.” European
Journal of International Relations Online: 1–21.
Halperin, Eran, Daniel Bar-Tal, Keren Sharvit, Nimrod Rosler, and Amiram Raviv.
2010. “Socio-Psychological Implications for an Occupying Society: The Case of
Israel.” Journal of Peace Research 47(1): 59–70.
Hameiri, Boaz, Eden Nabet, Daniel Bar-Tal, and Eran Halperin. 2018. “Paradoxical
Thinking as a Conflict-Resolution Intervention: Comparison to Alternative Inter-
ventions and Examination of Psychological Mechanisms.” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 44(1): 122–139.
Hänninen, Vilma. 2004. “A Model of Narrative Circulation.” Narrative Inquiry 14(1):
69–85.
Harre, Rom. 2001. “Metaphysics and Narrative.” In Narrative and Identity: Studies
in Autobiography, Self and Culture, ed. Jens Brockmeier, and Donal Carbaugh.
John Benjamins Publishing pp. 59–73.
Hedström, Peter, and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sci-
ences.” Annual Review of Sociology 36(April): 49–67.
Henry, Nicholas. 2011. “Civil Society amid Civil War: Political Violence and Non-
violence in the Burmese Democracy Movement.” Global Society 25(1): 97–111.
Hermans, Hubert JM. 2000. “The Coherence of Incoherent Narratives.” Narrative
Inquiry 10: 223–228.
Hinkin, Timothy R, and Chester A Schriesheim. 1989. “Development and Appli-
cation of New Scales to Measure the French and Raven (1959) Bases of Social
Power.” Journal of Applied Psychology 74(4): 561.
139
Hogg, Michael A, Deborah J Terry, and Katherine M White. 1995. “A tale of Two
Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory With Social Identity Theory.”
Social Psychology Quarterly pp. 255–269.
Holliday, Adrian. 2010. “Complexity in cultural identity.” Language and Intercultural
Communication 10(2): 165–177.
Hollway, Wendy, and Tony Jefferson. 1997. “Eliciting Narrative through the In-
depth Interview.” Qualitative Inquiry 3(1): 53–70.
Hoover Green, Amelia. 2016. “The Commander’s Dilemma: Creating and Control-
ling Armed Group Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 53(5): 619–632.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1973. “Direct, displaced, and cumulative ethnic aggression.”
Comparative Politics 6(1): 1–16.
Huijer, Marli. 2010. “New and Unexpected! Female Life Practices Resonating in
the Philosophy of Time.” Time & Society 19(1): 72–80.
Ingiriis, Mohamed H, and Markus V Hoehne. 2013. “The Impact of Civil War and
State Collapse on the Roles of Somali Women: a Blessing in Disguise.” Journal of
Eastern African Studies 7(2): 314–333.
Jaspal, Rusi. 2013. “British Sikh Identity and the Struggle for Distinctiveness and
Continuity.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 23(3): 225–239.
Jaspal, Rusi, and Glynis M Breakwell. 2014. Identity Process Theory: Identity,
Social Action and Social Change. Cambridge University Press.
Jaspal, Rusi, and Marco Cinnirella. 2010a. “Coping with Potentially Incompatible
Identities: Accounts of Religious, Ethnic, and Sexual Identities from British Pak-
istani Men Who Identify as Muslim and Gay.” British Journal of Social Psychology
49(4): 849–870.
Jaspal, Rusi, and Marco Cinnirella. 2010b. “Media Representations of British Mus-
lims and Hybridised Threats to Identity.” Contemporary Islam 4(3): 289–310.
Jaspal, Rusi, and Marco Cinnirella. 2012. “Identity Processes, Threat, and Inter-
personal Relations: Accounts from British Muslim Gay Men.” Journal of Homo-
sexuality 59(2): 215–240.
Jaspal, Rusi, and Marco Cinnirella. 2014. “Hyper-Affiliation to the Religious In-
group Among British Pakistani Muslim Gay Men.” Journal of Community & Ap-
plied Social Psychology 24(4): 265–277.
Jepperson, Ronald, and John W Meyer. 2011. “Multiple Levels of Analysis and the
Limitations of Methodological Individualisms.” Sociological Theory 29(1): 54–73.
Jervis, Robert. 1997. “Complexity and the Analysis of Political and Social Life.”
Political Science Quarterly 112(4): 569–593.
Jervis, Robert. 1998. System effects: Complexity in political and social life. N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
140
Jetten, Jolanda, Nyla R Branscombe, S Alexander Haslam, Catherine Haslam,
Tegan Cruwys, Janelle M Jones, Lijuan Cui, Genevieve Dingle, James Liu, Sean
Murphy et al. 2015. “Having a Lot of a Good Thing: Multiple Important Group
Memberships as a Source of Self-Esteem.” PloS ONE 10(5): e0124609.
Joshi, Madhav, and Jason Michael Quinn. 2017. “Who Kills Whom? The Micro-
Dynamics of Civilian Targeting in Civil War.” Social Science Research 63(March):
227–241.
Josselson, Ruthellen. 2006. “Narrative Research and the Challenge of Accumulating
Knowledge.” Narrative Inquiry 16(1): 3–10.
Jost, John T, Mahzarin R Banaji, and Brian A Nosek. 2004. “A Decade of Sys-
tem Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious
Bolstering of the Status Quo.” Political Psychology 25(6): 881–919.
Juen, Barbara. 2000. “The Spiral Movement from Externally Authoritative to In-
ternally Persuasive Discourse.” Narrative Inquiry 10(1): 119–126.
Kachanoff, Frank J, Renate Ysseldyk, Donald M Taylor, Roxane de la Sablonnière,
and Jonathan Crush. 2016. “The Good, the Bad and the Central of Group Iden-
tification: Evidence of a U-shaped Quadratic Relation between In-Group Affect
and Identity Centrality.” European Journal of Social Psychology 46(5): 563–580.
Kallio, Hanna, Anna-Maija Pietilä, Martin Johnson, and Mari Kangasniemi. 2016.
“Systematic Methodological Review: Developing a Framework for a Qualitative
Semi-Structured Interview Guide.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 72(12): 2954–
2965.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2001. ““New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?”
World politics 54(1): 99–118.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity
in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on politics 1(3): 475–494.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006a. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University
Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006b. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University
Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2008. “Ethnic Defection in Civil War.” Comparative Political
Studies 41(8): 1043–1068.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2012. “Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining
and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model.” Terrorism and Political Vio-
lence 24(4): 658–668.
Kalyvas, Stathis N, and Matthew Adam Kocher. 2007. “Ethnic Cleavages and Ir-
regular War: Iraq and Vietnam.” Politics & Society 35(2): 183–223.
Kanazawa, Satoshi, and Mary C Still. 2000. “Why Men Commit Crimes (and Why
They Desist).” Sociological Theory 18(3): 434–447.
141
Kane, Anne E. 1997. “Theorizing Meaning Construction in Social Movements: Sym-
bolic Structures and Interpretation During the Irish Land War, 1879–1882.” So-
ciological Theory 15(3): 249–276.
Kaplan, Oliver. 2012. “Shootings and Shamans: Local Civilian Authority Structures
and Civil War Ciolence in Colombia.” Available at SSRN 2102751 .
Kaplan, Oliver. 2013a. “Nudging Armed Groups: How Civilians Transmit Norms
of Protection.” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(3):
1–18.
Kaplan, Oliver. 2013b. “Protecting Civilians in Civil War: The Institution of the
ATCC in Colombia.” Journal of Peace Research 50(3): 351–367.
Kaplan, Oliver. 2017. “The Art of Rhetorical Traps in Civilian Self-Protection.”
Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 12(3): 111–116.
Kappler, Stephan, Kristin A Hancock, and Thomas G Plante. 2013. “Roman
Catholic gay priests: Internalized homophobia, sexual identity, and psycholog-
ical well-being.” Pastoral Psychology 62(6): 805–826.
Karlberg, Michael. 2008. “Discourse, identity, and global citizenship.” Peace Review
20(3): 310–320.
Kasfir, Nelson, Georg Frerks, and Niels Terpstra. 2017. “Introduction: Armed
Groups and Multi-Layered Governance.” Civil Wars 19(3): 257–278.
Kim, Kyung-Man. 2004. “Critical Theory Criticized: Giddens’s Double Hermeneutic
and the Problem of Language Game Change.” Cultural Studies? Critical Method-
ologies 4(1): 28–44.
King, Charles. 2004. “The Micropolitics of Social Violence.” World Politics 56(3):
431–455.
Kinnvall, Catarina. 2004. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity,
and the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25(5): 741–767.
Kinnvall, Catarina, and Jennifer Mitzen. 2017a. “An Introduction to the Special
Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics.” Cooperation and Conflict 52(1):
3–11.
Kinnvall, Catarina, and Jennifer Mitzen. 2017b. “An Introduction to the Special
Issue: Ontological Securities in World Politics.” Cooperation and Conflict 52(1):
3–11.
Kinnvall, Catarina, and Jennifer Mitzen. 2018. “Ontological Security and Conflict:
The Dynamics of Crisis and the Constitution of Community.” Journal of Interna-
tional Relations and Development 21(4): 825–835.
Kivisto, Peter. 2003. “Social Spaces, Transnational Immigrant Communities, and
the Politics of Incorporation.” Ethnicities 3(1): 5–28.
142
Klem, Bart, and Sidharthan Maunaguru. 2017. “Insurgent Rule as Sovereign
Mimicry and Mutation: Governance, Kingship, and Violence in Civil Wars.” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 59(3): 629–656.
Koch, Erika J, and James A Shepperd. 2004. “Is Self-Complexity Linked to Better
Coping? A Review of the Literature.” Journal of Personality 72(4): 727–760.
Kranton, Rachel E. 2016. “Identity economics 2016: Where do social distinctions
and norms come from?” American Economic Review 106(5): 405–09.
Kranton, Rachel E, and Seth G Sanders. 2017. “Groupy Versus Non-Groupy Social
Preferences: Personality, Region, and Political Party.” American Economic Review
107(5): 65–69.
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2006. “On Legitimacy.” International Relations 20(3): 302–
308.
Kraus, Wolfgang. 2006. “The Narrative Negotiation of Identity and Belonging.”
Narrative Inquiry 16(1): 103–111.
Krcmaric, Daniel. 2018. “Varieties of Civil War and Mass Killing: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Guerrilla Warfare and Civilian Victimization.” Journal of
Peace Research 55(1): 18–31.
Kroger, Jane, Monica Martinussen, and James E Marcia. 2010. “Identity Status
Change During Adolescence and Young Adulthood: A Meta-Analysis.” Journal of
Adolescence 33(5): 683–698.
Kuol, Luka B Deng. 2014. “Confronting Civil War: The Level of Resilience in Abyei
Area during Sudan’s Civil War in the 1990s.” Civil Wars 16(4): 468–487.
Kwak, Nojin, Nathaniel Poor, and Marko M Skoric. 2006. “Honey, I shrunk the
world! The relation between Internet use and international engagement.” Mass
communication & society 9(2): 189–213.
Laclau, Ernesto. 1992. “Universalism, particularism, and the question of identity.”
October-The MIT Press 61: 83–90.
Lai, Brian, and Clayton Thyne. 2007. “The Effect of Civil War on Education,
1980—97.” Journal of Peace Research 44(3): 277–292.
Laing, Robert. 2010. The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness.
Penguin UK.
Lehmann, Rosa. 2009. “The Strength of Diversity: A Micro-History of Ethnic
Conflict and Coexistence in Rural Southeast Poland.” Anthropological Quarterly
82(2): 509–545.
Lewis, Janet I. 2017. “How Does Ethnic Rebellion Start?” Comparative Political
Studies 50(10): 1420–1450.
143
Leydesdorff, Loet. 2010. “The Communication of Meaning and the Structura-
tion of Expectations: Giddens’ ‘Structuration Theory’ and Luhmann’s ‘Self-
Organization’.” Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Tech-
nology 61(10): 2138–2150.
Li, Han Z. 2003. “Inter-and intra-cultural variations in self–other boundary: A
qualitative-quantitative approach.” International Journal of Psychology 38(3):
138–149.
Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1981. “The Conflict Process: A
Formal Model.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 25(1): 3–29.
Linville, Patricia W. 1985. “Self-Complexity and Affective Extremity: Don’t Put
All of Your Eggs in One Cognitive Basket.” Social Cognition 3(1): 94–120.
Little, Daniel. 1993. “On the Scope and Limits of Generalizations in the Social
Sciences.” Synthese 97(2): 183–207.
Little, Daniel. 2015. “Mechanisms and Method.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences
45(4-5): 462–480.
Lodewijkx, Hein FM, Gaby LE Kersten, and Martijn Van Zomeren. 2008. “Dual
Pathways to Engage in ‘Silent Marches’ Against Violence: Moral Outrage, Moral
Cleansing and Modes of Identification.” Journal of Community & Applied Social
Psychology 18(3): 153–167.
Lott, Eric. 2000. “After identity, politics: the return of universalism.” New Literary
History 31(4): 665–680.
Lu, Lingyu, and Cameron G Thies. 2011. “Economic Grievance and the Severity of
Civil War.” Civil Wars 13(3): 215–231.
Lucius-Hoene, Gabriele, and Arnulf Deppermann. 2000. “Narrative Identity Em-
piricized: A Dialogical and Positioning Approach to Autobiographical Research
Interviews.” Narrative Inquiry 10(1): 199–222.
Lupovici, Amir. 2014a. “Ontological (In)Security and Violent Peace in Northern Ire-
land.” In Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security, ed. Bahar Rumelili. Rout-
ledge pp. 113–130.
Lupovici, Amir. 2014b. “Ontological security and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Pro-
cess.” In Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security, ed. Bahar Rumelili. Rout-
ledge pp. 33–51.
Lyall, Jason. 2010. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence
from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104(1): 1–20.
Mankowski, E., and J Rappaport. 1995. “Stories, Identity, and the Psychological
Sense of Community.” In Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story, ed. R.S. Wyer.
Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbuam Associates, Inc. pp. 211–226.
Marcia, James, and Ruthellen Josselson. 2013. “Eriksonian Personality Research
and Its Implications for Psychotherapy.” Journal of Personality 81(6): 617–629.
144
Marcia, James E. 2002. “Identity and Psychosocial Development in Adulthood.”
Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research 2(1): 7–28.
Marcia, James E, and Sally L Archer. 1993. “Identity Status in Late Adolescents:
Scoring Criteria.” In Ego Identity. Springer pp. 205–240.
Mashiach-Eizenberg, Michal, Ilanit Hasson-Ohayon, Philip T Yanos, Paul H
Lysaker, and David Roe. 2013. “Internalized stigma and quality of life among
persons with severe mental illness: The mediating roles of self-esteem and hope.”
Psychiatry research 208(1): 15–20.
May, Todd. 1996. “Gilles Deleuze and the Politics of Time.” Man and World 29(3):
293–304.
McEwan, Bree, and Miriam Sobre-Denton. 2011. “Virtual cosmopolitanism: Con-
structing third cultures and transmitting social and cultural capital through social
media.” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 4(4): 252–258.
McIntosh, Michele J, and Janice M Morse. 2015. “Situating and Constructing Di-
versity in Semi-Structured Interviews.” Global Qualitative Nursing Research 2(On-
line).
McKenzie, Kerry. 2014. “Priority and particle physics: Ontic structural realism as
a fundamentality thesis.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65(2):
353–380.
McKenzie, Kerry. 2017. “Ontic structural realism.” Philosophy Compass 12(4): On-
line.
Miguel, Edward, Sebastián M Saiegh, and Shanker Satyanath. 2011. “Civil War
Exposure and Violence.” Economics & Politics 23(1): 59–73.
Mirza, Garib, and Humam al Khateeb. 2015. The Conflict in the Town of Salamiyah:
A Model for the Formation of ‘Mafias’ in Syria. Democratic Republic Studies
Center.
Mitha, Karim, Shelina Adatia, and Rusi Jaspal. 2017. “Two Cultures, One Identity:
Formulations of Australian Isma’ili Muslim Identity.” Contemporary Islam 11(1):
41–60.
Mitzen, Jennifer. 2018a. “Anxious Community: EU as (In)Security Community.”
European Security 27(3): 393–413.
Mitzen, Jennifer. 2018b. “Feeling at Home in Europe: Migration, Ontological Se-
curity, and the Political Psychology of EU Bordering.” Political Psychology 39(6):
1373–1387.
Moscovici, Serge. 1988. “Notes Towards a Description of Social Representations.”
European Journal of Social Psychology 18(3): 211–250.
Mosinger, Eric S. 2018. “Brothers or Others in Arms? Civilian Constituencies and
Rebel Fragmentation in Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research 55(1): 62–77.
145
Munck, Ronaldo. 2008. “Introduction: Deconstructng Violence: Power, Force, and
Social Transformation.” Latin American Perspectives 35(5): 3–19.
Munif, Yasser. 2013. “The Arab Revolts: The Old is Dying and the New Cannot be
Born.” Rethinking Marxism 25(2): 202–217.
Murtagh, Niamh, Birgitta Gatersleben, and David Uzzell. 2014. ““Identity Threat
and Resistance to Change: Evidence and Implications from Transport-Related
Behavior”.” In Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change,
ed. Rusi Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge
pp. 335–356.
Nagel, Joane, and Susan Olzak. 1982. “Ethnic mobilization in new and old states:
An extension of the competition model.” Social Problems 30(2): 127–143.
Nasie, Meytal, Daniel Bar-Tal, Ruthie Pliskin, Eman Nahhas, and Eran Halperin.
2014. “Overcoming the Barrier of Narrative Adherence in Conflicts Through
Awareness of the Psychological Bias of Naïve Realism.” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 40(11): 1543–1556.
Nelson, Hilde Lindemann, and Hilde Lindemann. 2001. Damaged Identities, Narra-
tive Repair. Cornell University Press.
Nerlich, Brigitte, and Rusi Jaspal. 2012. “Metaphors We Die by? Geoengineering,
Metaphors, and the Argument from Catastrophe.” Metaphor and Symbol 27(2):
131–147.
Neuman, L. William. 2014. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches. USA: Pearson.
Norton, Matthew. 2014. “Mechanisms and Meaning Structures.” Sociological Theory
32(2): 162–187.
Nwankwo, Beloveth Odochi. 2015. “The Politics of Conflict over Oil in the Niger
Delta Region of Nigeria: A Review of the Corporate Social Responsibility Strate-
gies of the Oil Companies.” American Journal of Educational Research 3(4): 383–
392.
Ollerenshaw, Jo Anne, and John W Creswell. 2002. “Narrative Research: A Com-
parison of Two Restorying Data Analysis Approaches.” Qualitative Inquiry 8(3):
329–347.
Oren, Neta, and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2014. ““Collective Identity and Intractable Con-
flict”.” In Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change,
ed. Rusi Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge
pp. 222–252.
Orjuela, Camilla. 2005. “Civil Society in Civil War: The Case of Sri Lanka.” Civil
Wars 7(2): 120–137.
Oyefusi, Aderoju. 2007. “Oil-dependence and civil conflict in Nigeria.” CSAE Work-
ing Paper Series .
146
Pacilli, Maria Giuseppina, Alessandro Taurino, John T Jost, and Jojanneke van der
Toorn. 2011. “System Justification, Right-Wing Conservatism, and Internalized
Homophobia: Gay and Lesbian Attitudes toward Same-Sex Parenting in Italy.”
Sex Roles 65(7-8): 580.
Parnas, Josef, Paul Møller, Tilo Kircher, Jørgen Thalbitzer, Lennart Jansson, Pe-
ter Handest, and Dan Zahavi. 2005. “EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience.” Psychopathology 38(5): 236.
Pearlman, Wendy. 2009. “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation
and the Middle East Peace Process.” International Security 33(3): 79–109.
Pearlman, Wendy. 2012. “Precluding Nonviolence, Propelling Violence: The Effect
of Internal Fragmentation on Movement Protest.” Studies in Comparative Inter-
national Development 47(1): 23–46.
Pearlman, Wendy. 2013. “Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Upris-
ings.” Perspectives on Politics 11(2): 387–409.
Pearlman, Wendy. 2015. “Puzzles, Time, and Ethnographic Sensibilities: Research
Methods after the Arab Spring.” Middle East Law and Governance 7(1): 132–140.
Pearlman, Wendy. 2016. “Narratives of Fear in Syria.” Perspectives on Politics 14(1):
21–37.
Pehrson, Samuel, and Stephen Reicher. 2014. ““On the Meaning, Validity and
Importance of the Distinction Between Personal and Social Identity: A Social
Identity Perspective on Identity Process Theory”.” In Identity Process Theory:
Identity, social action and social change, ed. Rusi Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell.
Cambridge University Press Cambridge pp. 97–117.
Petersen, Roger. 2012. ““Identity, Rationality, and Emotion in the Processes of
State Disintegration and Reconstruction”.” In Constructivist Theories of Ethnic
Politics, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Oxford University Press New York pp. 387–421.
Pichler, Florian. 2009. “‘Down-to-earth’cosmopolitanism: Subjective and objective
measurements of cosmopolitanism in survey research.” Current Sociology 57(5):
704–732.
Pierro, Antonio, Lavinia Cicero, and Bertram H Raven. 2008. “Motivated Com-
pliance with Bases of Social Power.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 38(7):
1921–1944.
Pretty, Grace H, Heather M Chipuer, and Paul Bramston. 2003. “Sense of Place
amongst Adolescents and Adults in Two Rural Australian Towns: The Discrimi-
nating Features of Place Attachment, Sense of Community and Place Dependence
in Relation to Place Identity.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 23(3): 273–
287.
Radovan, Mario. 2011. “Time is an Abstract Entity.” Time & Society 20(3): 304–324.
Reichardt, Sven. 2013. “Violence and Community: a Micro-Study on Nazi Storm
Troopers.” Central European History 46(2): 275–297.
147
Roccas, Sonia, and Marilynn B Brewer. 2002. “Social Identity Complexity.” Person-
ality and Social Psychology Review 6(2): 88–106.
Roe, Paul. 2008. “The ‘Value’of Positive Security.” Review of International Studies
34(4): 777–794.
Ross, Don. 2008. “Ontic structural realism and economics.” Philosophy of Science
75(5): 732–743.
Rossdale, Chris. 2015. “Enclosing Critique: The Limits of Ontological Security.”
International Political Sociology 9(4): 369–386.
Rumelili, Bahar. 2014a. “Introduction.” In Conflict Resolution and Ontological Se-
curity, ed. Bahar Rumelili. Routledge pp. 1–9.
Rumelili, Bahar. 2014b. “Ontological (In)Security and Peace Anxieties.” In Conflict
Resolution and Ontological Security, ed. Bahar Rumelili. Routledge pp. 10–26.
Rumelili, Bahar. 2018. “Breaking with Europe’s Pasts: Memory, Reconciliation,
and Ontological (In) Security.” European Security 27(3): 280–295.
Rumelili, Bahar, and Ayşe Betül Çelik. 2017. “Ontological Insecurity in Asymmetric
Conflicts: Reflections on Agonistic Peace in Turkey’s Kurdish Issue.” Security
Dialogue 48(4): 279–296.
Rumelili, Bahar, and Jennifer Todd. 2018. “Paradoxes of Identity Change: Integrat-
ing Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Identity in Conflict Processes.” Politics
38(1): 3–18.
Ryeng, Marianne S, Jane Kroger, and Monica Martinussen. 2013. “Identity Status
and Self-Esteem: A Meta-Analysis.” Identity 13(3): 201–213.
Sahdra, Baljinder, and Michael Ross. 2007. “Group Identification and Historical
Memory.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33(3): 384–395.
Sani, Fabio, Mhairi Bowe, and Marina Herrera. 2008. “Perceived Collective Con-
tinuity and Social Well-Being: Exploring the Connections.” European Journal of
Social Psychology 38(2): 365–374.
Sani, Fabio, Mhairi Bowe, Marina Herrera, Cristian Manna, Tiziana Cossa, Xiu-
lou Miao, and Yuefang Zhou. 2007. “Perceived Collective Continuity: Seeing
Groups as Entities that Move through Time.” European Journal of Social Psy-
chology 37(6): 1118–1134.
Santo, Jonathan Bruce, Josafa da Cunha, Lina María Saldarriaga, Holly E Recchia,
Alexa Martin-Storey, Luz Stella-Lopez, Gina Carmago, and William M Bukowski.
2013. “Measurement Invariance of Self-Continuity Strategies: Comparisons of
Early Adolescents from Brazil, Canada and Colombia.” European Journal of De-
velopmental Psychology 10(4): 518–525.
Saroglou, Vassilis, and François Mathijsen. 2007. “Religion, multiple identities,
and acculturation: A study of Muslim immigrants in Belgium.” Archive for the
Psychology of Religion 29(1): 177–198.
148
Savin-Baden, Maggi, and Lana Van Niekerk. 2007. “Narrative Inquiry: Theory and
Practice.” Journal of Geography in Higher Education 31(3): 459–472.
Sayyid, S. 1998. “Anti-essentialism and universalism.” Innovation: The European
Journal of Social Science Research 11(4): 377–389.
Schank, R.C, and R.P. Abelson. 1995. “Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story.”
In Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story, ed. R.S. Wyer. Hove, UK: Lawrence
Erlbuam Associates, Inc. pp. 1–85.
Schiller, Nina Glick, Tsypylma Darieva, and Sandra Gruner-Domic. 2011. “Defin-
ing cosmopolitan sociability in a transnational age. An introduction.” Ethnic and
Racial Studies 34(3): 399–418.
Schori-Eyal, Noa, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2014. “Three Layers of Col-
lective Victimhood: Effects of Multileveled Victimhood on Intergroup Conflicts in
the I sraeli–Arab Context.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 44(12): 778–794.
Schrauf, Robert W. 2000. “Narrative Repair of Threatened Identity.” Narrative
Inquiry 10(1): 127–145.
Schwartz, Seth J. 2004. “Brief Report: Construct Validity of Two Identity Status
Measures: The EIPQ and the EOM-EIS-II.” Journal of Adolescence 27(4): 477–
483.
Secrest, Janet S, and Richard Zeller. 2003. “Measuring Continuity and Discontinuity
Following Stroke.” Journal of Nursing Scholarship 35(3): 243–247.
Sewell Jr, William H. 1992. “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Trans-
formation.” American journal of sociology 98(1): 1–29.
Shahar, Eldad, Boaz Hameiri, Daniel Bar-Tal, and Amiram Raviv. 2018. “Self-
Censorship of Conflict-Related Information in the Context of Intractable Conflict.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(5): 957–982.
Shani, Giorgio. 2017. “Human Security as Ontological Security: A Post-Colonial
Approach.” Postcolonial Studies 20(3): 275–293.
Sheller, Mimi. 2017. “From Spatial Turn to Mobilities Turn.” Current Sociology
65(4): 623–639.
Skrbis, Zlatko, and Ian Woodward. 2007. “The ambivalence of ordinary cosmopoli-
tanism: Investigating the limits of cosmopolitan openness.” The sociological review
55(4): 730–747.
Skrbis, Zlatko, Gavin Kendall, and Ian Woodward. 2004. “Locating cosmopoli-
tanism: Between humanist ideal and grounded social category.” Theory, Culture
& Society 21(6): 115–136.
Skrbis, Zlatko, Ian Woodward, and Clive Bean. 2014. “Seeds of cosmopolitan future?
Young people and their aspirations for future mobility.” Journal of Youth Studies
17(5): 614–625.
149
Slone, Michelle, and Ilan Roziner. 2013. “Does Self-Complexity Moderate the Effects
of Exposure to Political Violence for Adolescents?” Anxiety, Stress & Coping
26(6): 659–673.
Slugoski, Ben R, James E Marcia, and Raymond F Koopman. 1984. “Cognitive and
Social Interactional Characteristics of Ego Identity Statuses in College Males.”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47(3): 646–661.
Smeekes, Anouk, and Maykel Verkuyten. 2013. “Collective Self-Continuity, Group
Identification and In-group Defense.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
49(6): 984–994.
Smith, Philip L, and Daniel R Little. 2018. “Small is Beautiful: In Defense of the
Small-N Design.” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 25(6): 2083–2101.
Southerton, Dale. 2013. “Habits, Routines and Temporalities of Consumption: From
Individual Behaviours to the Reproduction of Everyday Practices.” Time & Soci-
ety 22(3): 335–355.
Southwick, Natalie, and Oliver Kaplan. 2016. “Walls as a Nonviolent Strategy in
Armed Conflict.” Available at SSRN 2719062 .
Spini, Dario, and Daniela S Jopp. 2014. ““Old Age and Its Challenges to Identity”.”
In Identity Process Theory: Identity, Social Action and Social Change, ed. Rusi
Jaspal, and Glynis Breakwell. Cambridge University Press Cambridge pp. 295–
315.
Staniland, Paul. 2012. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide,
Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 56(1): 16–40.
Steele, Brent J. 2005. “Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British
Neutrality and the American Civil War.” Review of International Studies 31(3):
519–540.
Stets, Jan E, and Peter J Burke. 2000. “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory.”
Social Psychology Quarterly pp. 224–237.
Stillman, Peter G. 1974. “The Concept of Legitimacy.” Polity 7(1): 32–56.
Stones, Rob. 2001. “Refusing the Realism—Structuration Divide.” European journal
of social theory 4(2): 177–197.
Storper, Michael. 1985. “The Spatial and Temporal Constitution of Social Action:
a Critical Reading of Giddens.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space
3(4): 407–424.
Strömbom, Lisa. 2014. “Thick recognition: Advancing theory on identity change in
intractable conflicts.” European Journal of International Relations 20(1): 168–191.
Tappan, Mark B. 2000. “Autobiography, Mediated Action, and the Development of
Moral Identity.” Narrative Inquiry 10(1): 81–109.
150
Tetlock, Philip E, and Michael Oppenheimer. 2008. “The Boundaries of the Think-
able.” Daedalus 137(2): 59–70.
Tetlock, Philip E, Orie V Kristel, S Beth Elson, Melanie C Green, and Jennifer S
Lerner. 2000. “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-offs, Forbidden
Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 78(5): 853.
Themnér, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2014. “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2013.” Jour-
nal of Peace Research 51(4): 541–554.
Thompson, Holland. 1931. “The Civil War and Social and Economic Changes.” The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 153(1): 11–20.
Tilly, Charles. 2001. “Mechanisms in Political Processes.” Annual Review of Political
Science 4(1): 21–41.
Timotijevic, Lada, and Glynis M Breakwell. 2000. “Migration and Threat to Iden-
tity.” Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 10(5): 355–372.
Todd, Jennifer. 2018. “The Politics of Identity Change and Conflict: An Agenda
for Research.” Politics 38(1): 84–93.
Topal, Cagri. 2009. “The Construction of General Public Interest: Risk, Legitimacy,
and Power in a Public Hearing.” Organization Studies 30(2-3): 277–300.
Tuckett, Anthony G. 2005. “Applying Thematic Analysis Theory to Practice: A
Researcher’s Experience.” Contemporary Nurse 19(1-2): 75–87.
Van der Toorn, Jojanneke, Tom R Tyler, and John T Jost. 2011. “More Than
Fair: Outcome Dependence, System Justification, and the Perceived Legitimacy
of Authority Figures.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47(1): 127–138.
Van Zomeren, Martijn, and Aarti Iyer. 2009. “Introduction to the Social and Psycho-
logical Dynamics of Collective Action.” Journal of Social Issues 65(4): 645–660.
Vieira, Marco A. 2018. “(Re-) magining the ‘Self’of Ontological Security: The Case
of Brazil’s Ambivalent Postcolonial Subjectivity.” Millennium 46(2): 142–164.
Vieten, Ulrike M. 2006. “‘Out in the blue of Europe’: modernist cosmopolitan
identity and the deterritorialization of belonging.” Patterns of Prejudice 40(3):
259–279.
Vignoles, Vivian L, Xenia Chryssochoou, and Glynis M Breakwell. 2000. “The Dis-
tinctiveness Principle: Identity, Meaning, and the Bounds of Cultural Relativity.”
Personality and Social Psychology Review 4(4): 337–354.
Vignoles, Vivian L, Xenia Chryssochoou, and Glynis M Breakwell. 2002. “Evaluating
Models of Identity Motivation: Self-Esteem is not the Whole Story.” Self and
Identity 1(3): 201–218.
Wang, Carol Chunfeng, and Sara Kathleen Geale. 2015. “The Power of Story:
Narrative Inquiry as a Methodology in Nursing Research.” International Journal
of Nursing Sciences 2(2): 195–198.
151
Weatherford, M Stephen. 1992. “Measuring Political Legitimacy.” American Political
Science Review 86(1): 149–166.
Weidmann, Nils B, and Christoph Zürcher. 2013. “How Wartime Violence Affects
Social Cohesion: The Spatial–Temporal Gravity Model.” Civil Wars 15(1): 1–18.
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2006. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence.
Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander E. 1987. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Rela-
tions Theory.” International organization 41(3): 335–370.
Whitbourne, Susan Krauss, Joel R Sneed, and Karyn M Skultety. 2002. “Identity
Processes in Adulthood: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges.” Identity:
An International Journal of Theory and Research 2(1): 29–45.
Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils W Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kris-
tian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. “Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil
War.” World Politics 64(1): 79–115.
Zeira, Yael. 2019. “From the Schools to the Streets: Education and Anti-Regime
Resistance in the West Bank.” Comparative Political Studies 52(8): 1131–1168.
152
APPENDIX A
A.1 Complexity and Narrative
A.1.1 Complexity
Describing a phenomenon as complex implies that each element (or component,
part, variable) of this phenomenon impacts and interacts with the other elements
in a non-ignorable way. We cannot seclude a specific selected element (variable) of
a complex phenomenon, making it solely act or vary, keeping the other elements
(variables) constant, to check how it impacts the phenomenon as a whole. In a com-
plex phenomenon, there is no room for “ceteris paribus” (Jervis 1998; Little 1993).
A complex phenomenon should be understood as a whole system, or an organic
system; it exists as it is only because every element or ingredient interacts with each
other. This quality of complexity (i.e., no ceteris paribus) seriously challenges quan-
titative methodology, especially the standard regression models (Braumoeller 2003),
whereby we assume that only a variable varies while all others are set constant, to
check the significance of this sole varying variable.
Complex phenomena also assume that the outcome or dependent variable impacts
the associated independent variables via a feedback circuit(s). In standard regression
models, independent variables in any model must be “independent”; i.e., they are
not affected by the outcome or the dependent variable. However, this assumption
is not valid in complexity studies. An outcome impacts the independent variables
through a feedback process (Byrne 2005; Jervis 1998).
Environment, into which any phenomenon under study exits and functions, is critical
as well. There is no phenomenon that exists or functions in void. Environment
affects the phenomena acting within it inherently; hence, different environments
will affect the “same” phenomenon in different ways (Berger 2019; Jervis 1998).
So, the civil war phenomenon should be studied within its ambient environment
(political, social, economic ... environments) in order to reveal (or control for) the
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connections that link this phenomenon to its environment1 (Byrne 2005).
Complexity-related literature suggests that a researcher needs to analyze a complex
phenomenon at three levels: micro-level (Little 1993, 2015); macro-level (Elster
1982), and meso-level (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Jepperson and Meyer 2011).
This disaggregation of a complex phenomenon into three levels helps to loosen the
complex knot of the mechanisms that give rise to that phenomenon. At the micro-
level, researchers collect their data from individuals, focusing on their everyday lives
and their banal experiences; nuanced mechanisms are revealed at this level and what
is obscured behind the complexity becomes more transparent (e.g., Cederman and
Vogt 2017; Gerring 2010; Kalyvas 2012; Pearlman 2015; Tilly 2001).
On the other hand, the macro-level should not be ignored and must not be re-
duced to be a result of the micro-level’s mechanisms. Macro-level’s mechanisms
have their own, autonomous existence, and –to some extent– they are independent
from the micro-level’s mechanisms (Elster 1982). Ergo, we need to collect data at
the macro-level as well. In other words, we need to collect data on the contexts,
the environments, and the circumstances, in which the studied phenomenon takes
place.
Finally, meso-level data helps us to connect the macro- and micro-levels together,
providing a clear explanation of the phenomenon under study. Indeed, both the
micro- and macro-levels interact with each other, and this interaction should be
explored in order to have a better understanding of the complexity (Hedström and
Ylikoski 2010; Jepperson and Meyer 2011).
A.1.2 Narrative
Narrative is difficult to be defined because of its wide usage. However, someone can
propose a comprehensive definition of narrative, which is extracted from relative
literature. This definition should be “vast” to capture the most canonical and salient
qualities of narrative, which form the main data of this thesis.
A narrative is a story told by an individual (or even a group) to specific audiences
or potential listeners. It coalesces in a meaningful way the numerous deeds, activ-
ities, and inner feelings that the narrator has endorsed or even imagined; by this
1Environment is labelled later – similarly to the literature – as macro-level and context-effects.
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coalescing narration, some activities are selected due to their importance and others
are neglected. The logic behind selecting-neglecting life events is to imbue the nar-
rator’s life with meaning and with a suitable interpretation of what s/he has done.
Thus, narrative is not a chronicle. It does not merely tell what have happened in a
temporal order, but rather it reorders what have happened in a way showing mean-
ingfulness of the outer world and the inner Self. Any narrative, finally, is a story,
i.e., it must have a plot, around which the everyday, banal events evolve (Bar-Tal,
Oren, and Nets-Zehngut 2014; Brockmeier and Harre 2001; Bruner 1990; Feldman
2001a; Hänninen 2004; Nelson and Lindemann 2001; Nerlich and Jaspal 2012).
Narrative does not solely point to the individual- or the micro-level, but also it
alludes to the macro-level, reflecting information, events, and meanings from both.
Narrative is only formed or created in a zone that brings together a cultural domain,
a social domain, and personal experiences (Bruner 1990). Narrative, then, is only
possible to exist in the intersect of these three domains. While cultural and social
domains represent the collective or the macro-level, the personal experiences repre-
sent the micro-level. Cultural domain includes the repertoire of “infinite” possible
narratives and cultural elements that could be put into a narrative told by some-
one. No one can create his/her own “words” or elements of his/her own narrative;
everyone borrows his/her narrative’s constructing blocks (e.g., themes, descriptions,
words, and metaphors) from the cultural repertoire, in which the narrator lives.
Social domain refers to the interactions between the individual (the narrator) and
the others who belong to his/her in-group(s) and out-groups. Needless to say that
an individual accesses to the cultural repertoire via interactions with social enti-
ties; either these entities are formal institutions such as schools (Bar-Tal and Rosen
2009), informal gatherings, or other forms of public spheres (Bruner 1990). The
personal experience, eventually, fuses these cultural and social dimensions in an al-
most – but not always – coherent whole narrative (Bsumeister and Newman 1995;
Hermans 2000; Schank and Abelson 1995). Any narrative, then, represents: (1) the
outer world (Bsumeister and Newman 1995); (2) social and collective identities, to
which the narrator belongs or from which s/he distances him/herself (Bruner 2001;
Feldman 2001b); and (3) the deep (or even unseen) cultural norms (Nelson and Lin-
demann 2001). Hence, the macro-level is represented in narrative throughout these
elements.
On the other hand, an individual narrator does not only tell his/her personal stories
and express his/her own worldview (Feldman 2001a), but also s/he reshapes his/her
identity every time s/he narrates (Kraus 2006; Mankowski and Rappaport 1995).
Put differently, narrative is not only an object expressed in a personal storytelling,
but it actualizes the narrator’s personality every time it is storied. Hence, it is an
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“active” tool to reflect on the micro-level.
Finally, narrating is a process that continuously manages and balances the relation-
ship between the micro-level (including self-identity, self-experience, and the like)
and the macro-level (including cultural values, etc.) (Juen 2000; Tappan 2000).
Furthermore, to reassert, without this interaction between the micro- and macro-
levels, no narrative can be created (Harre 2001; Nelson and Lindemann 2001). It is
worthy to note that narrative does not combine the complex relationships in a so-
ciety (between the macro- and micro-levels), but it fuses them in an organic whole.
That is to say, narrative must not be understood as a merely reflection upon the
objective and subjective reality; rather, reality is reformed continuously by the nar-
rative (through (re)creating the meaning-system, at least). An ontological splitting
of narrative from the objective and subjective reality does not make sense according
to some narratolgists (Brockmeier and Harre 2001; Schrauf 2000). Ergo, narratives
– as data – are themselves parts of the reality more than being reflection upon that
reality; thus, analyzing this type of data gives us a deeper and a more “credible”
image of the reality that the research is interesting in. To clarify, when someone is
asked to express his/her opinion or observations about the reality, then s/he is asked
to make a reflection (to varying extents) on this reality. However, when someone
is asked to narrate or tell his/her story in relation to the reality, we almost get the
reality itself as a narrative, whatever that means.2
2To make the last paragraph clear, we can think of the reality under question as a hierarchy of levels or
orders. Order-0 is the lived, experienced reality, in which individuals act and function, and sometime they
are not aware of it and its details especially when it punctuated with routines. Order-1 is the reality as
the individuals think of and reflect upon it. Order-2 is the reality as the researcher reformulates it using
abstract concepts after extracting these concept (inductively) from order-1 or testing them (deductively)
in order-1. Narratives are – of course – placed in order-1, but closer to order-0 compared to answering
direct, analytical questions.
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APPENDIX B
B.1 The Interviews Questions
(1) Tell me your story, about your life, before the beginning of the war and when it
started, 2011?
(2) Focusing on the war breakout and the years later, how did you manage to
survive?
(What are the threats, harms that have impacted your life? Can you explain? You,
also, may explain the climate of threats generally even if you were not personally
harmed.)
(3) Why do you think the war happened?
(What is this war about? How others perceive the war?)
(4) In Salamiyah, before and during the war, and also now, who have the upper
hand in terms of power?
(Who seize control over people life; their resources; how can you describe the rela-
tionships between you and the power-holders?)
(5) Who is “rightful” now in terms of what is happening in Syria as a whole and in
Salamiyah?
(Do you trust the public institutions in Salamiyah, and the governmental institutions
in Syria? What are the rules that are followed to manage your relations with the
public institutions?)
(6) What is home for you right now, during the war, and before the war?
(7) How have your activities at the everyday base changed before and after the war’s
breakout?
(8) Can you explain to me your identity? Who are you? To which group(s) do you
belong? Again before and after the war if there were any change.
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(9) What are the values you believe in? how did they change before and after the
war?
(The most important things to you)
(10) What are your goals? Did they change before and after the world, how?
(11) The Other, who is the most distanced from you? it can be the most different
and the most abhorrent, who is it? Did it change after and before the war?
(12) What is your worldview? How do you understand or see this world? From
which perspectives? Did they change before and after the war?
(13) What is your ideal Self? What is your actual Self? How did it change during
the war?
(14) Are you happy economically and psychologically? How has your happiness or
self-satisfaction changed before and after the war’s eruption?
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APPENDIX C
C.1 The Consent Form
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Figure C.1 The Consent Form–The First Page
Sabanc  University 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Study Title: 
Principal Investigator Prof. Ayse Betul Celik  
Co-Investigator: Samer Sharani  
Interviewer: Samer Sharani
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Figure C.2 The Consent Form–The Second Page
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